

9. Prescriptivity of for others (What I *ought* to do?);
10. Therefore, I ought to do ϕ or not- ϕ .

Steps 1–4 represent the first or *intuitive* level; steps 5–8 represent the critical or metaethical level; and steps 9 and 10 represent the conclusion.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. R.M. Hare, *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (MT)*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1981. His remarks against naturalism are found in chap. 4 and 5. See esp. pp. 62–78.
2. Sen's epigram appears in his recent Dewey Lectures (1984) titled as 'Well-Being, Agency and Freedom', published in the *Journal of Philosophy* (1985), pp. 169–221; see especially p. 173 (fn. 14).
3. The most recent attempt to prove moral thinking as a three-level theory is found in Hare (*MT*); See fn. 1.
4. The change from prediction to one of 'explanation' is traceable to Hare's 'What Makes Choices Rational?' (WMCR) in *Review of Metaphysics* (p. 32, 1979), and is of comparable interest to Bas van Fraassen's attempt to construct a pragmatics of explanation in his *The Scientific Image*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980; See chap. 5, pp. 97–153.
5. Asking for reason, context, and explanation lies at the core of the method of explanation in Fraassen also; see fn. 3.
6. Hare takes informed choice as *only* necessary and not sufficient, for rational preference; see WMCR, p. 628.
7. E.g., see Harman's 'Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics' in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. iii, 1978, pp. 109–21.
8. Hare denies this in *MT*, p. 159.
9. Hare is indebted to Brandt's account of rationality; see p. 214 (*MT*).
10. See the opening remarks of Hare in WMCR, fn. 3.
11. Hare classifies emotivism as a non-descriptive theory, and probably a non-naturalistic but a subjectivistic moral theory, and, therefore, it is inferior to prescriptivism. The relation between emotivism and prescriptivism, in my opinion, needs further study.
12. Here and in what follows, I am indebted to the incisive criticisms made by H.M. Robinson in his 'Is Hare a Naturalist?' in *Philosophical Review*, 1982, pp. 73–86.
13. R.M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
14. See especially Sen's 'The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal' in *Journal of Political Economy*, lxxviii, 1970, pp. 152–57.
15. There is clear evidence that Hare talks about moral choice in this way only; see p. 223 (*MT*).
16. Hare's claim to give a modest account appears on p. 191 (*MT*).
17. This new account of fanatics is considerably extended to overcome previous problems. My own account of its relation to auto-fanatic is a modified account of his distinction which appears on p. 95 ff.

Thinking vs thought

STRATEGIES FOR CONCEPTUAL CREATIVITY*

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The activity of thinking seems not only distinctive of man, but also appears to lie at the very roots of all his other activities. Yet, the activity itself is seldom directly paid attention to, as what we normally know are only its results, that is, thought. And it is with thought that we are usually concerned, the thought of others as embodied in language—the language that we ourselves know. The understanding of what someone else has said and finding fault with it constitutes the largest part of what goes on under the title of intellectual activity in the world. Even a casual glance at the list of publications in, say, *Choice* or any other review journal will confirm this. So will the teaching-and-learning process in any educational institution, where the whole activity usually consists in somebody explaining to students what someone else has said and examining them for their capacity to reproduce what he had said.

In a sense, this is almost unavoidable, for what can be more palpable, concrete, visible, objective than the libraries and the museums in which thought and imagination has embodied itself. And that is also perhaps the reason why the secondary sources always take over and proliferate till they almost bury the primary sources or drive them into oblivion. The shock of a real encounter with the original is well known, but what is not so well known is the still greater shock which one feels when one meets the thinker himself. There is, on the one hand, the encounter with the person which, in a sense, puts all that he had said or written far behind and seems somehow strangely irrelevant to the situation. The *presence* of the person, in a sense, transcends all that he has written and, to a certain extent, even negates it. But that is not what we are interested in here. Rather, it is the person actually thinking before us and the relation of this to his finished thought that we had read earlier in his writings that I am interested in for the present. And the contrast here is almost as great as between the person and the thought that he thinks or the action that he does. Seeing the thought arising, so to say, before our very eyes is to see it in a different way than when one finds it finished, frozen, congealed between the covers of a book. The latter appearance is deceptive, but its deceptiveness is grasped more easily if one has the thinker thinking before oneself, even if it be only for a little while. After one has experienced it, everything becomes fluid once again—tentative, hesitant, provisional—subject to revision and counter-revision.

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The truth of what we have pointed out seems so obvious and trivial that one wonders if it even needs to be said. Yet, the perennial disputes regarding what texts really mean is a reminder that the point that we have made, though obvious, is forgotten or ignored most of the time. How much misguided intellectual effort humanity would have been saved if nobody had worried about what the Bible or the Koran or the Vedas really meant. And, as everybody knows, the problem is not confined to the so-called revelatory texts alone or to those misguided ancients who believed in their authority. The so-called moderns are not immune from the disease. The amount of effort that has been wasted on finding what Marx or Freud or Wittgenstein or Hegel really meant is truly astonishing. These names are only illustrative and one may add others, according to one's liking, to the list.

This strange phenomenon of hundreds of able minds engaging themselves in disputing about what someone else has said may be seen as a hangover from those times when the authority of the revealed text was so great and the dangers of unorthodoxy so real that the only way that one could safely say what one wanted to say was to present it as the real meaning of the text whose authority everyone accepted. But the hangover hypothesis can hardly explain the continuance of the phenomenon and its proliferation even in times when the dangers of unorthodoxy have become only marginal in character. Perhaps the *guru-śiṣya* symbiosis or the master-disciple syndrome, along with the *saṃpradāya* mentality arising out of the inevitable schisms regarding who understood the master best, may explain the phenomenon better. Deeper than these, however, is perhaps the lack of confidence in one's own capacity to think originally, and thus to find crutches in the thought of others who are already acknowledged and established in the field. The cult of masters, past and present, helps to perpetuate this feeling, and the burden of the past and present greats stifles the young and the not-so-young into repeating what others have said and making their own thought respectable by buttressing it from quotes from others, forgetting that one could have easily found quotations for the counter-position also.

A more charitable view of this enormous wastage of intellectual effort is that it seeks to establish a relationship with the past and is not so much a sign of a lack of self-confidence in the power of one's own thinking as the acknowledgement that one thinks on the basis of what others have thought, that thinking is not a monadic activity but rather the achievement of a community of thinkers. But a community can only be of equals where none is afraid of saying what he thinks to be correct or significant or fruitful and, what is perhaps even more important, where none feels that no one else can say anything worthwhile or significant in the matter. The arrogance of knowledge is as much an arrogance as the arrogance of power, and both lead to essential asymmetries which, however real, militate against innovation and creativity. A questioning attitude may prick the pretensions of both, as neither is as certain or secure as it usually proclaims itself to be.

Knowledge, it should be remembered, is usually a knowledge of what someone else has said or a repetition of what is habitually accepted as true by practitioners in a certain domain. The first is just information which may be useful in certain contexts. As for the second, a closer look at the field will always reveal dissidents who are anathema to the establishment. Thus, the distinction between those who know and those who do not is not only relative but also misleading if it is construed as a relationship of authority in which the latter have necessarily to accept what the former say, as they are a disadvantaged group in the situation. This illusion of authority is generated by the relation of dependence on adults which the child has in respect of many things, and is later strengthened by the schooling system where the teacher is supposed to know and the student to learn. However, when a question is raised either by the child or the student, the situation is generally reversed, revealing the ignorance of both the adults and the teachers. One is often surprised at the questions that children ask, but few reflect on the fact that this capacity is soon lost as children grow older. As for students, most teachers do not like questions to be asked in the class or they prefer that only certain types of questions be asked.

To ask a new question is to disrupt the closed circle of accepted knowledge and to open a new vista for thought. Asking a new question is, in a sense, an invitation to look at things anew. But, normally, only certain questions are allowed or accepted within the existing frameworks, and those that depart from them are usually treated as eccentric or irrelevant. But once one sees that a new question is an opening to a new possibility for thought, one will not dismiss it so easily or brush it aside as of no consequence whatsoever. True, one cannot accept all questions as equally relevant or promising, but, from the perspective we are trying to open, one will hesitate to pass such a judgement in an off-hand fashion, and, at a deeper level, see it as one's own limitation rather than that of the questioner. At another level, perhaps, what one has to learn to cultivate is a sensitivity to questions and the ability to think and feel into what lies behind the question.

But if it is the asking of questions that is crucial for thinking, then what we have to ask with regard to any text is not what it says but the questions it asks or rather the hidden questions which lie behind what is said. The whole exercise of understanding will take on a new turn; for now it will be the questions and the problems that shall occupy the centre of attention, and what is said will be seen as a more or less satisfactory attempt at an answer or solution to them. The questions and the problems, however, are seldom there in the open, and many a time it is not clear which questions are being answered or which problems are being solved. Yet, once the attention shifts to the underlying questions and problems, one begins to take part in the thinking process itself, and the answers and the solutions begin to assume a far more tentative character than they generally do when only what is ostensibly said is taken into account. Also, alternative answers and solutions may begin to

take shape, or at least their possibility begin to affect one's cognitive awareness.

What is, however, an even more important consequence of this shift of attention is the overcoming of that theological hangover which has infected so much of cognitive enterprise in all parts of the globe. The exegetical disease, which results not only in trying to discover the real meaning of the text but also in claiming that the master said what one oneself considers to be true, can only be cured if one's basic attitude to the text itself changes. The text, in the changed perspective, is seen as providing an occasion for a dialogue with a person with whom one cannot enter into a personal dialogue for some reason. And the purpose of this dialogue is to help one in the process of one's own thinking, a process that—as we shall see later on—is not a solitary, individual monadic exercise but rather the joint undertaking of a community of visible and invisible persons which ultimately includes, perhaps, the whole of mankind. But to see it in this way is to see it as an unfinished process, unfinishable in principle. For, as long as there are human beings, thinking shall go on; and its stoppage at their cessation will only be like the one that occurs when one gets tired or goes to sleep or dies, that is, accidental in character. Yet, to see it that way is to see that, though the text has seemingly a beginning and an end, this is illusory. And to see it as illusory is to realize that the so-called ending is only a provisional ending, and that the end is really a challenge to us, the readers, to continue or carry the thought further. The 'continuance' or 'carrying' need not be in the same direction, and may even oppose it or move in a direction which is essentially tangential to it.

It may, perhaps, be thought that texts which are explicitly in the form of a dialogue such as the *Dialogues* of Plato or certain parts of the Upanishads will not require any such strategy as they ostensibly are doing what we want them to do. Unfortunately, the camouflage in such texts is even deeper, for, though they present an air of open-ended discussion, the questions asked and the replies given are always subtly structured in such a way as to lead to the predetermined conclusion which the author wants to reach. Some of the dialogues of Plato seem to be an exception as, at the end, Socrates confesses his inability to provide an answer to the questions he had asked. Yet, how many times in the course of a Platonic dialogue, one feels like disagreeing with the interlocutor's readiness to agree with what Socrates has said. As for the Upanishads, they do not even attempt to provide the atmosphere of a real dialogue, for it is a dialogue between those who have known and realized the truth and others who have not. Not only this, there is at times even the threat of punishment with death if one dares to disagree. The *Dialogues* of the Buddha do not have this covert or overt threat of punishment in them, but as far as authority is concerned they breathe the same spirit.

Yet, in spite of these obvious limitations, the dialogues may provide an interesting take-off point for exploring those possibilities of thought which have been so brusquely or casually rejected in the text. In a sense, the Indian

philosophical texts provide a far greater opportunity for such an exercise than most philosophical texts written in the western tradition as they provide in the very format of their presentation the possible argument or arguments against their position and their reply to them. The counter-positions are, therefore, there in open and the reader is continuously aware of them. He does not have to hunt for them, or try to find them by delving under the surface of the text as is the case with most of the philosophical texts written in the West or in the Western tradition. The suppressed text, so to say, is more exposed in the Indian tradition of writing, specially of the philosophical sort than in most other traditions.

The idea of a 'suppressed text' makes us look at the texts in a different way than is usually done by most readers who are still under the sway of what we have called the theological hangover without being aware of it. No text is, or can be, all of a piece as is usually presupposed. Rather, it is a compromise formation between different pulls, all of which are basically intellectual in nature. The Freudian parallel, though tempting, is fundamentally incorrect as it assumes that the only reason for suppression or rejection can be emotional or moral in character. It is forgotten that there can be purely intellectual or aesthetic reasons for such a situation. It is, of course, true that the Freudian perspective is one of neurosis, but that need not be the only context in which we may think of suppression or rejection. The suppression or rejection in the intellectual context results from the judgement of the relative weightage of the evidence and the argument that an individual entertains, and this, obviously, can differ from person to person. The other factor responsible for this emanates from the over-all judgement of a person regarding the total cognitive world-view which he considers preferable to others. As these other views are many and diverse in character, the so-called 'suppressed texts' of a text are also multiple in nature. Also, as there is always some argument and evidence for them, they are not a nullity, and hence cannot be completely rejected with the assured certainty of truth. Rather, it is a wager that one puts on one's judgement against that of all the others; but one is aware or at least half-aware that they have a possible plausibility which, yet in one's judgement, is less than that which one has chosen. However, the claim is usually an overclaim, for, in that way, one assures both oneself and others of the truth of what one is saying.

The text, in other words, is to be seen as the thought product of someone's thinking and thus having all those characteristics which any product of one's own thinking usually has—tentativeness, incompleteness, provisionality, lack of finality, etc. But this would destroy the illusion created by the appearance of the beginning and the end within a finite number of pages securely bound within the confines of a book. That there is no real end to the thinking process is known to everybody, for one returns again and again to the themes one had written about till death intervenes and puts an arbitrary end to the process. Even earlier, one may lose interest, get tired or incapacitated or find

one has nothing new to say. But these are as accidental or arbitrary as death, with the only difference that one may possibly recover from them. The interest may revive, the vision return, the incapacity be overcome and the creativity flow again. As for the beginning, one knows that there must have been one, but exactly when, one hardly can tell.

But, once the illusion of the beginning and the end are realized, the revelatory attitude to texts will cease also. One can easily see the absurdity of this attitude in the context of the so-called revealed texts of other religions but seldom in that of one's own. And those, who have seen through the revelatory pretensions of all religions, are seldom able to see through their almost universal prevalence in secular contexts also. The tribes of Marxians, Freudians, Fregeans, Wittgensteinians, Husserlians, Chomskians is legion, and one may easily extend the list if one is inclined to do so. The disciples proudly proclaim the final findings of the master, little realizing that each of them has been rejected as untenable by followers of the other group. Hard-core empirical sciences, such as physics, are not immune to the infection as any reader of Popper's *Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics** would quickly realize. Basically, it is not the subject matter which determines whether the revelatory attitude shall prevail or not, even though certain subject matters may be more prone to it. Rather, the attitude derives from the belief that certain persons are nearer the truth than others, and that, as truth is presumably a unique and coherent whole, such persons are nearer to it in its totality. Both the beliefs, however natural, are mistaken. The first is a generalization or rather a wrong translation of the fact that certain people in certain fields seem to know more than others. The second derives from the seemingly harmless tendency to use the term 'truth' in the singular and to conceive of knowledge as a journey towards a fixed destination. To give up these ways of looking at knowledge and truth would not only help in overcoming the revelatory attitude and the theological hangover about which we have talked earlier but also, in its own turn, release the spiritual quest from its imprisonment in these attitudes in all the religions of the past.

The roots of creativity in all fields, including that of thinking, are unknown and perhaps unknowable in principle, at least in the usual sense in which 'knowing' is generally used. Yet, one of the preconditions for creativity to manifest itself is the giving up of the mistaken belief that it is confined only to certain persons or periods or countries or civilizations, and that the rest are only doomed to repeat or approximate what has been achieved by them. The belief that every human being is capable of entertaining a new thought, of asking a new question, of seeing a new problem is almost an a priori condition for fostering creativity and letting it emerge in the life of the mind. This means that people have to be encouraged to ask questions, to see problems and to attempt solutions, and that what they attempt in this regard is treated

*Karl R. Popper, *Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics*, ed. W.W. Bartley, III, London; Hutchinson, 1982.

with genuine respect. Many a time, the person who asks the question, sees the problem and attempts a solution does not know the significance of what he has asked or seen or attempted. It is, or should be, the function of those who can see a little farther ahead, to see the potential directions for thought which are implicit in them. But such a situation can only emerge when people who pose questions, formulate problems and attempt solutions are not afraid of making themselves appear foolish or ridiculous or ignorant. This, however, depends on an atmosphere which is just the opposite of what normally obtains in most institutions devoted to the fostering and development of intellectual life today. There is usually a greater emphasis on the development of the critical ability rather than the creative one, even in the best of them. The first habitual response, therefore, in most people to what has been said is to find faults in it. The centre of intellectual life, thus, lies in the development of the critical faculty in the hope that the exposure of the weaknesses and faults in the contention would lead the person concerned either to give it up or modify it in the light of criticisms made. But the critical response does not merely make the atmosphere full of antagonism and hostility, thus discouraging the relatively weaker members of the group from expressing their views freely; but also makes the proponents stick to their views more rigidly as they tend to identify themselves with them more strongly because of the criticisms made. Also, in such a situation, the questions themselves tend to get determined and restricted by the framework, ultimately leading to what may be called the establishment of different *sampradāyas* or schools, each with a position of its own consolidated over a long period of time in debate with other schools which also have, in turn, consolidated their own positions. The ultimate end becomes the development of defensive strategies which may save the position from any challenge whatsoever.

The fate of these impregnable fortresses of thought, built in theological and non-theological contexts, is well known to all those who are acquainted with the history of ideas in the major civilizations of the world. The security they might have provided to their adherents has been bought at the cost of closing the horizons to thought. Even the adventure of the battle against the opponents has long ceased, as all the questions have been answered and objections met.

The atmosphere for creative thinking to emerge is, thus, radically different from the one that has been traditionally associated with the intellectual seeking of man until now. It is a half-serious, half-playful attempt to explore collectively the various possibilities that spontaneously arise when people gather together to think about something that appears problematic to anyone belonging to that group at that moment. The attempt is to welcome each idea that spontaneously suggests itself to anyone present, and to see in it the possible opportunity for a new direction of thought. But the idea need not be pursued to the bitter end, even when some other interesting idea has suggested itself to someone else. The purpose, ultimately, is not so much to find a defin-

itive answer or solution to the question raised or the problem posed, but rather to see how many directions thinking can take when confronted with a question or a problem. In fact, one's attention need not be confined to the question asked or the problem raised as, in the course of thinking, new questions or problems may emerge which might seem, at least for the moment, even more interesting or more promising.

The enterprise of thinking is usually supposed to be a solitary exercise. Similar is the feeling about creativity. But this is a mistake. When people gather together, something new emerges. This has been known to all religious traditions as well as to those who have known how to manipulate people. But this age-old insight has seldom been used in the context of cognitive thought. The usual seminars, symposia and conferences, whose quantitative explosion in recent times is tending to destroy thinking at its very roots, are perhaps the farthest away from situations in which people gather together to invoke the spirit of creativity which lies in what has been called the *realm of the between*. The invocation of the spirit of creative logos requires, on the part of its seekers, strategies which, though similar in certain respects to those practised in religious and artistic domains, have a radical difference and individuality of their own. The collective adventure in exploring new directions which thinking may take presupposes attitudes amongst its participants which imply an essential openness to thought and ideas and the courage to follow them wherever they may lead. What the *other* says, therefore, is always an opportunity for one's own thought—not in the sense of controverting what he has said or in seeing in it what one always says, but rather in finding in it the possibility of a new direction for thinking which is not only different from what one has usually thought regarding that issue until that time but also beyond what the other person actually meant when he said what he said. What is required, in other words, is conceptual imagination, the ability to think beyond what has been thought.

Imagination, normally, is supposed to be the preserve of the arts. But the capacity to go beyond what is given lies at the root of all innovation and creativity. 'What is not' is, therefore, more important than 'what is' or 'has been'. The latter only conditions or plays a restricting role, but it is neither clear nor certain in what way. The transformation of a limitation into an opportunity is the eternal wonder of the creative genius. But, in the context of concepts, limitations arise from the settled habits of the past which constrain thinking to move in certain grooves only. To break the habit one has to make a conscious effort to think against the grain, and one may develop as many strategies to achieve this as one can think of. The central point in all strategies, however, is a subdued sceptical attitude to the sufficiency of what is given and an openness to everything that suggests the possibility of the development of a new conceptual alternative or even of a new way of looking at old concepts which have ceased to excite curiosity or wonder or even interest by long familiarity and mechanical use. The writers, specially the

poets, have known this for long, but that has been in the context of images, symbols and metaphors. The thinkers do not seem, at least consciously, aware of this in respect of concepts, even though they are the concept wielders *par excellence*. Concepts, unlike images, are not supposed to grow stale and lose their vibrancy and vitality to make thinking alive. But this just is not the case, and one of the tasks of thinking is to infuse new life into old concepts and see in them potentialities not realized before.

One of the simplest strategies, perhaps, is to realize that, though one is aware of concepts in certain contexts alone, there are other contexts and settings in which they occur or may occur also. As most people are usually confined to their own disciplines, they are not aware of the way same or similar or even analogous concepts are used in other disciplines. Reading a work in a different discipline is like entering a new terrain of knowledge, which arouses not only curiosity about the unfamiliar and excitement about something new along with the challenge to understand it, but also an incipient comparative judgement about the way the knowledge-enterprise is conceptually structured in the two different disciplines. In case the disciplines concern fields too far apart, there is, of course, little likelihood of anything meaningful emerging from this incipient act of comparison; but where the fields happen to be closely related there is every possibility of returning with a new feel and fresh look regarding the concepts one is habitually used to.

But, normally within a cognitive culture even different disciplines share a certain way of looking at things or certain ways of asking questions or seeing certain issues as problematic. It is, therefore, only when one undertakes a conceptual journey to another cognitive culture that one really encounters a different world—a world which, because of its different conceptual framework, appears to be no cognitive world at all. It can only be seen as something bizarre, something superstitious, something that one need not waste one's time upon. In the arts, one has already learnt or is slowly learning the perverse parochiality of such an attitude. In religion, one is groping towards an awareness where one may accept, even provisionally, the meaningfulness of others' religion, at least for them if not for oneself. But, as far as cognitive enterprise is concerned, the very idea that there may be different cognitive traditions seems perverse to most of its practitioners today. And this, in spite of current fashions in model-building, on the one hand, and what goes under the name of sociology of knowledge, on the other.

In a certain sense, the claim to knowledge is a claim to truth, and one naturally wonders how truth can be multiple in character. But this is to conceive of truth not only in a crudely 'correspondence' way but also to think of reality as something to which temporality is essentially adventitious in character. Not only this; it also denies in a very fundamental sense the possibility of creativity in the field of knowledge. The ideal of knowledge is supposed to be a perfect mirror, but how can a mirror ever innovate except at the cost of distorting reality? But reality must include the knowing mind as much as

what is attempted to be known, and temporality is as much a character of the one as of the other. The cognitive structures through which the knowledge enterprise is conducted are not, as Kant thought, completely given and static in character. Rather, they are themselves the creations of thinking and one seldom feels very much bound by them. Kant himself was forced to make a distinction between 'thinking' and 'knowing' at one stage of his thought as the 'thing-in-itself' could only be an object of 'thinking' and not of 'knowing' in his system. As for the 'categories of the understanding', it is never quite clear in what sense they may be regarded as objects of 'thinking' or of 'knowing'. In fact, the whole enterprise of transcendental investigation in which Kant was engaged confirms the freedom of the 'thinking self' as much as the 'moral action' does that of the 'moral agent'. But even if it be granted that categories, whether those enumerated by Kant or some others, constitute the very structure of the thinking process when it embodies itself in thought, they still function at a level of such generality that they do not affect the real diversity of cognitive structures across cultures and civilizations.

However it may be, the fact of what we have called 'cognitive journeys across conceptual frontiers' cannot be denied, nor that they can be intellectually as invigorating and rewarding as such journeys usually are. There are, of course, the hazards which all travel generally involves, but then there always are risks which the leaving of safe, habitual, beaten tracks involves. A realization of the limited parochiality of what one had taken to be universal and self-evident is the first consequence of such an encounter. The second is an openness to the possibility of alternatives which one had not even thought of before. The two are, in fact, two sides of the same coin, though the second is more positive than the first.

'Cognitive journeys' apart, one of the simplest strategies for conceptual innovation is to recognize that concepts are not monadic or atomistic in character. They are always related to other concepts, and to change the relationships is to change the conceptual structure itself. If one analyses the conceptual structure underlying some text, one would discover not only the roster of concepts which the author has used but also the way he has organized them. A different organization will result in a different conceptual structure, a different way of looking at things. Hence, one of the simplest strategies for achieving conceptual innovation is to ask oneself in what ways one can possibly change the relationships between the concepts in a significant way, so as to achieve a new way of looking at the phenomenon concerned. In any mapping of concepts, it will be obvious that they fall into clusters in which some seem obviously more closely related than others. Amongst the clusters, some concepts will have a dominating position such that other concepts in the cluster will get their meaning and significance determined by their relationship to the dominant central concept in the cluster. Some concepts may be common to more than one cluster, and, thus, may play a connecting role between clusters. The relationship between clusters may not be obvious

at first sight. It may require conceptual insight to apprehend it. On the other hand, the clusters themselves may not be very clear-cut. If such a situation obtains, the possibility of there being alternative conceptual clusters embedded in the conceptual situation need not be ruled out. In fact, the whole purpose of conceptual mapping in the perspective that we are talking about is to explore the multiple conceptual structures which lie as hidden possibilities amongst the concepts employed in any text. The same considerations apply to what may be called 'differential weightage' which an author gives to the concepts he uses. The number, distribution and frequency of the occurrence of a concept give some idea of its relative weightage in relation to others. However, one has to be careful in using these indicators, and, in any case, they should never be used mechanically.

Ultimately, the devising of strategies for conceptual creativity is itself an exercise in creativity. And, hence, they can neither be fixed in number nor be used in such a way as to ensure the result deterministically. The exercise of the strategy is as much a creative act as its discovery, for, ultimately, it's an invocation of the same mystery and power that lies at the root of the universe and ourselves.

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