The Philosophy of
DAYA KRISHNA
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DAYA KRISHNA

Edited by
BHUVAN CHANDEL
K.L. SHARMA

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL
RESEARCH • NEW DELHI
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## Preface

Rooted in the tradition of Indian thinking and trained in western philosophy, Professor Daya Krishna developed over years a model of philosophizing of his own. The depth of his ideas is incredible and the range of his works really amazing. But the most important thing about him is that his mind is unfailingly creative and interrogative. In the Indian style we often hear of starting philosophy with the interrogation, *jiñāsā*. The spirit underlying *jiñāsā* is the sense of discontent with what is available at a time in a tradition of philosophizing.

Daya Krishna’s philosophy is not a mere corpus of concepts and theories. It is rather an outcome of a philosopher’s encounter with his own tradition. Fortunately, in the case of Daya Krishna, consistently with his range of erudition, this encounter is not primarily exegetical. Familiar with the basic texts, he always tries to show what is relevant today and what is not, and in the light of what seems relevant he formulates questions and extracts new concepts and supporting arguments.

Daya’s approach is consciously critical. He refuses to accept any authority either of an author or of a tradition however venerable they might be. The idea is to elicit the best out of the author or the tradition. The form of elicitation is dialogical. Another fallout of this dialogical enterprise is to give rise to new ideas and new seminal questions. The proliferation and complexification of this exercise makes philosophy interesting and shows its close relation with other disciplines.

To the discerning reader of Daya’s works the critical spirit of Kant is unmistakable. As Kant was fond of presenting his philosophy as a sort of interrogation of nature, Daya would have liked to describe his philosophy as a sustained interrogation of culture, especially philosophical culture from an interdisciplinary point of view. This reminds one of the Kant-minded Collingwood’s well-known method of question and answer.
A philosophical encounter with a thinker is fated to take the form of questioning. To state who said what, where and when is both uninteresting and jejune. The tendency of some analytic thinkers to catalogue other’s views and arguments has not interested Daya Krishna, certainly not in his later phase. His interest lies elsewhere; to find out why a thinker expresses himself/herself in one particular way rather than another. He situates a thinker in his cultural background and then tries to understand and interpret him. The Western culture and thinkers draw his pointed attention.

This approach has a positive outcome. It leads to a type of cultural and intellectual pluralism. It is no surprise that Daya Krishna is a consistent and vigorous pluralist. His method of critical dialogue is not intended to demolish or even distort other’s point of view. In this conceptual articulation one is pleased to find that self and others are engaged in a continuous dialogue providing best possible freedom to both. This form of philosophizing is born of Daya’s deep commitment to freedom as value.

The two main dimensions of freedom, as we all know, are attān-centric and societal or socio-centric. Strictly speaking, within the inter-societal dialogue one can easily find out inter-individual as well as individual-societal dialogues and dialectics of various kinds. Daya Krishna does not fail to highlight the cyberneticity of the two poles of human consciousness, attān and samājā. One can hardly be reduced to the other. One type of reductionism leads us to ‘social’ atomism and another kind into collectivism or totalitarianism. Without social presuppositions individual actions and dispositions turn out to be meaningless. Dehumanized social structure is a theoretical extrapolation of the denial of individual human minds.

One may safely describe Daya Krishna as a philosopher of depth and diversity. In the depth dimension he traces and discovers the different layers of individual life and social reality. In the area of diversity he is a tireless pluralist, praxiologically and ideologically, and studies the borderlines of different disciplines. Unlike the modern Western philosopher he is not fascinated by a narrow segment of life or reality and its idioms. His love for depth dimension is evident from the rejection of the idea of logic with-out ontology. That thought cannot be separated from its content and further that content makes difference to ways and validity of thought are emphasized by him time and again. Both to depth and diverse domains of life we all are irretrievably and practically committed. This aspect of Daya’s philosophy makes him anti-reductionist.

He refuses to impose one value or one set of values on all alike. To him values are not immutable Platonic entities. The basic locus of values is the individual human being. But individuals qua individuals, i.e. unrelated to other individuals, cannot be the sole authors of values. Creativity makes hardly any sense without transcendental moorings or social affiliations. It is no surprise to note that Daya traces two perennial sources of values, immanent or ‘internal’ and transcendental or ‘external’.

The domains of the immanent and the transcendent are interfused. So are the values, whether primarily rooted in individual human beings or those that are durably anchored in society.

Another innovative aspect of Daya’s philosophy is to highlight the role of imagination and belief in shaping our Weltanschauung. Not only the society and tradition we are born in mould our outlook, our expectations and ideology also play a significant role in creating the world we live in. This creative duality of the self and the other is an active engagement of the spiritual and the social resulting in their mutual enrichment. What is more interesting in Daya Krishna’s philosophy to note is this. One’s worldview does not consist only of one’s own self and the other; the transcendental elements and forces simultaneously inform both the self-in solitude and the self-in relation.

In the later writings of Daya Krishna another element of his worldview becomes increasingly manifest. This pertains mainly to value. Our search and re-search for values make little or no sense unless the transcendental dimension of the world is clearly recognized. That one’s creativity is not confined to the causal nexus we are situated in, but that it also gives an inkling of the extra-causal transcendental aspect of our life are persuasively argued by Daya Krishna.

The fact that by reflection and contemplation we can bring into being the values hitherto unavailable is rooted in this tran-
scendental and inexhaustible dimension of life. Life and world are intertwined. We bring values into world through different forms and activities of life. It is in this connection that one may look into the insightful references made by Daya Krishna to biology in some of his writings. In his thought biology, sociology, axiology and cosmology form a graded chain of being. It is indeed an amazing spectrum. One only regrets that Daya Krishna—one of the most gifted philosophers of modern India—has not spelt out this comprehensive and attractive aspect of his philosophy.

We are thankful to all the contributors who have discussed Professor Daya Krishna’s views on a diversity of philosophical subjects as the relation between logic and ontology, the issue of transcendent and empirical freedom, the concept of action and the art of philosophizing and creativity in philosophy. The detailed reply by Professor Daya Krishna to each of the articles presented here makes the volume doubly interesting as it is perhaps for the first time that there has been such a give-and-take on such diverse philosophical issues in one volume.

We are also grateful to Shri Buddhadev Bhattacharya for his professional help in the publication of this volume.

BHUVAN CHANDEL
K.L. SHARMA

1

Appearance, Reality, Nothing, and The Law of Contradiction

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA

The concepts of Appearance and Reality are important in all spheres of human activity, not merely in philosophy. It is, therefore, natural that these concepts should receive attention from all types of philosophers.

One way to understand the two concepts is to find some sort of similarity between appearance and pretension, and reality and actuality. This way of understanding the concepts makes it clear that the concept of appearance is parasitic on the concept of reality, just as pretension is parasitic on normal behaviour, and lying is parasitic on truth. Appearance must be understood as appearance of the real, so much so that appearance cannot be understood except as a shadow, imitation, copy, of reality.

A second way of understanding the two concepts is to identify appearance with the subjective and reality with the objective. But as the objective has to be understood as being independent of the subject or of the subjective, the subjective becomes the basic notion. Thus, appearance is a more fundamental concept than reality.

A third way of understanding the concepts is to identify the real with the actual and appearance with the merely possible. An appearance cannot be an impossibility even though it cannot also be an actuality. There are two ways of conceiving the relation between the actual and the possible. One, it may be held that the actual world is itself one with the possible world (the composable
world, perhaps), so that the concept of possibility becomes the basic concept. Two, the possible may be regarded only as possibly real, so that reality or actuality becomes the basic concept. This ontological priority of the actual or the real also has a logical or an epistemological consequence. There are logicians, like Johnson, who have defined a proposition as assertible although a proposition may be entertained, questioned, doubted, without being asserted. It is argued that when, for example, we doubt a proposition, an element of assertion enters into it in one way or the other.

There is also an extreme theory according to which reality alone is consistent, and appearances involve inconsistencies and hence are impossible. Against this extreme theory it may be noted that although all appearances may be impossible, yet all impossibilities are not appearances. Impossibility can only be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of appearance. It is, therefore, necessary to find sufficient conditions of appearance. An impossibility is often identified with a self-contradiction. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the nature of a self-contradiction, and of the law of contradiction. We may examine the following formulations of the law.

(i) \( A \) cannot be not-\( A \).
(ii) \( A \) cannot be both \( B \) and not-\( B \).
(iii) \( A \) cannot be both \( B \) and not-\( B \) at the same time.
(iv) \( A \) cannot be both \( B \) and not-\( B \) at the same time in the same respect.

We shall now discuss these different formulations.

(i) Łukasiewicz does not consider this to be a formulation of the law of contradiction, but of the law of double negation. Still we may examine this formulation more closely. The verb ‘be’ occurring in it can only be regarded as an abbreviation of ‘be identical with’, so that (i) can only mean (i*): \( A \) cannot be identical with not-\( A \).

(ii) The verb ‘be’ as occurring in the second formulation cannot be construed as ‘be identical with’ without further ado, for then it is necessary to introduce the convention that different letters need not stand for different objects. But even with this convention, ‘be’ cannot be regarded as an abbreviation of ‘be identical with’, for then using the same symbol ‘\( A \)’ for ‘\( B \)’, (ii) becomes (ii*): \( A \) cannot be identical with both \( A \) and not-\( A \). This is either nonsense, or reduces to (i). Thus ‘be’ in (ii) can only mean ‘be characterized by’, so that it becomes (ii*): \( A \) cannot be characterized by both \( B \) and not-\( B \).

Łukasiewicz, however, does not consider this to be a formulation of the law of contradiction. According to him, it is essential for the law of contradiction to contain an expression for the operation of logical product. For this, he believes that ‘at the same time’ has to be added in the formulation of the law of contradiction. Hence (iii) is the proper formulation of the law of contradiction according to him. As we shall see, the Buddhists reject this version and accept (ii) as the proper formulation of the law.

(iv) Nagel has argued that as sameness of respect cannot be given independently and as whenever a putative counter example is given, the law is so interpreted as to make it valid, this version of the law is useless.

ARISTOTLE’S ARGUMENT

Łukasiewicz has presented Aristotle’s position on the law of contradiction in the following way.

1. Aristotle formulates the principle of contradiction in a three-fold way, as an ontological, logical and psychological law without making explicit in any way the differences among them.

(a) Ontological formulation: Met. T 9. 10056 19, 20: ‘It is impossible that the same thing belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.’

(b) Logical formulation: Met. T 6. 1011b, 13, 14: ‘The most certain of all basic principles is that contradictory propositions (Aussagen) are not true simultaneously.’
(c) Psychological formulation: Met. T 3. 1005b, 3, 24: ‘No one can believe that the same thing can (at the same time) be and not be.’

2. One could attempt to express these principles more precisely in the following way:

(a) Ontological, respectively ‘object-theoretical’ [Gegenstands-theoretische] formulation: To no object can the same characteristic belong and not belong at the same time. By ‘object’, I understand with Meinong everything that is ‘something’ and not ‘nothing’; by ‘characteristic’, I mean everything which can be predicated of an object.

(b) Logical formulation: Two conflicting (contradictory) propositions cannot be true at the same time. By ‘proposition’ [Aussage] I understand a string of words or other sensibly perceptible symbols whose meanings consist in the fact that they attribute or deny some characteristic to an object.

(c) Psychological formulation: Two acts of believing which correspond to two contradictory propositions cannot obtain in the same consciousness. By ‘act of believing’ [Glaubensakt] I understand a physical [psychische] function sui generis, which is also designated by the words ‘conviction’ [Überzeugung], ‘recognition’ [Anerkennung], ‘belief’, etc., and which cannot be more finely explained but must rather be experienced.1

5. Aristotle attempts to prove the psychological principle of contradiction on the basis of the logical principle.

1. ‘On the principle of contradiction in Aristotle’, pp. 486—87. The proof falls into two parts:

(a) If it is not possible that to one and the same object antithetically opposed propositions, apply; and if two acts of believing to which antithetically opposed propositions correspond, are themselves antithetically opposed; then clearly no one can believe at the same time that the same thing is and is not.

(b) If it is impossible to truthfully assert contradictory characteristics at the same time of one and the same object, then it is obvious that antithetically opposed characteristics cannot be held of one and the same object simultaneously.

For, of two antithetically opposed characteristics the one is just as much privation as the other, namely, privation of being; the privation, however, is negation of a determinate species. Thus, if it is impossible to truthfully affirm and deny something simultaneously, it is also impossible that antithetically opposed characteristics hold of the same object.

Precisely formulated the Aristotelian proof of the psychological principle of contradiction reads as follows.

Were it possible that two acts of believing, corresponding to contradictory assertions, could obtain in the same consciousness, then antithetically opposed characteristics would hold of this consciousness at the same time. But on the basis of the logical principle of contradiction, it is impossible that incompatible characteristics hold of the same object at the same time. It follows that two acts of believing corresponding to contradictory assertions [propositions] cannot obtain in the same consciousness at the same time.

6. Aristotle’s proof of the psychological principle of contradiction is incomplete because Aristotle did not demonstrate that acts of believing which correspond to contradictory propositions are incompatible. Discussions related to this point are found in the final chapter of De Interpretatione. However, they are inconclusive for two reasons.

(a) Antithetically opposed [Konträr-entgegengesetzt] means for Aristotle characteristics which lie farthest apart from each other in a series (e.g., ‘black’ and ‘white’ in the series ‘colourless’ colours). Every series must be constructed on the basis of an ordering relation. Aristotle adopts as the ordering relating of acts of believing differences in their degree of being true or being false, and he even speaks of ‘truer’ and ‘false’ beliefs. It is however, impossible that there be differences in degree of being true or false.

(b) In the psychological investigation of acts of believing Aristotle commits the very common fallacy of ‘logicism in psychology’, which can pass for the counterpart of ‘psychologism in logic’. Instead of investigating psychical functions, the Stagirite considers the propositions corresponding to them
and their logical relations. That is shown in that he characterizes acts of believing as true or false, although as psychical functions, acts of believing could be true or false in the primary sense no more than could sensations, feelings, and the like. 'True' and 'false' are relative characteristics which belong only to assertions as representations of the objective [Abbildungen der objective].

Further, Aristotle confuses [vermengt] logical succession [logische Abfolge] with psychical causality. Characteristic of this is the passage at De Interpretatione, 'The conviction that the good is not good is closely intertwined with the conviction that the good is bad; for whoever holds the good to be bad the same one must believe as well that the good is not good.'—Indeed, if he only thinks about it, and that must he not, and whether it were even possible at all to have such perverse 'convictions?'

7. Regardless of Aristotle's reasoning, the following can be said about the psychological principles of contradiction:

(a) The psychological principle of contradiction cannot be demonstrated a priori, rather it is most to be induced as a law of experience.

(b) The principle in question has not yet been empirically demonstrated.

(c) It is questionable whether it is provable at all. In any event there are sufficient examples in the history of philosophy where contradictions have been asserted at the same time and with full awareness.²

Daya Krishna has, however, gone further and argued that even the ontological law of contradiction is violated by empirical objects. He shows that the law cannot be saved by adding 'at the same time, at the same place, in the same respect', etc. He has actually given examples to show that the law of contradiction is violated in the case of empirical objects. There are various ways of meeting his arguments, of which we shall note only three.

This way is to deny that logical laws in general and the law of contradiction in particular, are meant to be applicable to the world of experience. There are three different forms of this theory. (a) It is a form of Platonic realism, according to which the laws of logic are applicable to universals, numbers, propositions, etc. In recent times, Alonzo Church has developed a logic of sense and proposition following Frege's distinction between sense and reference. According to this theory, logic is not applicable to the empirical world at all—the world of becoming. (b) According to conceptualism, logic is applicable only to concepts such as the concept of number, etc., and is not applicable to the world of experience. (c) According to nominalism, or formalism, the laws of logic are about the symbols themselves and not either about concepts or objects, a priori, or empirical. This Hilbertian conception of logic has been applied to the realm of the concept of number, specially after Wittgenstein.

The game of chess, as has often been observed, affords an excellent parallel with mathematics (or, for that matter, with language itself). To the numerals correspond the chess pieces, and to the operations of arithmetic, the moves of the game. But the parallel is even closer than this, for to the problem of defining number corresponds the problem of defining the entities of the game. If we ask ourselves the question 'what is the king of chess?' we find precisely the same difficulties arise in trying to find an answer which we meet in our consideration of the problem of defining the concept of number. Certainly the king of chess, whose moves the rules of the game prescribe, is not the piece of characteristic shape which we call the king, just as a numeral is not a number, since any other object, a match-stick or a piece of coal, would serve as well to play the king in any game. Instead of the question 'What is the king of chess?', let us ask, 'what makes a particular piece in the game the king piece?' Clearly
THE SECOND WAY

The last conception of number and the laws of arithmetic leads naturally to a totally different conception of logic. Ryle has argued that all logical laws including the law of contradiction are normative rules of thinking.

The normative concept of logic implies that in actual practice logical laws can be violated. Ryle shows that taking the laws of logic to be positive laws of reality, one is led to the absurdity of trying to imagine what a real world which violates the law of contradiction looks like. There is no difficulty in imagining what sort of person an illogical person is: he is not consistent in his own thought and fails to detect fallacies in others’ arguments. Thus, there will be two different approaches to the law of contradiction as a positive law either of reality, or of thought or of belief; and the law of contradiction as a normative law of human thought and speech behaviour.

One difficulty of the concept of positive logical laws as pervasive laws of reality is that it will be impossible to give any example of a violation of the law of contradiction. Strawson, for example, says that to contradict oneself is like writing a sentence and then erasing it. But if the sentence is erased we are left with nothing. Thus, nothing real can be self-contradictory. If logical laws are conceived as positive laws of thought then it will be impossible to have a self-contradictory thought, and hence no example of self-contradiction can be given. But, if self-contradiction is impossible then how can the law of contradiction which denies this impossibility be itself significant? So the question is not whether the law of contradiction in any of its forms (i)–(iv) is applicable to objects of experience, but whether it is significant at all.
‘A cannot be the locus of both B and negation of B’.

Here the addition ‘at the same time’ is essential, for otherwise, the law thus interpreted will be obviously invalid. We now see how the Nyaya philosophers can meet the Buddhistic objection. All moments of time may be alike as moments of time; still, some moments may be related to an object A which will then be present, while other moments, in the past or future, may not be related to it, when it will be absent. What the law of contradiction prevents is that one and the same moment be both related and not related to the same object at the same time.

But this is still a superficial analysis of the Nyaya theory. For any object may be related with other objects, including moments, by different relations. If an object be present at some moment of time, it is related to it by what is called a temporal relation. But there will be many other relations in which it will not be so related to the same moment, and hence will be absent in those relations. There are two ways in which this apparent violation of the law of contradiction can be resolved. Either the law of contradiction has to be modified thus: A cannot be both related and not related to B by the same relation. Or, we shall have to restrict the law only to a special type of case. According to Nyaya philosophers the first alternative too cannot save the universality of the law.

Nyaya philosophers admit that there are qualities, attributes, properties, etc. which can be both present and absent at the same time in the same locus. But, according to Nyaya, there are other kinds of attributes, qualities, properties, etc., which if they are present in a locus cannot be absent from it. Daya Krishna considers the example of a table which is partly red and partly green; he asks whether the table is not both red and not-red at the same time. Following the Nyaya theory we may give the example of a table being heavy (i.e. gravitating). Now this property of gravitation is present in all parts of the table, even its minutest parts, and is present always, so that it is unnecessary here to add the qualification ‘at the same time’. The table gravitates and there is no normal situation where the table does not gravitate.

It may be argued, however, that there is still a condition under which the table gravitates and without which it will cease to gravitate; if, for example, it is placed in a zero-gravity zone then it will not gravitate and so it may be argued that the table both gravitates and does not gravitate. Raghunatha Siromani has argued that it is impossible to find any quality, attribute, etc., of a material object of restricted size where the law of contradiction holds unconditionally, for the same attribute, though present in the object in some relation, may be said to be absent in some relation or the other. So Raghunatha comes to the conclusion that only eternal properties of eternal entities can be of pervasive occurrence so that if they are present they will be present wholly and eternally. For example, every self is one, so the number one belonging to a finite self is ubiquitous is itself eternal and belongs to the whole of the self which is partless. This theory of Raghunatha restricts the validity of the law of contradiction in form (iii) but not in form (ii) which is not violated by Daya Krishna’s examples. The reason for this is that to say the table is brown and red in parts, is to admit that the colour red is such a quality that it can be absent from another part of the table. The law of contradiction is stated in such a form as not to be violated by examples of such qualities of such objects as the red colour of a table. Such qualities, attributes and properties are restricted in time if they are spatial or restricted in space if they are temporal. Objects existing in both time and space do not exist in both in the same way. According to Nyaya, one may regard them as existing in space when the time of their existence becomes their limitor; one may also regard them as existing in time when their spatial location becomes the limitor. The argument for this is the difficulty of conceiving a thing as being both in space and time in the same sense.

Then the law of contradiction is to be stated in the form: A cannot be related to B and not-B, as limited to the same place or to the same time.

Thus the Nyaya theory is radically different from the Buddhist theory of momentariness. For, according to Nyaya, there are two kinds of partless, and therefore eternal, entities—atoms and ubiquitous objects. Daya Krishna has considered the Buddhist theory of momentary atoms which are point-instants, but has not
considered the Nyāya theory of partless, ubiquitous, eternal entities possessing some eternal properties. As Raghunātha has pointed out, there is no conceivable relation in Nyāya in which such properties of such objects can be said to be both present and absent. Thus the unrestricted law of contradiction in form (ii) is valid for these objects and properties. For other properties and of other objects a form of (iii) of the law of contradiction is accepted as valid. This form will be:

(iii)\(^*\) \(A\) cannot be both \(B\) and not-\(B\) each at the same time or (in the exclusive sense) at the same place.

For according to Nyāya, it does not make sense to say that an object may be both in space and time in the same sense.

Daya Krishna has raised the problem of the relation between the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle. We have already explained a theory according to which the logical laws apply only to abstract entities like propositions. According to this theory, the law of contradiction as applicable to propositions is usually stated in the following form:

\[ (LC) \quad \neg (p \land \neg p) \]

and the law of excluded middle as

\[ (LE) \quad p \lor \neg p. \]

In systems of logic which accept De Morgan’s laws, the law of double negation, the commutativity of conjunction and of disjunction, these two laws are equivalent not merely in the sense of having the same truth-value, but also from the standpoint of algebraic transformation. In systems where one or the other of these laws is rejected this equivalence also is rejected. The development of alternative systems of logic in the sense that some laws which are valid in one are not valid in another shows that logical laws are not positive laws of reality, but are postulates.

**NON-EXISTENCE AND APPEARANCE**

The law of contradiction is the only means available to us for proving the unreality or non-existence of something. If the assumption that the thing exists leads to a self-contradiction it is proved by *reductio ad absurdum*, that the thing is non-existent. Fitch, however, has distinguished between two different forms of proof by *reductio ad absurdum*. In the weaker form this proof merely shows that if the assumption is made then the contradiction follows. But from this it does not follow that the assumption itself cannot be made. In the strong form it proves that the assumption itself is wrong. By using the restricted principle of negation introduction or restricted *reductio ad absurdum* Fitch can reject (LE) while admitting (LC). Thus there are various ways of admitting (LC) but rejecting (LE). In what follows we shall use the unrestricted form of the *reductio*.

In this form the *reductio* proves the non-existence of a self-contradiction absolutely, unconditionally. Now there are two different types of persons doing logic—hard-boiled logicians and soft logicians. Parmenides in explaining his negative way was a hard-boiled logician. He accepted the law of contradiction in form (i), and argued that there can be nothing which is self-contradictory. Thus change, becoming, motion, etc., are self-contradictory and are, therefore, nothing. There is nothing like appearance which is other than reality, for reality alone exists and appearance not being identical with reality is nothing. The problem of appearance arises only in the case of soft logicians who in spite of their logic are yet overwhelmed by their experience. According to Parmenides, change, motion, becoming, etc., are non-existent and we cannot experience them; there the matter ends. But soft logicians who cannot get over the overwhelming evidence of their senses wonder how the self-contradictory, i.e. nothing, can yet be experienced as real.Appearances involve inconsistencies in their very concept and yet they are not nothing because they are experienced as real. To accommodate becoming, change; motion, etc., therefore, soft logicians change the law of contradiction from form (i) to form (iii). Thus Parmenides’
concept of reality as simple and indivisible is replaced by the concept of a reality which endures in time. The law of contradiction then becomes applicable only to a reality at the same time but not to reality at different times. Thus reality must be not only enduring in time but time itself has to be conceived as a sequence of time-segments. So long as A remains B, it cannot also be not-B; it is not necessary to hold that time is a series of moments in order to apply the law of contradiction to empirical objects, unless, of course, the objects themselves are conceived as changing every moment.

So also objects of experience, i.e. macro objects, are extended in space and it may be that they have some quality, attribute or property in some parts and do not have them in other parts. Here, too, it is not necessary to conceive of space as atomic in order to apply the law of contradiction to them. For the law states that A cannot be not-B at the same stretch of place where it is B. Space has to be conceived as atomic only if the objects are conceived as having atomic parts. There is nothing in the law of contradiction in form (iii) which requires objects to be point-instants. Thus the law in this form will have no essential difficulty if space and time are conceived as being infinitely divisible instead of having points and instants.

The whole exercise of reformulating the law of contradiction stems from the unease of the soft logicians that nothing violating the law of contradiction can be experienced as real. As change, becoming, extension, are all experienced, in order to accommodate them the law of contradiction is given different forms. In the process, reality which is conceived by Parmenides as indivisible unity is replaced by a concept of reality having various aspects, spatial and temporal. But then there are various other aspects of reality as experienced. Thus shadows and the objects of which they are shadows are equally visible and are visible in the same sense. Yet shadows are not regarded as real for various purposes, because although the empirical objects and their shadows are equally visible, empirical objects are also tangible whereas shadows are not. Thus the concept of reality is further analysed into aspects appropriate to different senses. That which is both visible and tangible is real and that which is merely visible is an appear-

ance. But then that which is visible cannot be nothing; and as a matter of fact there are various purposes for which shadows deserve the most important consideration, as for example, the technological problems connected with TV projections. Thus the law of contradiction has to be further expanded to give rise to the following form.

(iv) A cannot be experienced as both B and not-B at the same time, at the same place, by the same sense organ.

This formulation which introduces a further dimension of the concept of reality can accommodate even shadows as real. Thus we are gradually led to formulation (iv) of the law and to a bewilderingly complex and multifaceted concept of reality. But by thus changing the law of contradiction to accommodate whatever we experience as real we are led to the position of Parmenides, according to whom there is nothing which is self-contradictory. What Parmenides rejected as nothing—motion, change, becoming—are now included within reality. But the concept of appearance as different from that of reality has not been explained.

An appearance, therefore, has to be unreal and yet not nothing. An appearance is not nothing because it is experienced as real and it is not real either. To accommodate these two inconsistent features of appearance we may say either that an appearance is both real and unreal, or that an appearance is neither real nor unreal. To hold that appearance is both real and unreal is to make the concept of appearance impossible for there cannot be a self-contradictory concept. An appearance is inconsistent only in a special way. We have to distinguish between an inconsistent object of experience which is both real and unreal and other inconsistent objects which are wholly unreal. Reality, as well as thought of reality, must be self-consistent. An appearance is real as an object of experience, but unreal because it is inconsistent. Sense-experience tells us that it is real, reason tells us that it cannot be. A thing which is both red and not-red at the same time is an impossibility, it is nothing; therefore, it is not an appearance either. Although A cannot (really) be not-A still A can
appear as not-A. The law of contradiction, therefore, cannot prevent appearances.

NOTES

2. Ibid., pp. 489-92.
3. Ibid.

In 1961 Daya Krishna wrote a paper called 'The Synthetic A Priori—Some Considerations', which is quite characteristic of the way in which he has always done philosophy. At the time he wrote this paper the current philosophical opinion was that there could be no propositions that were really both synthetic and a priori. This opinion was held not only by those who had still retained their logical positivistic hangover, but also by those who never had anything to do with that movement. That all a priori propositions must be analytic was supposed at that time to be proved conclusively, and proving it so conclusively was considered to be at least one good thing that the logical positivists had done. But Daya Krishna was not to be overly impressed by the success of the doctrine of analyticity. He subjected it to his usual critical scrutiny, and came up with a clear and straightforward argument against this doctrine, an argument which was also supposed positively to support the claim of the synthetic a priori, and concluded that unless we were going to deny certain things that were quite obvious we had to accept that the synthetic a priori was possible. In this paper I take the opportunity to join once again my favourite battle against the analyticity thesis and support Daya Krishna as far as I can in his. I first state his argument, then examine it, and then make some new suggestions to strengthen it further.
Daya Krishna begins his paper with a formulation of the thesis that there are synthetic a priori propositions. The thesis, in this formulation, is that there are propositions about matters of fact that possess a logical necessity about them. (Daya Krishna points out that the philosophers who have denied the possibility of the synthetic a priori have actually denied this very possibility. They have maintained that propositions concerning matters of fact can only be contingent.) But in his argument in support of the thesis of the synthetic a priori, Daya Krishna does not argue directly in favour of the thesis so formulated. He argues in an indirect manner. He argues first in favour of a second thesis which he claims to entail the thesis of the synthetic a priori as he formulates it. This second thesis is that there are necessary relations between facts. 'The issue of the synthetic a priori', he says, 'is concerned primarily with the question whether there are any necessary relations among matters of fact.' He first produces an argument in support of the thesis that there can be necessary relations among matters of fact. This argument, Daya Krishna then claims, also proves the thesis of the synthetic a priori, because we cannot deny that there are necessary propositions concerning matters of fact without denying that there are necessary relations among matters of fact. 'A denial of the synthetic a priori is', he says, 'the denial that there are necessary relations among facts.' Daya Krishna's argument is thus as follows.

1. That there are propositions about matters of fact which possess logical necessity cannot be denied without rejecting that there are necessary relations among facts.
2. But that there are necessary relations among facts cannot be denied, for this is entailed by the fact that the hypothetico-deductive method of verification of hypotheses is valid.
3. And it is indeed a fact that the hypothetico-deductive method of verification of hypotheses is valid.

A more straightforward formulation of the same argument would be as follows.

1. The hypothetico-deductive method of verifying hypotheses is valid.
2. If the hypothetico-deductive method is valid then there are necessary relations among facts.
3. If there are necessary relations among facts then there are synthetic a priori propositions.
4. Therefore, there are synthetic a priori propositions.

This argument is clearly of the form:

1. \( p \)
2. If \( p \) then \( q \)
3. If \( q \) then \( r \)
4. \( . . . r \)

There is absolutely no doubt that Daya Krishna's argument is formally valid. So if the argument still fails to establish the conclusion, viz. that there are synthetic a priori propositions, then that must be due to the fact that one or more of the premises are not true. If, on the other hand, all his premises are true, we have to accept the conclusion. Thus, in order to find out whether or not Daya has indeed succeeded in establishing that there are synthetic a priori propositions, we shall have to find out whether or not the premises themselves are all true.

Let us then begin with the first premise, namely, that the hypothetico-deductive method of verifying hypotheses is valid. This premise can be contested, and, also, it has actually been contested. But it is not necessary to do so. The reason why it is not is that Daya Krishna is here exploiting one aspect of the hypothetico-deductive method which is, I think, beyond all dis-
pute. It is that in a verification of a hypothesis by this method we deduce one formal proposition from some factual premises, both the general hypothesis and the statement of the initial conditions being factual propositions. I can also add that, as far as I am concerned, I do not have any desire to challenge the validity of the method. I think that the method is valid, as far as the notion of validity can at all be applied to a method of establishing a hypothesis. So I conclude that the first premise of Daya Krishna’s argument is all right, and, thus, if his argument fails to establish the conclusion then that is due to some other premise. Let us then turn to the second premise.

III

The second premise tells us that if the hypothetico-deductive method is valid then there are necessary relations among facts. Is this premise true?

To begin with, I propose a minor amendment of the second premise, as well as of the first premise itself, in the light of what I have just said. What I have said is that even if the hypothetico-deductive method is not valid, for some reason or other, the main point of Daya Krishna’s argument—and of the first premise itself—will remain valid. The point is that there are forms of inference in which we deduce a factual conclusion from one or more factual premises. It is upon this possibility of deducing one matter of fact from another, because that is what it amounts to, that Daya Krishna is actually banking in his argument for the synthetic a priori; and it is clear that one may accept this even if one rejects the claim of the hypothetico-deductive method on other grounds. On the amendment I propose, the second premise would be: If a factual inference is valid then there are necessary relations among facts. Accordingly, the amendment on the first premise itself that I propose is that it be reformulated as follows: A factual inference, i.e. a deduction of a factual conclusion from factual premises, can be valid.

Thus, as I understand, the question regarding the second premise is basically the following: Is it at all possible to deduce one fact from another fact (or set of facts)? It is so because if the premise is a factual one then it is true if and only if the fact stated by the premise obtains; and, again, if the conclusion is a factual one then it is true if and only if the fact stated by the conclusion obtains. So, if both the premise and the conclusion are factual propositions then to say that we have deduced the latter from the former is to say that there is a logical connection between two facts—two actual facts in case both the premise and the conclusion are true, and, at least, possible facts in case both or any one of them is false. So, it seems that the possibility of deducing one factual proposition from another really amounts to the possibility of deducing one fact from another, and this possibility must be sustained by a logical relationship of facts themselves.

But there are a few questions to answer here; especially questions which are raised by the special nature of the premises required for an application of the hypothetico-deductive method. One of the premises used here is a universally generalized proposition (involving, let us say, a universal quantifier). Another is a particular proposition, either a singular or an existential one, stating the circumstance for which a consequence is drawn in terms of the general hypothesis stated in the first premise. Can we really say that all the premises which thus occur in the derivation are statements of facts in the strict sense of the term?

According to one conception of facts, it is only an atomic proposition which can be said to stand for a fact. And whatever may be our definition of an atomic proposition, no proposition containing logical constants can be atomic. So a general proposition, whether it is universal or existential, cannot be said to stand for a fact. On this conception of a fact, therefore, the necessary relation between the premise and the conclusion of the deduction in a hypothetico-deductive verification of a hypothesis cannot be said to stand for a necessary relation among facts. So, on this view of facts, it is only propositions which are related, and can be related necessarily, facts can never be.

But this certainly is too narrow a conception of facts. This does not accord with the usual conception, although it is the one which is at the centre of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Take, for
example, David Hume's conception of a matter of fact. (In fact, it seems that both Daya Krishna and his opponents have this conception of a fact in mind.) According to this conception, that the sun rises in the east, that fire burns, and that water quenches thirst are all matters of fact, as distinct from relations of ideas (which, in his opinion, are typically asserted by mathematical propositions). This conception is certainly different from the one we find in the *Tractatus*. For none of the examples of matters of fact I have just cited from Hume's own writings can be regarded as something which is stated, or can be stated, in an atomic proposition. The proposition 'The sun rises in the east' really means 'Every time the sun rises, it rises in the east'. 'Fire burns' really means the same as 'All instances of fire cause burning'; and 'Water quenches thirst' really means the same as 'Whenever someone thirsty drinks water, the thirst is quenched'. So, unless we take the term 'fact' in the artificially narrow sense in which it is used in the *Tractatus*, there is no reason to suppose that the propositions which figure as premises in a deductive inference can never be statements of facts. Apart from the artificiality of the Tractarian conception of facts, there is another problem which is raised by this conception when it is sought to be used to prove that there cannot be any necessary connections between facts. It is that the thesis may turn out, really, to be utterly trivial, being strictly tautological. To see how this happens we have to ask ourselves the question whether we can at all define a fact in the Tractarian sense without bringing in this feature of mutual independence; i.e. whether the only possible definition of a fact in this sense will have to be given in terms of this very independence, like in the following: If both the propositions $p$ and $q$ are statements of facts, then they are logically independent of each other; and if they are not logically independent then they are not both statements of facts. If this be the case, and this does seem to be the case, then the thesis that all facts are logically independent of each other amounts to the thesis that all things (facts) that are logically independent of each other are logically independent of each other.

For these reasons, we need not, in fact cannot, take the term 'fact' in the Tractarian sense, and should stick to the more usual sense of the term we find in Hume; at least to make the thesis of independence a significant (albeit a false) one.

So I think we can conclude that Daya Krishna's second premise, like his first premise, is all right. Thus if there are still any doubts about the success of his argument then it must be due to some doubts about the legitimacy of the third and last premise. We turn to consider that now.

IV

To recall, Daya Krishna's third premise is as follows: If there are necessary relations among facts then there are synthetic a priori propositions. Is this premise all right?

It seems to me that it is extremely difficult to accept this premise as right. From the fact that one factual proposition is a logical consequence of another it does not seem to follow either that any one of the two factual propositions is necessary, or that the connection, or the relation, between the two propositions is synthetic. Let us try to illustrate the point with the help of a simple example. The proposition

(Q) Either the earth is round or the earth is flat

is a necessary, because a logical, consequence of the proposition

(P) The earth is round.

Both the propositions $(P)$ and $(Q)$ are factual, but neither of them is necessary, both being true only in a contingent way. But, on the other hand, the connection between $(P)$ and $(Q)$ is necessary, one being a logical consequence of the other. However, and this is the most important point, this connection itself is only *analytic*, and not synthetic at all. To put the last point in a manner which would be more pertinent to the debate on the possibility of the synthetic a priori, neither the proposition
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(I.) ‘Either the earth is round or the earth is flat’ is a logical consequence of ‘The earth is round’, nor the proposition.

(II.) If the earth is round then either the earth is round or the earth is flat.

is synthetic, although both of them are necessary and a priori. Each of the propositions is analytic. The relation of logical consequence is in fact the paradigm of analytic relationship, and a proposition asserting such a relationship is a paradigm of an analytic proposition.

We can also put the point in terms of facts. The relation between the fact stated by (P) and the fact stated by (Q) is an analytic, and not a synthetic, one. We can say, if we want, that the statements (L) and (L') themselves are statements of fact. But, then, we shall have to be prepared to make a big departure from the usual convention regarding the use of the term ‘fact’: for, if (L) and (L') state facts at all, it is analytic facts which they state. The usual convention regarding the use of the term ‘fact’ demands us to say that a statement of fact is always synthetic. It is obvious that while it would be sheer dogmatism to rule out this terminological departure, this departure by itself is not going to serve the purpose of the synthetic a priori. (L) and (L') are certainly a priori, but they are both analytic a priori propositions.

V

So, it looks as though Daya Krishna’s argument to prove that there are synthetic a priori propositions has failed. The argument is formally valid, the first two premises are both true, but the third premise is false; and so it fails to establish the conclusion.

This does not certainly mean that the conclusion he has tried to establish with the help of this argument is wrong, for it may still be right and could be sustained by other arguments. Neither does it mean that there is no point of fundamental importance to which his argument draws our attention even if it be the case that the argument is inconclusive. I believe that Daya Krishna’s conclusion is all right. (I have never lost a chance of defending the cause of the synthetic a priori myself.) I believe that some arguments are available to establish his conclusion. And I also believe that some of these arguments would come close to exploiting the kind of insight that has inspired Daya Krishna to write his essay in defence of the synthetic a priori. So I shall proceed to defend each of these beliefs—especially the second and the third—now.

First, the question of what kind of arguments, independently of the considerations put forward by Daya Krishna, can be found in favour of his conclusion. Next, I shall try to reinforce his way of arguing the case of the synthetic a priori.

VI

To begin with, it would be worth our while to be quite clear about the exact significance of the analyticity of the propositions (L) and (L'). Clarity on this point would enable us to have a clear view of what is really required by the thesis of the synthetic a priori, and what kind of considerations may be advanced to supplement Daya Krishna’s argument.

If we ask ourselves the question ‘What exactly is the significance of the analyticity of (L) and (L’)?’, we find that it consists in what we may call the relation of inclusion between the fact stated by the sentence ‘The earth is round’ on the one hand, and the fact stated by the sentence ‘Either the earth is round or the earth is flat’ on the other. The fact that the earth is round includes the fact that the earth is either round or flat; the first cannot obtain without the second obtaining too because of just this reason. (We are admittedly using the concept of a disjunctive fact, but that is, to recall, because we have not restricted ourselves to admitting only atomic facts.) We can make the same point about the inclusion of one fact in another with regard to the familiar syllogism: If Socrates is a man then the fact that he is mortal is included in the fact that all men are so. And this really brings out what is needed by the thesis of the synthetic a priori. What is needed is that there be necessary connections between facts that are distinct, i.e. between facts that do not stand in the relation of inclusion. Such facts would not be analytically related with one another. They
would be related synthetically, though necessarily, and consequently propositions asserting relations between them would be both synthetic and a priori.

It should now be clear why Daya Krishna cannot possibly vindicate the case of the synthetic a priori with the help of the example he has chosen, viz. the kind of factual inference we find in hypothetico-deductive reasoning. It may be granted that a hypothetico-deductive reasoning is made possible by a necessary connection of facts. But that does not prove that a statement asserting this connection would be synthetic a priori. In fact, the point that I have been trying to make with the example of the inference from 'The earth is round' to 'Either the earth is round or the earth is flat' can perhaps be brought out even more easily in the context of the kind of deduction that is involved in a typically hypothetico-deductive verification of hypothesis. The form of such a deduction is broadly that of a syllogism in which the general hypothesis plays the role of the universal major, a statement of a particular circumstance covered by the hypothesis plays the role of the particular (or singular) minor, and a statement of what must happen under the circumstances if the hypothesis is true is the conclusion. So, to see quickly the point I am trying to make, we can take the familiar syllogism:

All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
∴ Socrates is mortal

The point I have been trying to make is that, given that Socrates is a man, the fact that all men are mortal includes the fact that Socrates is mortal. The mortality of mankind, in general, comprises the mortality of each and every human being, including that of Socrates. So, although it is true that the fact stated in the conclusion follows necessarily from the fact stated in the universal major, together with the one stated in the particular (or singular) minor, the relation here is only analytic and not synthetic. And, therefore, a proposition asserting the relation between the premise (or the conjunction of the premises) on the one hand and the conclusion on the other cannot be an example of the synthetic a priori. It would be a very good example instead of an analytic truth.

However, as I have already said, the fact that the example Daya Krishna offers to vindicate the case of the synthetic a priori fails to do so does not establish that the case cannot be vindicated, or that we cannot find examples to vindicate it. What we have just discussed about the requirement which such examples must fulfill is that they must be examples which show that facts which are totally distinct in the sense of not standing in the relation of inclusion can also be necessarily connected with one another. In fact, there are a few such examples that are well-known, and it is a little surprising that Daya Krishna does not cite those examples. We can mention a few here on his behalf.

(i) It is a fact that snow is white. It is also a fact that snow is not black. Between these two facts there is a necessary connection. The latter follows necessarily from the former. But these two facts are nevertheless distinct, neither of them is contained in the other, and so, although the latter follows necessarily from the former, it does not follow analytically. This, therefore, is an instance of a synthetic as well as a necessary connection between facts, a connection we are able to know a priori. Consequently, the conditional proposition 'If snow is white then snow is not black' would be a perfect example of the synthetic a priori.

(ii) It is a fact that the earth is round. It is also a fact that the earth is not flat. Between these two facts there is a necessary connection. The latter follows necessarily from the former. But these two facts are nevertheless distinct; neither of them is contained in the other; and, so, although the latter follows necessarily from the former, it does not follow analytically. This, therefore, is an instance of a synthetic as well as a necessary connection among facts, a connection we are able to know a priori. Consequently, the conditional proposition 'If the earth is round then it is not flat' would be a perfect example of a synthetic a priori proposition.

(iii) It is a fact that Gandhi died before Nehru did. It is also a fact that Nehru did not die before Gandhi did. Between these two facts there is a necessary connection. The latter follows necessarily from the former. But these two facts are nevertheless dis-
tinct; neither of them is contained in the other; and, so, although
the latter follows necessarily from the former, it does not follow
analytically. This, therefore, is an instance of a synthetic as well as
necessary connection between facts, a connection we are able to
know a priori. Consequently, the conditional proposition ‘If
Gandhi died before Nehru then Nehru did not die before
Gandhi’ would be a perfect example of the synthetic a priori.

(iv) It is a fact that Dundee is to the north of St Andrews. It is
a fact that St Andrews is to the north of Edinburgh. It is also a fact
that Dundee is to the north of Edinburgh. Between the first two
facts taken together and the third there is a necessary connec-
tion. The third necessarily follows from the first two. But all these
facts are nevertheless distinct; none of them is contained in
another; in particular, the third fact is contained neither in the first
nor in the second nor in the first and the second taken together;
and, so although the third follows necessarily from a conjunction
of the first two, it does not follow analytically. This, therefore,
is an instance of a synthetic as well as necessary connection between
facts, a connection we are able to know a priori. Consequently,
the conditional ‘If Dundee is to the north of St Andrews and St
Andrews is to the north of Edinburgh then Dundee is to the
north of Edinburgh’ is a perfect example of the synthetic
a priori.

In view of the fact that such examples are known to exist it
is—let me repeat—a little surprising that they are not mentioned
by Daya Krishna. Why is it that he has not mentioned them, and
has not banked his claim on them? I think it is not too difficult to
guess the kind of reason which led him not to depend upon
these examples, but to depend upon his own example of
hypothetico-deductive reasoning. That is what I am going to
describe now. (If I am wildly wrong in my conjecture, Daya Krishna
will, I hope, point it out in his response.)

VII

To find out Daya Krishna’s reasons for avoiding the kind of
examples I have given, we have, I think, to be clear about the very
basis of my claim that they are cases of the synthetic a priori. How
could I be so certain that the cases I have narrated are really cases
of the synthetic a priori? My reasons are, in fact, very simple. A
statement Q analytically follows from a statement P if and only if Q
can be derived from P by the laws of logic, and the meanings of
the different expressions occurring in P and Q. And a conditional
statement ‘If P then Q’ is analytic if and only if it can be estab-
lished as true on the basis of these alone. But in none of the cases
I have presented, the laws of logic, with or without an appeal to
the meaning of the relevant expressions, would be adequate to
derive the consequence we need, or establish the truth of the
relevant conditional. There are obviously no laws of logic which
will warrant the derivation of, say, ‘Snow is not black’ from ‘Snow
is white’. Neither can we trick the premise into yielding the con-
clusion by help of a definition of ‘white’, or a definition of ‘black’,
that will not be question begging. The incompatibility of colours,
and of shapes, and, for that matter, of all determinates under the
same determinable; the asymmetry of some relations, and the
transitivity of some, are not really logical principles. And it is this
that ensures that these principles will yield truths that are both
synthetic and a priori at the same time. But, maybe, it is precisely
this which makes these principles, and the examples grounded in
them unattractive to Daya Krishna. Maybe, I am tempted to
surmise, what Daya Krishna really wanted to establish with the
help of the example of hypothetico-deductive reasoning he him-
self had chosen is that there is synthetic a priori involved in the
principles of logic themselves, the principles which sustain, among
other relations of logical consequence, the relation of logical con-
sequence between one factual proposition and another. If this
really is his intention then there are many things to be said in its
favour. So I turn now to saying just those things.

VIII

We may first ask a very simple question about the truths of logic
themselves. The question is: Are they themselves analytic? Ac-
cording to the usual definition of the analytic, a logical prin-
ciple, say, *modus ponendo ponens*, cannot itself be analytic. For an an-
alytic proposition, according to the usual definition, is a proposit-
tion which is validated by the laws (principles) of logic and the meanings of the relevant terms alone. If, thus, analyticity is defined in terms of the principles of logic then the principles of logic themselves could not be called 'analytic'. But, then, if they are not analytic, they are synthetic, and there is no doubt that they are a priori too.

But we know that there is a very simple answer available to this. It is that the term 'analytic' is to be defined not as that which is validated by the laws of logic (and meanings of the relevant terms) alone, it should be defined as that which is either itself a law of logic or is something validated by the laws of logic (and the meanings of the relevant terms) alone. This answer certainly sounds ad hoc—indeed an ad hoc redefinition of the term 'analytic' to save the thesis that the principles themselves are analytic. But it need not be so ad hoc a defence of the thesis. One may say that the laws of logic are themselves validated by the laws of logic. There is no other way in which a law of logic can be validated. And that is the reason why we can say that the laws of logic are analytic, and that they are so even in the original sense. We can take a very simple example to illustrate the point. Given the usual definition of implication in terms of conjunction and negation, we can derive the law of contraposition from the commutative law for conjunction and the law of double negation. That we can do this shows that the law of contraposition is analytic.

This defence of the analyticity thesis is not, however, adequate. The reason why it is not so is that it is impossible to derive all laws of logic—i.e. absolutely all laws of logic without exception—from other laws of logic; for that would lead to a vicious circle because, ultimately, a law of logic will have to be derived from itself.

One may now continue in one's defence of the analyticity thesis by saying that this threat of a vicious circle need not worry us. There is nothing wrong about the idea of some laws of logic being self-supporting or self-justifying, and if there are such laws, we can say about them that they can be 'derived' from themselves. If this does not sound defensible, we can say that there are some laws which are not in need of any derivation in the ordinary sense, but they are nevertheless self-supporting, and since they are so, they can be called 'analytic'.

But there is a snag in this line of reasoning. One should be very careful about positing a law of logic as self-supporting. To make a long story short, we now know that a law of logic can be posited as self-supporting only if it can be taken to give the logical constant for which it is given, the logical constant it governs, its very meaning. (For example, the law of simplification for conjunction.) We know also that there are dangers in positing a law or a set of laws of logic as giving meaning to the logical constant in question. It has been shown conclusively by A.N. Prior that an indiscriminate choice of laws of logic (he talks actually of rules of inference, but these are really two ways of saying the same thing) as giving meaning to a logical constant may lead to absurd consequences, even to the consequence that any proposition can be derived from any other. A right choice of laws or rules can, however, be made; and the choice would be right if it was made, as has been shown by Nuel D. Belnap, within the constraints imposed by some most general facts about deducibility and definition. When our choice is made in keeping with all these requirements and constraints, we find that all the logical constants which can be said to be legitimate at all can be defined, i.e. given meaning by those rules of inference which are called the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constants.

In any case, it seems that we can say that all laws of logic are ultimately validated by those laws which are self-supporting, and the self-supporting laws (or rules) are those which give meaning to the logical constants. What else do we need to defend the analyticity thesis for the laws of logic? But the defence is not in fact complete yet. There is a fundamental question that remains unanswered. The question is regarding the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constants. What is the status of such a rule? To take a very simple example once again, what is the status of the principle called the law of simplification—an elimination rule for conjunction? Can we say that the principle embodied in the rule of simplification, viz. that if 'both A and B' is true then A is true, is analytic? One would certainly be tempted
to say that it is, and that might look like being the only answer possible. Here is a logical principle which validates itself, i.e. is validated by a logical principle, and, therefore, according to our definition of the analytic, must be recognized as being so. But one has to pause and ponder here. It may be that we have now reached a point where the characterization of the truth—the principle—in question as 'analytic' starts looking inappropriate at least, without much significance. Let us look at the example once again. What we have is a conditional proposition. Now, a conditional proposition is analytic if and only if the consequent follows analytically from the antecedent. But can we say that in this case? We can say that the consequent follows analytically from the antecedent only if the former follows from the latter strictly in accordance with the laws of logic (with or without reference to the meanings of the relevant expressions). But can we say that the consequent in this case follows from the antecedent in that way, i.e. in accordance with the laws of logic alone, or with them and the meanings of the relevant expressions? How can we significantly say this? That the consequent follows from the antecedent is itself the logical law here. And that too is what gives the logical constant in question, viz. the conjunction, its very meaning. How can we say that it happens in accordance with the logical law? But if it is not appropriate, or significant to say that the conditional here is analytic, how should we describe it? Will it not be quite natural to say that it is synthetic? We can, in fact, proceed a little further to give some substance to this characterization of the conditional as 'synthetic' by saying that when we know the law of simplification we know not only what the conjunctive sign means, we know also a fact about conjunction, and a necessary and essential fact about it.

* * *

To conclude, what we have found is that although Daya Krishna's argument does not succeed in establishing that there are synthetic a priori truths, because of a flaw in one of his premises, his thesis of the synthetic a priori could be defended by independent arguments, and examples, and also by a possible develop-

NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 48.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 50. This is the point which, I presume, Daya was trying to make here by help of the Tarski equivalences of the schema 'x is true if and only if y'.

6. Ibid., p. 49. Daya is absolutely right here.


The Problem of Coherence of Different Types of Coherence

VIRENDRA SHEKHAWAT

Daya Krishna's "Types of Coherence" concludes thus: "There is thus no unitary "coherence" as many have supposed. Rather there are "coherences" each of a distinct type belonging to realms autonomous and independent in their nature." The conclusion is reached after a systematic analysis of coherence or consistency as characterized in the realms of logic, the empirical sciences, and axiology. The paper serves, upon analysis, only to raise a problem with serious epistemological consequences for the idea of the unitary nature of knowledge: it does not attempt to surmount or even negotiate the problem. Thus there are three distinct types of coherences, namely, logical, empirical, and axiological coherence, each with its attendant difficulties. Since the epistemological characteristics of these coherences are not compared with other constraining criteria such as correspondence or prāphatva, it is difficult to say to what degree, in the author's view, the notion of coherence itself is satisfactory, though the valuable analysis has many insights to offer regarding the epistemological pitfalls in the criterion of coherence.

Logical coherence demands that any proposition $p$ and its negation be not derivable, within a logical or mathematical system, from the basic assumptions or axioms observing the syntactical rules. However, no such consistency proof can be given for any system and thus the impossibility of such a derivation within the system can never be shown. If in some situation inconsistency is shown by deriving both $p$ and $\neg p$, it is concluded that the axiomatic set is inadequate or a modification in syntactical rules is sought. The criterion that all derivations within the system be in accordance with the syntactical rules is itself an intuitive one and difficulties arise as we try to establish the criterion of coherence by strictly logical analysis. Difficulties further arise if we analyse the criterion of 'empirical coherence' of empirical theories in the sciences. The truth or falsity of any proposition in empirical theory cannot be established merely by deducing it from the basic postulates of the theory; it must be verified by the observed facts. The fundamental difficulty here is that the deduction from postulates which are themselves empirical cannot be a strictly logical deduction. If the empirical values of the premises are taken seriously, we can treat the deduction as formal only by ignoring the specific empirical character of these values. Thus, for example, in the formal syllogistic deduction 'All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, Socrates is mortal', if the first premise is taken as an empirical inductive generalization, its conditions of falsification can never be satisfactorily given, or if it is considered as definitionally true, no person can be called a 'man' till he is dead and by dying shows that he is a man. Further, the formal relations between the propositions themselves are affected in a far-reaching manner by the introduction of empirical values to the variables. Thus, 'All men are mortal' is not the same as 'All $S$ is $P$': the former is a statement of probable belief which can be revised in the light of a new experience, while the latter is a statement of categorical relation holding true of all 'all'. If 'all' values are supposed to satisfy these variables, as logicians usually demand, then this 'all' cannot be an empirical, accidental 'all', it must be a logical, necessary 'all', but then it will become useless for purposes of empirical investigation. Thus, according to the author,
relations between the propositions become themselves empirical and no longer remain logical in character. That some sentence, or rather sentential function, should follow from another may depend exclusively on the formal rules of transformation and derivation, but that some state of affairs be inferable from some other state of affairs depends not so much on the rules as on the relation between the states of affairs themselves. This relation, however, is and cannot but be empirical in the sense that no mere insight or contemplation or intuition on the state of affairs or the rules however formulated will give us the state of affairs supposed to be inferable from it.

Furthermore, the logical connectives expressive of formal relations between empirical statements cannot remain purely logical. The connective ‘and’, for example, is usually considered logically commutative since \( p \land q \equiv q \land p \), but in such a simple empirical proposition as ‘Francine plucked the fruit and ate it’, it cannot function in that manner since a time element is involved. The ‘and’ of this proposition goes counter to the logical, commutative ‘and’ because of the specific empirical nature of the activities it connects. Although this proposition reflects the logical property of the connective that a compound proposition is true if both the individual propositions are true, in another situation even this may not hold, as for example, in ‘I shall both be reading Plato and not be reading Plato’, if we keep in mind that ‘shall’ here means that one may not read Plato at a certain moment in the future. Similarly, the logical implication when employed in connecting empirical statements remains no longer an ‘implication’ but becomes a symbol of ‘causation’, but the truth conditions of an implication relation and a causal relation are not the same. The latter requires establishment of specific empirical linkages on the events concerned. Moreover, empirical coherence differs from logical coherence in that the former considers two empirical propositions coherent if both of them have been verified to be true. No further relation between the two propositions is asserted by calling them coherent than their just being true together. By ‘together’ here is meant only that both of them have been found to be true as a matter of fact. This is a weaker sense of empirical coherence. The stronger sense would demand that both the empirical propositions are derivable from the same set of general empirical principles. In this stronger sense it is only in the context of a theoretical system that one can talk meaningfully of coherence of empirical propositions. What is incoherent is not the facts or the isolated propositions but the alternative interpretations given to the same set of facts. From this point of view it is ultimately the theory that has to change and not the facts, as facts are never supposed to be incoherent with each other. Thus, the weaker sense of coherence is always presupposed by the stronger sense and is much more fundamental.

The situation becomes even more complicated if we examine coherence in the realm of values. Propositions with axiological values have axiological form different from logical or empirical form. ‘A proposition which has an axiological term as one of its members may be valid in spite of its being empirically false since its validity does not require any reference to existence.’ Thus two propositions that are ‘axiologically valid’ need not be coherent with each other. That ‘A is good’ and ‘B is good’ does not ensure that they are not incompatible goods. Thus no criterion of derivability or verification can be satisfactory here. The value propositions have an intrinsic autonomy that is far greater than that of empirical propositions, for while facts can be related by causality, we do not know what principle relates values. The natural division of values into truth, beauty and goodness hardly helps. If ‘realizability together’ is considered as a criterion of coherence for values, it should be remembered that ‘realizability’ is determined not so much by the nature of the values sought to be realized as by the empirical world in which we live at a certain time. Further, although some values may be compatible with each other yet they cannot be realized together due to limitations of human attention and the time devoted.

Strict autonomy of logical, empirical, and axiological coherences implies an autonomy of the realms of thought, experience, and
praxis, which means that any attempt at comprehension of these realms by means of a single rational theory is bound to be defeated. Even if a single theoretical network of principles is sought for these realms, a single overarching criterion of coherence may not be available. Yet the non-availability of such a single overarching criterion hardly implies autonomy of the realms; rather, one may think that although the same rational thread passes through them, only the degree of constriction has to be increased as one descends from the cognitive to the empirical to the valutational. Śaṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika theories are examples of the oldest informal logical systems which attempted to comprehend all the three realms of dharma, indriyāṇiḥkhaṇa, and buddhi or vicāra, by a single general principle of coherence called hetumattā. In recent times an impressive attempt was made by Hertz\(^3\) for making clear the criterion of coherence of formal logical systems for comprehension of the realms of thought and experience, although not of the realm of values. There is also an awareness of and dissatisfaction with the idea of form and formalist techniques, as evidenced by a revival of interest in informal logical techniques in contemporary western thought.\(^4\) Even in formal logical theories, strict logicism is hardly presumed since the axioms or postulates or first principles on which the theory is based are generally supposed to be intuited and not amenable to demonstration. Thus, the kind of strict logicism that the author espouses is hardly found in actual theories, being only a highly imaginative proposition true only in an idealistic world. The problems of coherence raised in the paper largely ensue either from this presupposition of strict logicism or from an inherent ambiguity in the very concept of form itself.

The logical alone is not rational but the scope of human rationality extends from the empirical to the logical to the intuitive. Limiting the scope of rationality amounts to a delimitation of reality itself which rationality aspires to comprehend. On the other hand, too much loosening of its scope may lead to admission of the unreal as real. The insistence of ancient natural philosophical theorists such as the Śaṅkhyaṇavādins on clarification of the conditions of validity of knowledge prior to everything else, ought to be seen from this angle. The epistemological insight that three and only three pramāṇas will suffice for valid knowledge of reality means that if smaller number of pramāṇas is accepted, a considerable chunk of reality will be left out (nyūna siddhi), whereas admission of more than three will allow the admission of spurious objects as real (ādhikāya siddhi). Thus, empirical and logical or inferential, as well as intuitive propositions, properly examined, all form part of a rational body of knowledge. Addition of further pramāṇas in subsequent theories marks only an extension of the logical conditions of validity. And although Buddhists, at least theoretically, seem to deny the role of intuition, no school subsequently denied Buddha’s fundamental intuitions of momentariness and non-being. Thus, pure empiricism or pure logicism or pure intuitionism can arise at best due to lack of appreciation of this fundamental epistemological insight of tripramāṇyavāda, and at worst due to epistemological immaturity that is so characteristic of the pre-Kantian Greco-European nature philosophical theories. In a supra-epistemology seeking to explain the origins of empirical and logical knowledge, intuition can be the only starting point in being presumed as self-explanatory, whereas in so far as the actual unified theory of reality is concerned, the empirical makes only its grosser parts accessible, the subler parts to be captured by the logical and the subtlest by the intuitive.

The concept of form is essentially a classical Greek category, it is almost absent in ancient or classical Indian thought. One may trace its similarity with the concept of avyakta or biṣa in avyakta gāṇita or biṣa gāṇita, where the category of avyakta or biṣa has a degree of generality higher than that of form. In a simple equation such as \(X - Y = 10\), say, ‘\(X\)’ and ‘\(Y\)’ are the avyakta representing ‘forms’ of natural numbers satisfying this equation. Since the numbers themselves are general by a degree higher than the empirical objects, the avyakta is of a still higher degree of generality. The form of propositions in Aristotelian syllogistic logic stands in almost a similar relation with empirical propositions as does the avyakta to numbers in classical Indian algebra. But Aristotelian syllogistic logic is severely limited, for it can tackle only ‘all’ and ‘some’ propositions expressing a relation between classes, as only such propositions can be formalized. It is not adequate for apprais-
ing the validity of syllogisms in which singular propositions occur, such as the example taken by Daya Krishna. This limitation on Aristotelian syllogistic is set by the concept of form itself, for the form of a proposition is such that it is absolutely independent of empirical contingencies, which idea is not captured in the form of singular propositions. Since form is independent of empirical content, it is possible to test the validity of syllogisms purely by virtue of form, which in Aristotelian logic are 256 in number so far as ‘all’ and ‘some’ propositions are concerned. If this definition of form is not adhered to, Aristotelian logic would not be possible. If I were given a choice between accepting the definition of form and giving up Aristotelian logic, I would choose the former.

“All’ and ‘some’ propositions themselves are troublesome, for while it is difficult to verify the former, it is equally difficult to falsify the latter. This difficulty arises due to their inductive basis. There can be absolutely no logical justification for inferring an ‘all’ proposition from a limited number of singular propositions, it being founded on the intuition of an all-pervading (ṣyaṭṭa) sub-stratum or substance (dṛṣṭa). But that there is substance is a purely intuitive proposition having no logical basis. Thus, when it is held that ‘All crows are black’, it is in fact being said that the crows concerned are made of the same substance. The generalisations or sāmānyas of the first degree (having an empirical basis) can have no logical basis: they must all be founded on the intuition of substance. This is as much true of the category ‘cause’, as of, say, ‘number’.

Fregean logic goes further than Aristotelian logic in postulating a form for propositions. Thus, ‘p’, ‘q’, etc. are forms of empirical propositions to be characterized by truth functionality. A host of problems arise due to this postulation. In Indian algebra the āryya was timeless since it was a form of timeless numbers; Aristotle sought to preserve this timeless form by restricting himself only to classes; but Fregean logic is paradoxical at the root, for if form is to be timeless how can it capture the empirical singular propositions in an ever-changing world? If the predicates are restricted only to properties and qualities and not to actions and events, then there are very few timeless properties and qualities of substances. This would severely limit the scope of Fregean logic. Strictly speaking, Fregean logic is an attempt to bind the temporal in the timeless. This ambiguity is preserved in first order predicate logic where the form of the propositions appears in a new garb such as Gx, Fx, etc., C being the predicates and x being a variable with free and bound states. Thus the simple membership relation of classes is transformed into a complicated matrix involving a quantification operation, a samudaya sort of relation between subject and predicate and a logical connective with a truth functional characteristic in propositions such as (s) (Fx ⊃ Gx) and ∃x (Fx, Gx). The basic idea of trans-empirical form is hardly preserved in such symbolism.

It will be profitable to examine Daya Krishna’s analysis in the light of this discussion.

The analysis disregards the distinction of the syntax and semantics of logical or mathematical systems. An uninterpreted logical system is an ordered grammar of symbols with definite structural features. Such a system is built with certain intuited primitives and axioms which are undefined, as also with certain intuitive rules of transformation and procedure of demonstration. With these primitives as the basis, one can formulate certain stipulative definitions that are supposed to be neither true nor false. With the help of this apparatus one can have theorems in the system which are all tautologies. Such an uninterpreted logical system does not possess the feature of semantic truth, although its logical truth is claimed in the sense that it is true in all possible non-empty universes. The consistency and functional completeness of such syntactical deductive systems can generally be demonstrated on the basis of their analyticity. Thus, a syntactical structure which is not a tautology cannot be a theorem of the system. This consistency can be demonstrated even under an intended interpretation when the logical system acquires the features of semantic truth. What is important is that a given syntactical deductive system can have many intended interpretations and this does not affect its coherence or truth characteristic in any significant way. Such epistemic meta-systemic
analysis of logical systems has largely become possible partly due to ambiguities in the form-perspective and partly due to study of the syntactical features of the uninterpreted Euclidean geometrical system about whose truth or falsity it was considered meaningless to ask any question.

The same line of reasoning regarding the empirical theories helps resolve many perplexities that arise largely from a pure empiricist or pure logicist stance. Thus we picture for ourselves symbols or images in thought of the external objects of the world. The form which we give them is such that the necessary consequences of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequences in nature of the things pictured (Hertz). If by logical form here we mean the syntactical order of the uninterpreted mathematical system intended to be an empirical theory under an interpretation, then indeed there can be no formal identity between empirical and non-empirical propositions as the author ascribes to empirical scientific theories. Thus, a proposition of mechanics such as, 'The distance between two positions of a system is always smaller than the sum of the distances of the two positions from a third', is completely independent of experience in so far as its nomic or law-like universality is founded purely on definitions of what the facts are like. Only under an intended interpretation do they come to acquire the characteristic of being semantically true. Even then the facts remain the facts and the propositions of the logical system remain such propositions. And whenever such a 'correspondence' between the 'necessary consequences of the images in thought' and the images of the necessary consequences in nature of the things pictured does not obtain under an interpretation, we are always free to construct new mathematical systems that would in fact yield such correspondence under some interpretation. Thus, the variables of propositions of such mathematical systems are not given empirical values, rather the mathematical system itself is given an intended interpretation. Similarly the logical connectives expressive of formal relations display under the interpretation the relations between empirical statements. It so happens that the example taken by the author, namely, 'Francine plucked the fruit and ate it', is not displayed in the complex proposition \( p \land q \) under the intended interpretation of the available logical system. For that logical system is not temporally sensitive and one needs a temporally sensitive logical system under whose interpretation the truth and falsity of such a statement can be adjudged. The same is true of the conditional connective so far as the situation of empirical causation is concerned. Thus a mathematical system is called, under one interpretation, a theory of any specific science. And it is considered satisfactory (not true) to the degree that it displays the images of the necessary consequences in nature of the things pictured.

To our great amazement, a similar understanding of theories can be found in classical Indian astronomy. The astronomical theory of Śūrya Siddhānta, for example, of planetary bodies, is an interpretation (ṣphutikarana) of an intuited logical system (ganiśa) built as a geometrical model of points and circles, in which points on each circle move around the central point. Such a geometrical model is uninterpreted (asphuta) to begin with and should yield a correspondence (ṣṛga ganiśa aśiśya) with observed planetary positions and motions under the interpretation. Such interpretation involves certain geometrico-arithmetic operations upon which the system displays the required correspondence. A remarkable correspondence is displayed by the mathematical system under the interpretation that the central point is the planet earth, the first circle is the orbit of the moon, the second of the sun and so on—remarkable indeed if we keep in mind the limited mathematical techniques and instruments of observation available at the time.

From this discussion it should be clear that factual statements or statements expressive of facts are never demanded to be mutually coherent; but the theory, as a mathematical system under an interpretation, is demanded to remain coherent or retain its consistency. And when a factual statement is not derivable from the theory, the theory can never be declared inconsistent but only inadequate to display the required correspondence under the intended interpretation. Therefore, that which is verified is said to be factually true and that which is derivable from a theory is said to be true under an interpretation, and the two must correspond if the mathematical system is consistent as well
as interpretatively adequate. Even the correspondence or verification in the sense of ‘always observable under similar conditions’ may be revised to ‘generally observable’ if the facts so demand and probabilistic mathematical systems construed for displaying them under an interpretation.

Regarding values it may be observed that they are like facts in many respects, but in other respects they are also unlike facts. Factual propositions may be empirically false (in the sense that no object corresponding to the proposition is in fact observable), yet theoretically true. Two factual propositions may appear incompatible empirically, yet they may be theoretically compatible. Further, limitations of attention and time are as much true for factual observations as for values. But values differ from facts primarily in respect of one value being comprehensible only in the light of another ‘higher’ value. Thus the demand of any value theory, as different from any fact theory, would be that one and only one ultimate value be discovered. This discovery can be intuitive as well as rationally defensible. Thus, for example, the Sāṁkhya theory insists that complete elimination of suffering (āyatā dūkha niścītā) is the ultimate purpose of the world process. This may be an intuition but, is also rationally defensible. Sāṁkhya theory successfully provides a purely mechanical explanation of four sets of values, namely, āpavarga, dharma, artha and kāma, in the light of this postulated ultimate purpose. Further, values acquire their meanings only in reference to human actions and experiences. That a flower is beautiful derives its validity not so much from the object that is flower as from the beholder who experiences a state corresponding to its beauty. The fact that any value theory must ultimately be founded in a natural purpose makes its mathematical representation difficult. The propositions constituting the body of knowledge of such a value theory will be of the sort cited above, namely, the proposition ‘Āyatā dūkha niścītā is āyatā puruṣārtha’, or the proposition that ‘bhaga (i.e. dharma, artha and kāma) is for the purpose of āpavarga.” Such propositions involve not a causal but purposive understanding of man and things and any formal theory that is both causally and purposively coherent is not yet available although it is not considered impossible. Regarding ‘axiological coherence’ one can only say that so far as mathematical systems are concerned, it is the least clear.

IV

In so far as mathematical systems are concerned, the criteria of their consistency are the least restrictive. Thus the condition that a non-tautological proposition not be a theorem of the system is enough for establishing its consistency. When such symbolic systems are interpreted under an empirical situation, further restrictions are required in addition to the above restriction of ‘logical permissibility (Hertz)’. Thus, for instance, it needs to be postulated further that such systems be ‘correct’ (Hertz) in the sense that their essential relations do not contradict the relations of external things. But two permissible and correct systems or images of the same external objects may differ in respect of their ‘appropriateness (Hertz)’; that system is more appropriate which pictures more of the essential relations of the objects. Moreover, of two images that are equally appropriate, the one that contains a smaller number of axioms, intuitions or empty relations is the simpler. Now, there can be no reason why such restrictions should be put on the images or systems except that it is satisfactory. The question here is, can these restrictions be entertained if we broaden the span of external objects, namely, by including in it actions, decisions, emotions, purposes, etc.? Obviously, the restrictions of permissibility and correctness are fundamental and indispensable in so far as our images have to be consistent and ones that picture reality alone. But the restrictions of appropriateness and simplicity will have to be adjudged in the light of the span of the external relations of the objects encompassed. Further, it may be that we can never have an empirical theory, however widespread, that can picture by mathematical symbolism the entire gamut of relations between the external objects of experience, the centre of experience as well as the objects of evaluation. The reasons may become clear if we analyse carefully the radically different structures of philosophical informal theories and empirical formal theories.

Empirical formal theories must possess the characteristic of
direct falsifiability by direct or inferred observation. The demand that such concepts alone be employed in the theories that can either be measured directly or be reduced to such concepts, restricts the scope of generalization of the concepts employed in empirical theories. For this reason, higher levels of generalization cannot be effected in empirical formal theories. This limits the notion of law in such theories, for a law can be only that which employs, relations between, concepts mentioned above. Contrary to this, philosophical theories are generally never directly falsifiable. That is, if we can 'deduce' an empirical hypothesis or law from a theory that is false empirically, the theory will have to be considered falsified; otherwise not. Such a structure of informal philosophical theories becomes possible due to their ability to employ categories of higher and higher levels of generality. For this reason, philosophical theoretic laws are also very general because these express relations between concepts of higher levels of generality. Examples of such laws are the law of cause and effect, the law of *karma* and *phala*, the laws of Hegelian dialectical logic, etc. These laws are not empirical but are formulative because they employ categories of much higher levels of generality than the categories and concepts employed in empirical laws. Thus, for example, neither is cause a specific object or property of the world of experience nor is effect such like. A detailed study of the structure and nature of informal philosophical theories and the informal logical apparatus (*hetuabhāsa*, etc.) employed by them can throw many features of empirical formal theories themselves into relief and remove quite a few obstacles in the path of formulation of unified, formal theories of reality.

NOTES

2. Ibid., pp. 197–98.

Are There Types of Coherence?

DHARMENDRA KUMAR

Daya Krishna, in his paper 'Types of Coherence', argues against the notion of 'unitary' coherence and claims: 'Rather there are "coherences", each of a distinct type.' He distinguishes 'empirical coherence' and 'axiological coherence' from 'logical coherence' which he seems to think is more often than the other two regarded as 'the sole "real" coherence'. He seems to suppose that his view that there are three 'types' of coherence follows from the position, which he actually tries to establish by argument, that what constitutes coherence 'in the deductive sciences' is not available in the empirical sciences and axiology, and that axiology has no room even for the coherence available in the empirical sciences. We propose to defend here the 'unitary' conception of coherence by showing the invalidity of Daya Krishna's arguments.

Coherence is obviously a certain kind of order, and incoherence its absence. Coherence and incoherence are thus properties of certain sets rather than of individual objects. The type of order of which coherence may be said to be an instance is determined by the type of objects which can be significantly said to have, or lack the order among them. Among the sorts of things said to be coherent or incoherent are descriptions or accounts, plans, concepts. The sets most commonly characterized by philosophers as coherent or incoherent may, however, be said to be large sets of propositions. Daya Krishna's use of 'coherence' may be said to conform basically to this practice, though his use is far from consistent. Expressions like 'in the deductive sciences' do fall short of specifying exactly the type of objects, sets of which may be regarded as coherent or incoherent, but there are some clear indications also. He says of a sense of 'empirical coherence', for instance: 'It would be meaningless to talk of the coherence of two facts or even of two propositions. Only in the context of a theoretical system would it be meaningful to talk of coherence or incoherence.' And one is inclined to take his expression 'coherence within a logical or mathematical system' for 'coherence of a logical or mathematical system'. But in the same breath he speaks of 'the coherence of a particular set of primitive assumptions', 'the coherence of a set of syntactical rules' (he uses 'syntactical rules' interchangeably with 'transformation rules'), and even of 'the coherence of specific derivation within the system'. A set of axioms of a mathematical system is obviously not the same sort of things as the system itself; and if in Daya Krishna's view it is meaningless to speak of the coherence or incoherence of a pair of two empirical propositions, how is it meaningful to speak of a pair of axioms of a mathematical system, particularly if, as is generally the case, the axioms are mutually independent? On Daya Krishna's definition of consistency, even consistency can be ascribed only to deductive systems. His alternation of the monadic predicate 'coherent' with the dyadic predicate 'coherent with' in his remarks on the dyadic relation and elsewhere, inclines one to take for the dyadic relation the coherence he ascribes to a 'specific derivation'. But this interpretation is made difficult by his wrongly inferred but explicit denial: 'A specific individual can scarcely be said to "cohere" with the class to which it belongs.' These inconsistencies in Daya Krishna's use of 'coherence' may, however, be disregarded in examining his main thesis.

What exactly constitutes the coherence of 'a logical or mathematical system'? Daya Krishna not only uses expressions like 'the consistency or coherence', 'incoherent or incompatible', as if coherent-
ence were identical with consistency, but even says that 'coherence is defined in terms of non-derivability of \( p \) and \( \neg p \cdot \) Both the properties belong to sets of propositions, but not to the same sets. Carnap's state-descriptions are not wanting in consistency; but they do not thereby acquire coherence. To say that a set of propositions is consistent is, traditionally, to say that the members can all be true together, though they may not be. A set is said to be coherent only when the members, to quote from Ewing's *Idealism*, have 'some positive logical relation of entailment to each other'. That is why coherence is a favourite of the monists rather than of the logical atomists, while consistency is almost universally sought. Consistency, however, is a necessary condition of coherence; a set is not said to be coherent unless it is logically possible for the members to be true together. Daya Krishna recognizes deducibility as the 'positive' element of 'logical coherence', though his statements to this effect are to be found in the sections devoted to other types of coherence. He says, for instance: 'logical coherence—means deductive derivability from a set of assumptions in accordance with certain rules'. Since 'deductive derivability' is presupposed in speaking of 'a logical or mathematical' system, its consistency may be said to amount to its coherence. Ignoring Daya Krishna's use of 'consistency' interchangeably with 'coherence' in speaking about sets other than 'systems', it may be said that, according to him, a system is logically coherent if and only if it is a consistent deductive system.

Daya Krishna's denial of 'logical coherence' to empirical theories is based on his refusal to regard any of them as *deductive*. He argues that 'deduction from hypotheses, which themselves are empirical can hardly be strictly deductive in character', and is surprised that the propositions constituting 'the classic example of deductive derivation' are all empirical, since formal or deductive inference is said to depend *solely* on logical form, and divesting a proposition of its content by replacing its non-logical constants by variables is supposed to isolate its logical form. Daya Krishna tries to refute the universally admitted 'formal identity' between a propositional function and its empirical substitution instances. 'The form does not retain its purely logical character once the variables are given empirical values.' He is thus led to deny any scope for logical constants in empirical discourse. 'Our contention is just this, that the logical connectives cannot remain purely logical if they connect propositions which are empirical in character.'

He draws on the well-known ambiguities of ordinary language to show that the conjunctive and the conditional connectives cannot connect two empirical propositions. He argues that the conjunctive connective 'is logically commutative, but in such a proposition as 'Francine plucked the fruit and ate it', it is obviously cannot function in such a way.' Fortunately, he anticipates the objection 'that the connective "and" in the compound proposition 'Francine plucked the fruit and ate it' is not merely a conjunctive connective but an *ordering connective also*, and that 'the ordering relation ... negates the commutative character'. But he dismisses the objection by saying that 'the everyday use of "and" in 'Francine plucked the fruit and ate it' does not only not carry the commutative force of the logician's minimal "and" but goes positively counter to it.' Daya Krishna is obviously confusing the question regarding the logical possibility of a purely conjunctive connection between two empirical propositions with the factual question regarding the everyday use of 'and'. And his claim of 'and' going 'positively counter' to commutativity has obviously not been arbitrarily dropped; the ordering role assigned to 'and' negates or disallows commutativity which is, therefore, not just absent but impossible to restore, while the temporal asymmetry of the events is indicated by the same word. In order to determine whether the conjunctive connective can connect empirical propositions one must rather look for cases not complicated by a multiplicity of roles. 'Francine is tall and fair', and a host of other examples are available. Sentences in which 'and' occurs otherwise than simply as the conjunctive connective are convenient for ordinary purposes, but what is expressed by them can always be expressed by sentences in which 'and' occurs purely truth-functionally. Giving the name 'A' to 'the fruit' for convenience, what is expressed by the sentence is: there is a
moment $x$ at which Francine plucked $A$, and there is a moment $y$ at which Francine ate $A$, and $y$ is later than $x$. It is obvious that both the occurrences of 'and' in this sentence are commutative, that the sentences obtained by varying the position of its conjuncts have the same truth value as this sentence, whatever the facts may be.

Daya Krishna admits, however, that 'in this case the truth of the conjunction depends upon the truth of the conjoined', but he defends himself by saying that 'it is purely accidental and more because of the nature of the empirical propositions connected than because of the so-called logical nature of the connective concerned'. He says nothing as to what this kind of 'nature of the empirical propositions' consists in. He does, however, cite as an example free from this accident a pair of statements in the future tense, whose truth, it is claimed, does not assure the truth of their conjunction. He is right in saying that 'it is equally possible that I may be reading Plato or not be reading Plato at any future time minus hence', and that 'the conjunct assertion is false'. This is simply an instance of the law of contradiction. But Daya Krishna equates this obvious truth with the absurdity that 'from the truth of 'I shall be reading Plato' and 'I shall not be reading Plato', I can not infer the truth of the conjunct statement'. My reading and not reading Plato at a given time are not two 'events' as Daya Krishna supposes. The two constituent statements respectively assert and deny the occurrence of a single event. The two cases 'while separately possible are conjointly impossible', but if so, how can both the 'individual statements' be true? From the contradictory statements not only their conjunction but any statement whatever can be inferred, as Daya Krishna himself notices in another section. It seems that while rightly correlating the impossibility of a situation with the falsity of the statement purporting to describe it, he has been misled into correlating the possibility of a situation with the truth of the statement describing the situation.

Daya Krishna is similarly misled by the more common use of 'if' into believing that the conditional connective cannot connect two empirical propositions, that when 'if' is used to connect two empirical propositions, 'the relation between them remains no more of 'implication' but of causation'. He is not aware that the conditional connective can connect as casually unrelated a pair of propositions as 'God is yellow' and 'Nehru died in May' into a true proposition. That the word 'if' is not always or ever commonly used in this sense is not relevant. What makes anything an argument of a truth function is that it has a truth value. An empirical proposition can be an argument of a truth function simply because it has a truth value. Unfortunately, Daya Krishna does not discuss the most commonly used truth function—negation; and his treatment of contradictions considered above hardly indicates a satisfactory notion of it. If he were clear about negation and conjunction, a definition of the conditional in terms of them might be helpful.

Besides trying to show that the conjunctive and conditional connectives do not connect any empirical propositions, Daya Krishna gives a ground for denying the occurrence of logical constants in general in 'empirical propositions', or more generally, for denying to empirical propositions the forms represented by 'propositional functions'. 'All men are mortal' is not the same as 'All S is P'. The former is more the statement of a probable belief which we are prepared to revise in the light of new experience than the statement of categorical relation holding true of S referred to in the proposition concerned. By 'a probable belief' Daya Krishna obviously means a belief whose truth can never with justification be taken as certain, a belief which can possibly turn out to be false. The words 'than the statement of a categorical relation' tend to confuse a probable statement with a second order statement ascribing probability to a statement. The empirical statement 'All men are mortal' asserts categorically, neither hypothetically nor as merely probable, whatever it asserts, though it is only a probable statement and can possibly turn out to be false despite all the evidence we have for taking it to be true. Daya Krishna's grounds for denying to 'All men are mortal' the form represented by 'All S is P', unlike his grounds for denying to propositions having empirical components the forms represented by conjunctive and conditional formulæ, is not that not every inference from empirical premises in accordance with a rule of formal inference involving the logical constant in
question, that is, the universal quantifier, is valid. He is right, therefore, in taking the conclusion, as he seems to do, as covering all forms represented by 'propositional functions' rather than the form 'All S is P' specifically, in so far as the possibility or impossibility of a proposition to turn out to be false in the face of any evidence, unlike the validity or invalidity of an inference, is not connected with the presence or absence of a specific logical constant or form. While it is false that rules of inference involving conjunctive and conditional connectives are valid only for logical and mathematical premises and not for empirical premises, and accounts for Daya Krishna's failure to establish the non-occurrence of these connectives with empirical components, it is generally admitted and seems true that a logical or mathematical proposition's claim to truth is not open to revision, but that of every proposition containing empirical terms, with the sole exception of empirical instances of laws of logic such as 'It is raining' or 'It is not raining', is open to revision. But Daya Krishna makes no attempt to show that this epistemological difference between logical and mathematical propositions on the one hand, and 'empirical propositions' on the other, implies that no logical constants can occur in an empirical proposition, or that the form of an empirical proposition cannot be represented by a propositional function. If this difference did imply what Daya Krishna presumes it does, one would be inclined to regard it as accounting for the inapplicability of the specific rules of inference considered by him to empirical premises, though he does not suggest this and it would be incompatible with the admission of tautologies having empirical components as certain. A consideration of the function of logical constants will, however, make it obvious that the admitted epistemological character of empirical propositions cannot prevent the occurrence of logical constants in empirical propositions.

A logical constant is defined by the inferential relations of the propositions containing it, or in other words, by a set of rules of inference. The applicability of these rules to any discourse is not only a necessary but also sufficient condition for the occurrence in it of the logical constant. Not only will Daya Krishna's claim of the inapplicability of the rule of conjunction to empirical premises, if true, establish the non-occurrence of the conjunctive connective in 'empirical propositions', the applicability to 'empirical propositions' of all the rules of inference governing this connective will as well establish the occurrence of the connective in the propositions considered. Following the procedure adopted by Daya Krishna himself, all the rules governing the various logical constants can easily be found to be applicable to empirical discourse. The fact that empirical propositions are 'probable', or do not admit of conclusive verification, has no bearing on the question whether the rules of inference are applicable to or valid for empirical discourse, simply because the definition of validity used by Daya Krishna himself, that necessarily the conclusion of a valid inference is true if the premises are true, makes no reference to the presence or absence of this epistemological feature. The modality and the epistemological peculiarities of the premises are no more relevant to the validity of the inference than is its truth value, though, like its truth value, they are certainly relevant to the modality and epistemological peculiarities of the conclusion. Daya Krishna, fails to notice this and while not insisting that the premises must be true in order to allow a valid inference, he insists on its certainty, and likewise regards the conclusion of an inference in accordance with a rule of formal inference as necessary and certain. He rejects the common view that 'from two assertory propositions' only an assertory proposition is derivable, that the conclusion of 'the classic example' of deductive inference 'should be "Socrates is mortal" and not "Socrates must be mortal", because he thinks that "a logical derivation cannot be necessary".' The necessity he ascribes to the proposition derived belongs rather to the conditional which has the conjunction of the premises as the antecedent and the conclusion as the consequent. He is possibly misled by the ambiguity of 'logical' which is used synonymously with both 'formally valid' and 'logically true', and by that of 'derivation' which is used both for inference and for the conclusion of an inference, to confuse the claim of logical or formal validity for the syllogism with that of logical truth for the conclusion. If the admitted contingency of 'Socrates is mortal' is to be preserved, then, of course Daya Krishna has no choice but to
deny that it can occur as the conclusion of a deductive argument.

The question whether an empirical proposition can have any of the forms represented by propositional functions, or whether a propositional function can represent the form of an empirical proposition, must be distinguished from the question whether the epistemological difference between logical and mathematical propositions on the one hand and empirical propositions on the other is reducible to a difference of form. Supposing that the answer to the second question is in the affirmative, and no empirical proposition, analysed or unanalysed, can have the form of a logical or a fully analysed mathematical proposition, it does not follow that the form of no logical or mathematical proposition (analysed or unanalysed) has anything in common with the form of any empirical proposition. The form of a proposition is something composite. What distinguishes the form of one mathematical or logical proposition from that of another is the arrangement rather than the elements composing their forms, and Daya Krishna does not deny this. To say that no empirical proposition has the form of any logical or mathematical proposition is not to say that no logical constants occur in empirical propositions, but their arrangement differs in certain ways. In so far as an empirical proposition can have a logical constant, it can share with certain mathematical propositions a common form represented by a propositional function and enter into inferences of the same pattern. Thus, ‘All odd numbers between four and eight are primes’ and ‘All major rivers between the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej flow entirely in India’ can be regarded as instances of the same propositional function, and thus as sharing a form, in so far as the two permit the same sort of inferences, say in conjunction with ‘Seven is an odd number between four and eight’ and ‘The Sone is a major river between the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej’, respectively. Instances of singular propositional functions are likewise not confined to mathematics. ‘Daya Krishna is a philosopher’ is as much an instance of ‘Fx’ as is ‘Two is a number’. It seems obvious that subject-predicate propositions and relational propositions, distinguished by propositional functions by the number of variables, are bound to occur in every discourse.

Daya Krishna’s denial of the forms represented by proposi-
tional functions to empirical propositions obtainable by substitut-
ing constants for the free variables arises partly from a misunder-
standing of the function of free variables. He includes among the letters occurring in the truth functional schemata as well as ‘S’ and ‘P’ as they occur in his example ‘All S is P’. He speaks of ‘the objects denoted by the values of the variables’, thus using the expression ‘values of a variable’ in the sense of substituents or expressions commonly substituted for the variable, without implying, however, that the substituents are proper substituents really capable of being substituted for the variable. He admits the possibility not only for a specific variable that none of the expressions commonly regarded as substituents may be proper substituent, but for all variables together that ‘no values’ may ‘fill in exactly the bill provided by the so-called variables’. He is obviously not considering the question whether a variable can be introduced in a language before that language has expressions analogous to those commonly regarded as substituents, since this question is not relevant to the distinction between proper and improper substituents as he makes it. He is rather saying that it may be impossible for a language ever to have proper substituents for the variables; that it makes sense to speak not only of some but of all variables as being incapable of having any values at all. The possibility he takes to be actually realized, however, is rather that ‘only certain specific types of values, say those of mathematics’ are proper substituents which fill in the bills exactly. Empirical substituents are not proper because they fill in the bills only approximately or imperfectly. That is why ‘the form though ostensibly remaining the same, undergoes a subtle transformation’ when empirical rather than mathematical expressions are substituted for the free variables occurring in the propositional functions. He seems to think that imperfect occupants of the bills are not receptive to logical constants which are thus confined to logic and mathematics. But a variable is an expression, and has the function assigned to it. The bill provided by a variable is not designed for its own sake under divine guidance or primarily for transcendent occupants, but to take a familiar expression distinguished by a certain syntactical feature. Daya Krishna’s ‘propositional variables’ are distinguished from the
variables occurring in ‘All S is P’ by the expressions which are respectively regarded commonly as their substitutes which, therefore, far from failing to fill the bills, actually define them. Anything which has a truth value is commonly regarded as a substituent for the ‘propositional variables’. Daya Krishna would agree that an empirical proposition has a truth value; and it makes no sense to speak of a proposition as having a truth value but not exactly. Similarly, an expression is either a predicate and thus fills a bill or not; there is no scope for approximation. Daya Krishna thinks that ‘if all values’ must fill the bill, the bill is ‘utterly useless for purposes of empirical investigation’ which concerns ‘specific structure and inter-relationships of empirical phenomena’. Since he distinguishes types of variables, propositional and others, his statement can only mean that if every proposition is a proposition or a value of a propositional variable and every predicate is a predicate, the bill for predicates and the bill for propositions are no use to the empirical investigator. He may agree that syntactical differences which distinguish predicates from names and both from sentences are implicit in the statement and other uses of language, but are the variables distinguished by these features useful? The generality for which the variables are introduced no more tampers with the specificity of empirical phenomena than it does with the specificity of mathematical objects, and is required in every investigation at any advanced level. It is by mistaking specificity as something sought only by empirical investigation and generally as something that has no scope in empirical knowledge, and by regarding the bills provided by the variables as designed for their own sake, that Daya Krishna is led to deny the possibility of the form of an empirical proposition being represented by a propositional function, rather than suggest the introduction of another set of variables to represent specifically the forms he seems to recognize sets of empirical propositions as sharing among themselves though not with mathematical propositions.

Daya Krishna says nothing about deductive arguments in philosophy, and his own arguments are obviously deductive. His argument for the non-occurrence of the conjunctive connective and that seeking to prove the non-occurrence of logical constants in general in empirical propositions are both syllogistic arguments, the first with a false minor and the second with a false major. If, as has been argued above, Daya Krishna is wrong in holding that in empirical theories ‘the derivation . . . is itself not logical but empirical’, and some empirical theories are deductive systems, in spite of the fact that ‘the derived proposition has its verification independently of that from which it has been derived’, then ‘logical coherence’ as defined in Section II belongs as much to them as to any other. In view of this important character shared in common by mathematical and empirical deductive theories, there would be no more point in saying that there are two different ‘types’ of coherence than there would be in saying there are two types of idiocy, male and female.

Daya Krishna says that ‘two valuational propositions may each be valid and yet be valuationally incompatible with each other’. This sounds like his contention that ‘I shall be reading Plato’ and ‘I shall not be reading Plato’ may both be true and their conjunction false. Daya Krishna’s use of the expression ‘valuationally incompatible’ is puzzling. In the absence of any explanation of its meaning it seems natural to interpret it as analogous to ‘physically incomplete’. Generally, it is events or states of affairs that are said to be physically incompatible, but ignoring this, two propositions may be said to be physically incompatible if and only if the negation of their conjunction is deducible from physical laws. Daya Krishna’s explicit denial of general axiological principles, rules out interpretation of ‘valuationally incompatible’ on this pattern. Most probably he means by it simply incompatible, and the adverb has been prefixed only to prevent a confusion of the incompatibility of two valuational propositions with the physical incompatibility of the propositions describing the realization of the objects to which value is ascribed by the valuational propositions. But it is self-contradictory to admit two propositions as true or ‘valid’ and also as incompatible—logically, physically, or whatever; for if they are true, so is their conjunction, and negation of
it is impossible to deduce from true propositions. Daya Krishna seems to have been led to this view by incomplete formulation of imperative and valuational indicative sentences. The admission of incompatibility between true propositions leads him to the view that the judgement of the consistency of two valuational propositions is ‘almost as intuitive as the judgement that this is a value’. But if axiology is thus reduced to strokes of intuition in the name of ‘the fullest autonomy’ of values, where is there any room left for coherence? Is it difficult to guess whom Daya Krishna has in mind as claiming this sort of autonomy as ‘the sole “real” coherence’. He may choose to use ‘coherence’ synonymously with ‘logical consistency’, ‘empirical (scientific) compositibility’, ‘feeling of valuational consistency’ (if that makes sense at all), besides ‘coherence’ itself at the same time; but this ambiguous use does not make such widely different properties into ‘types’ of coherence. Nor does it help any academic purpose to use a single word for different things when commonly used words distinguish them.

NOTES


In one of his recent papers Daya Krishna has attempted a detailed refutation of the traditional view that Indian philosophy—barring the materialism of the Carvaka school—is spiritually oriented. The main argument in this refutation is the similarity between Indian philosophy and its western counterpart in respect of subject matter and method of inquiry and the established view that western philosophy is not spiritually oriented. Daya Krishna has advanced certain historical and exegetical arguments too in support of his conclusions. Balasubramanian of Madras University and Potter, the well-known American scholar in Indian philosophy, have both in different ways countered the arguments of Daya Krishna and shown convincingly that the avowal of the moksha ideal by Indian philosophy as a whole marks it out as spiritually-oriented. So far so good. But we would like to take the argument against Daya Krishna’s contention a step further. We wish to show that not only Indian philosophy but philosophy as a whole is a spiritually-oriented enterprise. Unless philosophy is so regarded its raison-d’etre as an independent, intellectual branch of knowledge cannot be upheld.

In this connection we may recall the logical positivist charge against traditional western philosophy that it consists mostly of unverifiable and therefore meaningless statements. This charge was never effectively met by the advocates of traditional philosophy. They thought they had vindicated their stand simply by
showing that the positivistic criterion of meaningfulness was not tenable either as a general proposition or as a prescription. The controversy sparked off in the field of philosophy by the positivists in the first few decades of the century is now a forgotten episode, but the undeniable conclusion it left behind, that philosophy cannot but be a discipline subservient to science and that its sole business is to prepare the way for scientific investigation by analysing and clarifying the concepts on which the latter is based, is tacitly accepted by almost all progressive western philosophers. We refer to this fact mainly to highlight the contrasting situation prevailing in the sphere of Indian philosophy since pre-historic antiquity to the present day. The supremacy or independent status of philosophy was never questioned by any Indian school of thought despite the fact that there has been continuous debate among the adherents of different philosophical schools with regard to the various doctrines they advocate. How do we account for this contrast? It will not do to say that science had not developed enough in the India of ancient times for any scientific-minded Indian thinker to come forward with a positivist bias against philosophy. The sciences of anatomy, medicine, botany, astronomy, mathematics, etc., had been widely and intensively cultivated by ancient Indians and the theory of meaning on which the positivist critique of philosophy lays so much stress was elaborately and variely treated in the philosophies of grammar, logic and Mimamsa, if not of other schools. If, despite this, the credentials of philosophy as a supreme intellectual enterprise was never questioned in India it was mainly because Indian thinkers never lost sight of the fact that philosophy, unlike all other disciplines, is a spiritually-oriented discipline and so has its own characteristic approach to the problem of reality.

Spiritual orientation, however, does not mean dealing with the spirit or the self as the object of inquiry. The Sanskrit word ‘Adhyatmavidya’, which is rendered by the English word ‘spiritual orientation’, means literally ‘oriented to the self or the concept of self’. It does not mean ‘dealing with self’. So we may understand philosophy to be ‘inquiry which is oriented to or whose basis is the concept of self’. The object of this inquiry is, like that of scientific inquiry, the world itself. But this fact does not affect the independence or the scientific or rational character of philosophical inquiry; when the scientific inquiry is objective or object-oriented and is concerned with the objective world, the philosophical inquiry is self- (or self-concept) oriented although concerned with the same object. ‘To be oriented to’ therefore means ‘to be determined by’, the mode of determination being different in the case of different philosophies. To illustrate how a philosophy or its standpoint is determined by self or a self-concept we may consider two schools of philosophy, namely that of the Vaisheshika and the Sankhya. According to the Vaisheshika school the self is a substance endowed with certain attributes which characterize it only when it is associated with the body-mind complex. Even consciousness characterizes the self only when certain physiological functions are taking place in the body. When consciousness is not at work, which means that the self is devoid of the cognition of having itself as its object, the self may fall into a state of unconsciousness. This self mistakenly identifies itself with the body—quite different in nature from itself—which it inhabits. The relation of the self and the body is quite external, although it is felt to be the relation of identity. Such is the understanding of the nature of the self from which the Vaisheshika school derives its basic notion of the real, in the light of which it seeks to interpret the nature of the world. The important ingredients of this basic notion directly derivable from the above view of the self are: first, the confusion of one substance with another substance, as that of the self and the body; second, the knowability of all objects like that of the self; third, the retention of its being or nature by every substance despite the transitoriness of its attributes as is the case with the self during its unconscious state; fourth, the distinguishability of things which are erroneously confused with each other; and fifth, the association through different relations of things of distinctive natures. These ideas combined with one or two others connected with the above view of the self help determine the Vaisheshika standpoint with regard to the whole realm of objective reality.

Turning to the Sankhyaian standpoint, we find that the notion of the self which this school treats as authentic and basic, is used to determine its world-view or its standpoint only by contrast with
its self-view. The world is totally unlike the self. If the self is immutable and ineffable, the world is continually changeable and definite in form; and while the self is pure sentiment the world is nothing but inertia. The self suffers bondage and liberation but the world is unaffected by these processes. Thus, unlike the Vaiśeṣika school, the Sāṅkhya school conceives of the world not in the image of the self but in a diametrically opposite way. However, for both these schools it can be said that their respective world-views are determined mainly by their respective views of the self.

Having considered this account, one may ask, ‘Does not such an explanation of philosophy’s spiritual orientation turn it into a mere subjective endeavour, or to put it more simply, a sort of daydreaming?’ To attempt a satisfactory answer to this question it is necessary to be clear about the meaning of the word ‘subjective’, which is used here as an accusation against philosophies as understood above. Whatever be the nature of an inquiry or its subject matter, it is some conscious individual as a subject who initiates it. The nature of this subject—whether psychological, physiological, mental, purely rational, emotional—does not form a direct or indirect part of the inquiry or its subject matter, but it cannot be denied that the subject in some capacity or the other is an implicit presupposition of all inquiry. Even the thoroughgoing objection to the sciences cannot be regarded as devoid of this subjective presupposition. The inquiring scientist may have all his attention focussed on the object of his investigation, not allowing his subjective ideas and prejudices to influence his findings about the object. Yet, it is as a conscious living being, that is to say, as an embodied being, that the scientist is able to conduct his investigation. The scientist cannot afford to forget, while engaged in his scientific investigation, that he has a physical body with the help of which alone he is able to carry out all the experiments and observations that form part of his investigations. If, for the sake of argument, it is supposed that a practising scientist is all of a sudden transformed into a disembodied being, will he then be able to carry on the investigation as before or get the kind of results that are expected in routine scientific investigations? All measurement which is basic to all scientific investigation starts with and from the body of the scientist. So is the case with observations. Thus, it will be found that bodily subjectivity is built into all scientific pursuit, even though the scientist is totally unaware of this fact. Even if he were made aware of it he would not attach any importance to it because he treats his body only as a tool of which the various equipments he uses are only extensions in the conduct of his investigations. But could a disembodied being or a being who happens to be all-pervasive use scientific tools in just the way that a living scientist does or get the kind of results that he does?

As a matter of fact, it was the discovery made at the turn of the century by certain scientists, both at the macrocosmic and the microcosmic levels, that the scientist’s observational mechanism cannot but influence the object at which it is directed, which led to the discovery of the theory of relativity and quantum theory. These theories are, in philosophical jargon, the disguised admission of the intrusion of subjectivity in the scientist’s supposedly objective inquiry and its findings.

All this is not to condone, but to explain and thereby justify, the kind of subjectivity which philosophy on the above views cannot avoid. If the bodily subjectivity infecting science is implicit, the subjectivity of philosophy is quite explicit. The philosopher makes it the very starting point of his inquiry. The account of the world or a part of it that the scientist gives is one that is obtained mainly through the body of the scientist, but the philosopher’s account is of the world as a whole and as such is hypothetical in nature being derived, as shown above, from different notions of the self. The general form of this account is therefore given by the expressions: if the mind were the self such and such would be the nature of the world; if consciousness were the self the nature of the world would be something different; and so on. This hypothetical character of philosophical theories is explained by the fact that the philosopher being in reality an embodied being, cannot have direct experiential knowledge of the nature of the world as could be envisaged, say, by a purely mental or a purely sentient self. The philosopher will have to construct imaginatively the picture of such a world. A well-known example of such a construction in modern philosophy is that of Descartes. The imaginative justification of the possibility of universal scepti-
cism that Descartes has given is nothing but an imaginative construction of a philosophical view of the world that one might get if one were nothing but pure mind. Similarly, Husserlian phenomenology is another imaginative construction of a world obtainable by a bracketing of all ontological presuppositions.

In contrast to theories of science, philosophical theories are by nature universal. Scientific inquiry being object-oriented, the nature of the object with which a particular scientist deals partly determines the nature, scope and method of the inquiry that science conducts. In philosophy, however, the object or the objective world is not the primary object of inquiry. The philosopher is not interested in the world, or more precisely, in the world as it is or might be in itself apart from any knower of it. Realizing that the scientific and necessarily partial views of the world obtained by the different sciences are infected by bodily subjectivity, the philosopher seeks to attain a universal view of the world from the vantage point of higher levels of self-conscious subjectivity. From one level of subjectivity the philosopher may rise to another and higher level of subjectivity in his quest of the real nature of the world, and this process may continue as long as the philosopher is not completely satisfied with the nature of his quest or the world-view finally attained by him.

If both science and philosophy are equally infected by subjectivity, what is gained by the pursuit of philosophy over and above that of science? One may answer this pertinent question by drawing attention to the fact that the different grades of subjectivity with which philosophy deals imaginatively are intended to be experienced by means of a spiritual discipline as respectively appropriate to those grades so that the philosophical quest seriously conducted inevitably leads to the gradual spiritual development of the philosopher. The intellectual experimentation with different notions of the self by the philosopher is, firstly, aimed at attaining the most comprehensive and satisfactory view of reality as a whole in terms of that notion or some notion derivable from it. Secondly, the self-notion, which is intellectual to begin with, is sought to be cultivated assiduously with a view to make it one's own, and realize it within one's own being. Thus, philosophy, which to start with is merely an intellectual endeav-
Some Thoughts on Daya Krishna’s ‘Three Myths’

J.N. MOHANTY

For many years now, Daya Krishna has been, in a series of highly provocative papers, questioning many of the received and taken-for-granted ideas about Indian philosophy. It is a sign of the sad state of philosophy in India that these challenges have gone mostly unheeded and that the same clichés continue to be rehearsed despite his critique. I think he has succeeded in showing that the characterization of Indian philosophy as ‘spiritual’ is shallow, unthinking, and after all a myth. Two other myths about Indian philosophy that Daya Krishna draws attention to are: the claim that Indian philosophy is based on the authority of the Vedas, and the claim that Indian philosophy consists of a fixed number of clearly delimited ‘schools’. These two critiques have been elaborated in a number of papers. One of them, entitled ‘Vedānta: Does it Really Mean Anything?’, I argue that it is impossible to define—either by identifying a set of doctrines or by specifying a body of founding texts—what ‘Vedānta’ stands for. The enormous difficulty of identifying a text, or a corpus of texts, has been one of Daya Krishna’s chief concerns. What, after all, are the Vedas? The Mantras? Or the Brāhmaṇas? What are the Upaniṣads? He presses the point that the identity, and identifiability, of these, and other subordinate texts have just been taken for granted. But once questions are raised as to what they are, whether they are sharply demarcated from other coordinate or superordinate texts, one cannot deny, as was well recognized in antiquity, that many of the texts were but the result of arbitrary compilations, displacements and revisions to which later commentators gave the stamp of unified textuality. This last recognition inevitably raises the question whether ‘a new way of looking at the texts’ is not necessary.2

I am, as I have just said, in agreement with Daya Krishna’s critique of the facile characterization of Indian philosophy as ‘spiritual’. So I will make a few brief remarks on this matter before considering the questions concerning ‘authority’ and ‘philosophical schools’. With regard to the latter, again, I will not even attempt to consider Daya Krishna’s many and varied questionings about the ‘textuality’ of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, for it lies outside my competence. Granting Daya Krishna’s critiques provisionally, I will ask if there is still not something about those claims—the claims about ‘authority’ and ‘schools’—that cannot be saved.

First, then, as to the so-called ‘spiritual’ character of Indian philosophy. Philosophy, or even the dārśanas, whatever else they may be, embody thoughts. And (i) thoughts themselves may be, ontologically speaking, regarded as spiritual (geistige) entities; or, (ii) they may have as their subject matter something spiritual; or (iii) acts of thinking, of which those thoughts are products, may be said to be spiritual; or (iv) thinking specific to the dārśanas may be, indeed is, able to lead up to a goal that is spiritual; or (v) it may be said that one central task of such thinking is to demonstrate the possibility of achieving such a spiritual goal. Let us look at each of these alternatives. The first is useless, for if thoughts, qua thoughts, are spiritual, then all thoughts are so, and not merely the thoughts embodied in the dārśanas. The second is more helpful, for it is indeed the case that an important concern of the dārśanas is the nature of the ātman, and this certainly, if there is any, is a spiritual entity. The word ‘spiritual’ has no specific meaning, but without having to decide that issue now, it is best to ask which term in Sanskrit does the word ‘spiritual’ (or ‘spirit’) translate; which term, that is to say, that one uses in describing the ‘ātman’ would one want to render as ‘spiritual’? In the large spectrum of discussions on the nature of ātman that one finds in the literature of the dārśanas, the issues that stand out...
are: Is the ātmān essentially individuated or is it one universal entity present in all sentient beings? Is consciousness (āt) an essential, intrinsic property of ātmān, or is it an extrinsic, contingent property of it? Is ātmān distinct from the body, different also from the psycho-physical complex? Is ātmān a referent of the word 'I', or not? Is ātmān eternal or non-eternal? Which of these issues is the question, obscurating to say the least, is ātmān something 'spiritual'? I think the term 'spiritual' has long historical links with some concepts (and terms) in Christian theology; it does not help to appreciate the deep features of Indian thinking. The same scepticism I have voiced in the just preceding remarks may be raised with regard to (iii). That acts of thinking are spiritual is, in one sense, a trivial statement; to say, using the German word, that they are geistige is not to characterize them but to use familiar names for them. One wants to know further in what sense they are geistige. Hegel's *Phenomenology* of 1807 is a classic attempt to answer this question. In neither of the senses (ii) or (iii), is it just false to say that Indian philosophy is spiritual. It is, rather, either unilluminating and trivial, or obscurating and confusing, or it does not help distinguish the Indian *darśanas* from a large segment of western philosophy. For me, the most serious problem is that I do not understand what such a characterization means.

The really interesting claims, then, are to be found in (iv) and (v). The *darśanas* are supposed to lead to the highest goal of life, the highest *purusaśātra*, i.e. mokṣa, and this goal, if anything, deserves most eminently to be called 'spiritual'. As a means to reach this goal, *darśanas*—or at least most of them—also deserve to be called 'spiritual'. I will not reiterate my continuing unease with the term 'spiritual', but will rather concern myself with the substantive issue: whether this means—end relationship of the *darśanas* to the highest goal of life should not be taken to throw light on the nature of Indian philosophy. Even on the most traditional account, the *darśanas* do not directly lead to mokṣa, at most they provide the needed intellectual defence of the possibility of mokṣa. Consider the account, advanced by Vedānta: the person desirous of mokṣa should, first, undertake śravaṇa, i.e. studying the scriptures (and the relevant texts) under an appropriate teacher, then perform *manana*, i.e. reflection on what has been learnt, and, finally, undertake *nididhyāśana*, i.e. meditation on the truth learnt and reflectively appropriated. Now what is called philosophical thinking or doing the *darśanas*, belongs to the second stage, i.e. *manana* which, on the traditional account, consists in (i) finding positive arguments in support of the position learnt, and (ii) finding arguments by which doubts about the possibility of the position can be removed (*asaṁbhāva-nirādhiḥ nirūkṣaṇa*). The utmost that the Vedantin as a philosopher can do is to interpret the texts, give arguments in one's support, and refute the arguments advanced by the opponents against the position. The path from this point—provided there is an end point to this intellectual process of achieving mokṣa—is long, and leads beyond the scope of the *darśana*, in which case, even on the traditional account, the *darśana* is not the karaṇa of mokṣa. It is well known that it is not also a necessary antecedent—persons with no knowledge of the *darśana* may attain mokṣa by virtue of extraordinary gifts or inexplicable 'grace', or powerful 'traces' from past lives.

If the only function, then, which a *darśana* can perform in relation to mokṣa is to demonstrate the latter's possibility, the alleged 'spirituality' of the *darśana* loses much of its point. For we can say rather that a *darśana* leads to mokṣa, not that a person truly understands a *darśana* when he attains mokṣa. The last, if asserted, would be unwarranted, and would lead to the consequence that all the great and traditionally respected philosophers belonging to a *darśana* (e.g., Vācaspati and Madhusūdana Saraswati in the case of Advaita Vedānta) either did not truly understand the Advaita philosophy, or if they did they had attained mokṣa—the second alternative would prove itself to be either trivially true or simply unproven.

Against a more sophisticated version of the view, developed above, about the relation of a philosophy to mokṣa—a version which Daya Krishna ascribes to the late K.C. Bhattacharyya and according to which philosophy leads to the theoretic awareness of certain valuational possibilities which are then actualized by some other extra-theoretic process such as yāga, in general by some form of sādhanā—Daya has certain very pertinent objections. If
this were the purpose of the *darśana*, Daya Krishna argues, then Indian philosophy would have had a very short career indeed. For once the possibilities were demonstrated, that task would have needed no fresh attempt. This, I think, is a weak point: philosophical demonstration is not like mathematical proof (even mathematical proofs are revised, improved upon, sometimes entirely abandoned with the discovery of hitherto unnoticed assumptions). A philosophical proof always leaves room for fresh arguments challenging it—thus there is a never-ending process of reflection. In fact, the point to be made against the Bhattacharyya-type model would rather be this unending nature of philosophical thinking: the putative demonstration would never come to an end. The state of *manāna* has to be arbitrarily halted—as Kierkegaard knew very well—in order that the existential, actualizing *sādhanā* may begin. Left to itself, *manāna* would go on.

Daya Krishna has other arguments against any attempt to tie the ideal of *mokṣa* too closely to a philosophical system. There is no doubt in my mind that writers—not of philosophical works alone, but of quite other sorts of treatises—began by emphasizing their subservience to the ideal of *mokṣa*, which makes one wonder how seriously one needs to take such claims, whether this was not the manner of style, at most one of conforming to a recognized cultural norm. With regard to the *darśanas* one may want to take such claims more seriously: the issue is, how seriously? There is a well-known distinction between two sorts of philosophical works: *ādhyātmiaka* and *ānvikṣiki*. The former group—including the Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Vedānta ‘schools’, and, in my view, large chunks of Buddhism and Jainism—should be expected to have a closer connection with the goal of *mokṣa*; the latter group—the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools—may be expected not to have any such connection. Yet the distinctions are not thus clear-cut. Every *ādhyātmiaka* system has its own logic and epistemology, i.e. its own *pramāṇa* theory; every *ānvikṣiki* school lays claims to its own *ādhyātmiaka* goal. And yet the connections between these two ‘discourses’, despite claims to the contrary, are not clear and close, and one must recognize that Daya Krishna has again succeeded in putting his fingers at the right spot.

But instead of concluding that the claim regarding condu-
civeness to *mokṣa* was a large and well-cultivated self-deception, let me try to think if there is no other way of being fair to the tradition’s self-understanding. For this purpose, I suggest that we bear two things in mind. First of all, every *darśana*, as a theoretical system, had a certain conception of *mokṣa* built into it, determined by, and in turn determining, certain broad metaphysical concepts. Therefore, the different systems were not different attempts to demonstrate the possibility of the same practical ideal of *mokṣa*, but each was an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of its own ideal of *mokṣa* as interpreted within its own system. And part of that demonstration was to show how its understanding of that goal was connected with the broad categorical structure of its own system. Secondly, to maintain that the *darśanas*—all, or at least many of them—undertook a certain task, or even defined themselves as intellectual enterprises in terms of a certain task, is by no means to claim that a *darśana*—or even any of the said *darśanas*—successfully carried out the project. This gap between the founding project and the ‘success’ in executing that project haunts all philosophy and science, and provides the space where ‘history’ inserts itself. Each *darśana*, contrary (but not contradictory) to the tradition’s self-understanding, has a historical development, to the complex character of which I cannot attend at the moment. But this second point prepares us to respond to the argument—advanced by Daya Krishna and by me as well in other places—that not all the concerns of a *darśana* appear to have a conceivable relevance for the founding project of being instrumental to, or at least exhibiting the possibility of, achieving *mokṣa*.

The worry that not all the concerns of a *darśana* are equally relevant, or even have any relevance at all, for the founding project is, one may suggest, due to the implicit assumption that a *darśana* is a perfectly close-knit system in which every component stands in organic relation to every other. There are students of Indian philosophy who hold such a view. Only on such a construal of a *darśana* will it be a decisive argument against the thesis that the system is either instrumental to, or a demonstration of the possibility of, *mokṣa*. If only one can show that some very interesting and important concerns of the system do not appear to have
any relevance for that project. If the system is an organic unit, then that thesis must be misleading, indeed false. But I am convinced that a darśana is not such a closely-knit, organic unity—as the historical development of a system shows. Many old doctrines are reinterpreted, modified, rejected, and new ones added. With this conception of a loose system, many parts may be bereft of any relevance for the founding project, and yet the claim that such is the founding project may still be valid. It all depends upon what kind of determining role you assign to that project with regard to every nook and corner of a system.

Furthermore, consider the following comparison. Technology tries to deal with a specific task, a practical project, at hand. It falls back on applied physics, which is based on pure theoretical physics. Much of what the pure physicist does may be 'technologically' irrelevant, but a physical theory as a whole is not. Let us take another step in the direction of theorizing. A philosophy of science may seek to provide a logical foundation for a physical theory, as, for example, von Weizsäcker has done for quantum mechanics. But such a logical, foundational theory itself has no direct, or even proximately indirect, relevance for the technology under consideration. Connections between parts of a theory, except in the case of a formal-deductive theory guided by a fundamental project, are never logically tight, and the connection between theory and practice is many-layered. In this ramified and loose set of interconnections, the sense of the practical project may, at times, be lost and may resurface at others.

What I have been trying to suggest is that even if Daya Krishna's premises are correct, his conclusion does not inevitably follow. It may still be that the darśanas—and also the philosophers—accepted the founding project, sometimes explicitly if they were concerned with 'removal of pain', and implicitly in some other cases, possibly 'emptily'.

These remarks on the claim that the darśanas are 'spiritual' have, I believe, prepared the way for reflecting on Daya Krishna's other two 'myths' about Indian philosophy—namely, those about 'Schools' and 'texts'. With regard to both, Daya Krishna raises questions which are based on a largely correct evaluation of the facts concerned—that the putative 'Schools' encompass extreme divergences of views, this is particularly true of Vedānta as a school; and that the so-called 'texts' are, as in the case of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, results of compilations that are often arbitrary and editing that may appear capricious. But the conclusions that Daya Krishna appears to draw are that there are in fact no 'Schools' and no 'texts'. The premises warrant these conclusions only if it is assumed that talk about 'Schools' and 'texts' is viable only if there are rigidly definable schools and non-arbitrarily circumscribed texts, authored preferably by one person and not collected or compiled. It is this assumption that I find unacceptable.

To be fair to Daya Krishna, it must be emphasized that he draws attention to a serious drawback in our understanding of Indian philosophy. A well-known American philosopher—not lacking in either curiosity or respect for Indian philosophy—recounted to me with frustration his experience with a philosopher from India who was invited to give a talk on Indian philosophy. The visitor began by saying, 'There are six systems of orthodox Indian philosophy and three unorthodox systems.' The rest of the lecture was devoted to giving bird's-eye views of these nine systems. We need to notice, first, that this cliche of 'six systems' (sadrāsanas) does not and cannot claim antiquity (did it all begin with Max Müller?). Madhavacārya's Sarvādārāsanasaṃgraha lists many more, including the Grammarians, the Pāṇiniyās, and while the precise number, or even the inveterate habit of numbering, is not important and in fact may conceal the real truths about the darśanas, there is no doubt that from very ancient times the location of 'Schools' did figure prominently in philosophical interchange. Yet, even the best of the philosophers though from within a 'school', did not claim to have founded a new school. There is an obvious nobility about this last-mentioned fact which contrasts so strikingly with the way some western thinkers, far inferior in calibre, want to be known as founders of new schools of philosophy. (In the West claims to originality become trite; in India such claims are scarce. Regardless of geography, cases of true originality have to be sought after, and luckily and rewarding, are often found.) This nobility, however, brings with it a certain blindness, in the culture, to the thoughts
of an individual qua that individual, to the innovative and interpretive originality of the thinker. However, even the tradition was not entirely blind to individual contributions. In some rare cases, the individual thinker proclaimed his defiance of the 'school's' tradition and insisted on his own innovations. Raghunātha Śiromāṇi is a striking example of this individualism. We only wish there were many more like him, so that the appearance of rigidity of the systems could have received the severe jolt it needed. There are other cases where the tradition recognized the originality of individual thinkers. The difference between Pāṇini and Vācaspati in interpreting Śaṅkara-Uddyogaśāra's numerous innovations in the Nyāya epistemology, as also Dignāga's in the tradition to which he belonged; Gangeśa's many new formulations of the Nyāya positions—all these are well known and well recognized. It is then the modern Indian, writing in English, and not the Sanskrit pandit, who is guilty of the intellectual fuzziness which is incurably expressed in the clichés about schools. Let us correct that fuzziness. But when all is said and done, the fact remains, and we have to recognize this, contrary to Daya Krishna's conclusions that Indian philosophy throughout the ages understood itself in that location, and we must be able to preserve that self-understanding. In order to be able to do that we need to define the 'schools' in terms of some of their basic concerns and positions while leaving room for a whole range of possible variations and differences of opinion within that broad definition. Most of the schools are easy to take care of in this manner: no one could be a Vaiśeṣika unless he subscribed to atomism and a pluralistic ontology; no one could be a Nyāya unless he were a realist, a pluralist and also had an overriding concern with the pramāṇa theory. It is with Vedānta that one meets with difficulties: what could be the common conceptual framework between Advaita Vedānta and Dvaita Vedānta? I believe some common questions were being addressed: What is brahman (of the Upaniṣads) or the highest self (paramātman)? What is the relation between the finite individual self (jīva) and this highest self? Is the individuality of the finite self preserved in the state of mokṣa? None of the other 'schools'—not Śāṅkara, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika—asked these questions. Śāṅkara and Mādhva, standing at two extremes of the spectrum, may be understood as giving quite different answers to these and several other questions. Anyone is a Vedāntin whose chief philosophical concern is with such questions.

The view that the texts, the three prasthānas, define Vedānta by providing the textual source of that philosophy, has been challenged by Daya Krishna. When did the Bhagavadgītā come to be accorded the status of a prasthāna? Not all the ācāryas wrote commentaries on the Gītā. Not all the Upaniṣads enjoy the same 'authoritative' status, and all the ācāryas did not comment even upon all the major Upaniṣads. Again, here our criterion has to be loose and our critique cognizant of the unavoidably historical character of thought. Instead of going into the details, let me briefly indicate the interpretive moves that I will make in order to rehabilitate the tradition's self-understanding, even while conceding the facts Daya Krishna draws our attention to.

First of all, interpretive traditions and rhetorical styles of discourse spring up and are nurtured within a larger tradition. Within the large tradition opened up by the Upaniṣads—themselves compilations of texts from the Vedic corpus—the Brahmasūtras achieved a certain formalization of ideas and theses and issues. But it is only the bhāṣyakārās who, within the already opened-up horizon, established 'schools', although they reserved the school's name for that larger horizon within which they were thinking. The bhāṣya and all the rest of the epigones worked out what must have been the intention of the original horizon only by way of trying to interpret the bhāṣya. Why did not Madhusūdana comment on the Brahmāsūtras, why did not Vācaspati comment on the Nyāyasūtras? The reason is clear. You cannot overlook the history of interpretation that has already defined a (sub-) tradition, you cannot jump across time and history and directly enter into the intentions behind the sūtras. You can only do so standing at this point of time and this historical situation, through the interpretive legacy that separates you from the source. For a theoretical defence of this theory of interpretation (as contradistinguished from that 'romantic' stance according to which the interpreter must bypass history and tradition and seek to enter directly into the author's mind and
intention), see Hans George Gadamer’s *Wahrheit und Methode*.

You not only think and interpret from within a tradition—and not in an empty logical space—but as you carry the interpretive history forward, the tradition also undergoes changes, while the interpretive intention wants to hold on to and preserve a sense of identity in and through these changes. Tradition is not a cluster of facts about texts and documents, but a horizon of interpretive possibilities opened up and instituted by the founding texts; but as the interpretive possibilities are actualized, new possibilities open up—possibilities that were not ‘contained in’ the original disclosure, but which are ‘interpreted’ to be carrying on ‘anticipations’ and ‘pre-delineations’ indicated in the texts. Whether this in fact was so is a pointless question, for again we are trying to articulate how a tradition, in course of its history, perceives itself.

Such a developmental-interpretive conception of a tradition can, I believe, restore the validity of the locution of ‘schools’ in the face of many of Daya Krishna’s critiques.

I will not now take up the questions about *sābda prāmāṇa* and about the so-called (for this is only the modern English writer’s misleading mode of speaking) ‘authority’ of the Vedas. I have developed my positive views about these—after years of a sceptical and negative stance—in my presidential address (still unpublished) to the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1986. For my present purpose, I can only say this much: in the first place, it is important to bear in mind that the thesis to be examined is the thesis of *sābda prāmāṇa*. Talk about the authority of the Vedas is a red herring, it generates a false impression about what goes on within the *darśanas* and so is a rather weak thesis to combat. The theses that are debated within the *darśanas* are: (i) that *sābda* is a prāmāṇya that is irreducible to either perception or inference or any other; (ii) that in the hierarchy of prāmāṇyas, arranged in order of relative strength, the prāmāṇya of śruti stands highest, and so cannot be superseded by any other; (iii) that the prāmāṇya of *sābda*, as well as of any other cognition, is intrinsic (śrutikṣa) to that cognition; (iv) that śruti derives its strength and pre-eminence to the fact that it is *apauruṣeya*, i.e. not composed by any human author.

It must be remembered, while passing judgement on the tradition’s understanding of itself, that even in the case of *āśīka* (misleadingly rendered ‘orthodox’) *darśanas*, all these theses, with the sole exception of (ii) were debated, i.e. were open to discussion. Only the thesis that the prāmāṇya of śruti is the ‘strongest’ was not questioned. I will briefly state how I propose to understand this thesis.

If the ‘strength’ of the prāmāṇya of śruti was never to be called in question, there was considerable difference of opinion as to what the texts meant. Considering the fact that philosophies as diverse from each other as is conceivable accepted thesis (ii), one cannot but have reasonable doubts about the usefulness of that thesis. What I want to suggest is that śruti itself is not a pramāṇa, it does not give us a set of truths, true propositions, to be accepted. You cannot isolate any such truth that all the āśīka *darśanas* accepted, excepting the belief that the self, ātma, is different from the body and beliefs about rebirth, karma and the possibility of mokṣa. But, as is well known, regarding each of these concepts there was so much divergence of opinion that it would be misleading, if not false, to say that they shared a set of common beliefs. The overriding importance, the supreme pre-eminence of the śruti lies not in the fact that they are sources of our knowledge of truths that cannot be denied, but in the fact that they, for the first time, defined for us the parameters—i.e. the fundamental concerns, questions and basic vocabulary—within which we as well as our ancestors have been thinking. The śruti opened up the horizon—an open horizon, to be sure—within which we have learnt to think, interpret (both ourselves and our world) and question. The primacy of śruti, then, lies not in its being the ‘strongest’ pramāṇa, but in being the historical foundation of our modes of thinking.

And yet we do not have unmediated access to this foundation. Our access is through ‘interpretation’, and that again presupposes the history of interpretations which mediates between us and the texts. It is not important who wrote them; no less misleading is the enquiry, what did the authors intend to mean? The interpretive project has nothing to gain from these two queries. The first may lead to discoveries of fact but will not add to our
understanding of the texts; the second is pointless, being, in principle, unanswerable. The texts, the words, themselves are foundational. We shall go on interpreting the texts, not their authors. It is this infinite plasticity of meaning of the texts, which does not allow us to say with finality what is the meaning, for example, of a mahāvākya, but always leaves room for new possibilities of interpretation which, as far as I can see, best captures and retrieves the sense of the talk of the apaurusye of the śrutis.

NOTES


Daya Krishna is a versatile philosopher, one of the few such in this country. He wields a facile pen on philosophy, economics, sociology, literature, political science, and education. As far as I know, he does not claim to be a scholar of Sanskrit or even of Indian philosophy. Nor does he appear to be one whose chief concern is doing philosophy in a typically Indian spirit. Yet he philosophizes about Indian philosophy, does meta-Indian philosophy, so to speak, and does it in a staggering manner. He has produced quite a number of acutely argued papers on Indian philosophy, which bear ample testimony to his penetrating insight into the predispositions, presuppositions and pretensions of Indian philosophers, classical as well as contemporary. His findings in these papers are of a negative character and pose a standing challenge to those who swear by Indian philosophy. It is noteworthy that the challenge has not been taken up so far, apart from an exception of a limited nature (I mean Karl H. Potter).

Let us have an idea of Daya Krishna’s findings on Indian philosophy.

In his ‘Vedic Corpus: Some Reflections’, Daya Krishna subjects the Vedic corpus to rigorous textual criticism and reaches certain rather unconventional conclusions, such as that the Śrāvaṇa-Veda Sanhitā is not a Veda-Sanhitā at all; that the Śukla and Keśava Yajur-Veda Sanhitās are two independent Vedas each in its own right; that the extant texts of the so-called Sākhās are in the
nature of independent works rather than variants of a common
text; that the custodians of the different Vedas sometimes look
down upon each other’s Veda; and that the ancient RISHI “would
not have regarded it [Vedic text] as APURVAA or revealed, or
viewed it in any such manner that it was only to be memorized
and passed on and nothing added to it or altered” (p.120). He
also makes out a strong case for a new arrangement of the whole
Vedic corpus by “a new VAYA”, so as to rescue them ‘from the age-
old forms in which they have been imprisoned and immobilized”
(pp.125-26). In his “The Upanishads—What are They?”, he
argues that the bulk of the Upanishads are selections from pre-
extisting texts made in an arbitrary and haphazard manner, and
that ‘An alternative selection made on the basis of clearly formu-
lated criteria which are also philosophically relevant from the
temporary point of view may meet the current needs better
than the one that was made long back with a view perhaps to
meet the needs of those times’ (p. 81). In his “Vedanta—Does It
Really Mean Anything?”, his search for “the meaning of Vedanta
leads nowhere. The more we try to grasp its meaning and hold it
in our hands, the more we find ourselves grasping and holding
nothing. The most halocd term of Indian philosophical thought
connotes nothing. It is an empty shell, a mere verbiage, an abso-
lute nothing. It needs, thus, to be banished from the realm of
thought, if we are to be serious about thinking” (pp. 27-28).

In some of his papers, Daya Krishna comes out with a sharp
challenge to the current notions of Indian philosophy in general.
Accordingly, in his “Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy”, he
makes out a strong case against the cliche that the central con-
cern of Indian philosophy is spiritual liberation, pure and simple.
In this connection he examines the theses of Karl H. Potter and
K.C. Bhattacharya, propounded by them in justification of the
vast speculative enterprise of Indian philosophy which seems to
militate against or to be irrelevant to its presumed primary and
sole concern with MOKSA. Daya Krishna continues his criticism of
MOKSA as the sole concern of Indian philosophy in his “Three
Myths about Indian Philosophy” by trying to explode what he calls
the three myths about Indian philosophy: spirituality, authority
and schools of philosophy. He defines ‘spirituality’ or ‘spiritual
metaphysics’ as something which implies that the spirit alone is
real and matter unreal, and therefore draws the natural corol-
larly that there is no warrant for adjudging the whole of Indian
philosophy as spiritual. In this connection he also avers that the
ideal of MOKSA was a later take-over from non-Vedic traditions
in this country. He allows that Indian philosophers do all the same
have the distinctive feature of emphasizing the spiritual as against
the moral. As regards the usual claim that the second distinctive
feature of Indian philosophy is its acceptance of authority as the
last court of appeal in the discovery of truth, Daya Krishna asserts
that the attitude of the philosophers to Vedic authority is quite
usual, if not Pickwickian. Besides, he contends, the schools
have their own SUTRA-TEACHINGS, to which they bear equal allegiance. As
regards the third myth of Indian philosophy, Daya Krishna writes,
“There is no such thing as a final, frozen positions which the term
“school”, in the context of Indian philosophy, usually connotes. If
“schools” change, develop, differentiate, divide, then they are
never closed, finished or final with respect to what they are trying
to say. There could, then, be no fixed body of NAYA-VAISHESVIKA,
SARKHYA, MAHAJANSA, VEDANTA, BAUDDHA, JAINA or CARYAVA positions
except in a minimal sense. These would, on the other hand, be
rather styles of thought which are developed by successive
streams of thinkers and not fully exemplified by any” (pp.
100-101). Daya Krishna revisits the controversy in his “Indian
Philosophy and MOKSA: Revisiting an Old Controversy”, in reply to
Potter’s counter-attack in the latter’s “Indian Philosophy’s Alleged
Religious Orientation”. Here Daya Krishna formulates three
issues: ‘(1) Is Indian philosophy “spiritual” in a sense in which
western philosophy cannot be characterized as such? (2) Is the
conception of MOKSA distinctive of Indian philosophy in the sense
that no analogous concept is to be found in the western philo-
sophical traditions? (3) Even if such an analogous concept can be
found in the western philosophical tradition, is it a fact that it
(i.e. MOKSA) occupies such a central pivotal place in the Indian
philosophical tradition that the latter cannot make sense or even
be possibly understood without reference to it?’ (p. 50). In
regard to these issues, Daya Krishna reiterates and elucidates the
position he held in his earlier paper. As regards the questions vis-
à-vis the ideals of spirituality and mokṣa, he is sure that 'is western philosophy essentially spiritual?’ or ‘is it essentially concerned with man’s liberation?’ are questions which have never bothered the students or historians of western philosophy. (p. 53)

In his ‘Is Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṅkhyā Kārikā Really Sāṅkhya?’, Daya Krishna appears to suggest that kārikās 61 and 68 of the text, which according to him imply that the self in the state of final and absolute aloneness (kāivalya) is not aware of prakṛti at all, breathe an un-Sāṅkhyā spirit, if, rather since, ‘Sāṅkhyā basically seems to characterize a style of philosophical thought which asserts the ultimate dualism of subject and object and which maintains that the fundamental error consists in their confusion or identification in any form or at any level’ and the two kārikās nullify the dualism by stressing the subject’s aloneness and non-awareness of the object (pp. 202–03). In his ‘Adhyāya—A Non-Advaitic Beginning in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta’, he refers to Śaṅkara’s denial of the identity between the I and the not-I with which the latter begins his commentary on the Brahmasūtra and declares it non-Advaitic and Sāṅkhya. Daya Krishna formulates the Adhyāya of Sāṅkhyā as ‘I am this’, where ‘I’ stands for the puruṣa and ‘this’ for the prakṛti, and the Adhyāya of Advaita Vedānta as ‘I am not this’, where ‘I’ refers to the self, subject, or ātman and ‘this’ to nature, object, or brahman. (p. 244)

In his latest contribution, ‘The Myth of the Puruṣarthas’, Daya Krishna’s finding is: ‘The oft-repeated traditional theory of the puruṣārthas, thus, is of little help in understanding the diversity and complexity of human seeking which makes human life so meaningful and worthwhile in diverse ways.’ (p. 15)

I fully realize that the foregoing is a hopelessly sketchy account of Daya Krishna’s way of looking at Indian philosophy, but then in the limited compass of this paper, it is far from possible for me to examine in depth and detail all his papers under reference or even the salient points raised therein. Let us see what it is possible for us to do here.

Daya Krishna’s findings on the Vedic-Upaniṣadic corpus deserve special notice. Whatever view may be taken of the Vedas, it must be granted that they are the fountainhead of all Indian religion, philosophy and culture. But, unfortunately, they do not receive the attention they richly deserve from students of Indian philosophy. In fact, philosophers of repute have seldom taken them seriously in our time, barring of course Sri Aurobindo. The result is that there is a lot of muddled thinking, confusion and quackishness in regard to them. Historians of, and writers on, Indian philosophy, as also the common run of scholars of even other subjects, gibberingly maintain that the Vedas are, or are held to be, divine revelations, universally valid and binding, the fountain-source of all knowledge that matters, literally the last word on the truth, the holiest of the holy, peerless, timeless, inimitable in all respects, unsurpassable for all time to come. But serious research presents a different picture altogether. And Daya Krishna presents just such a picture in his paper on the Vedic corpus. I have no hesitation to confess to my being in general agreement with him on the points raised by him in the paper. He does succeed in undermining the foundation of the classical philosophers’ theory of the absolute authoritativeness of the Vedas (as also the Upaniṣads). His inquiry into the topic is insightful and serves to fill a gap in contemporary Indian philosophy to a considerable extent. In fact, I, too, have all along maintained that the Vedic hymns knew nothing like eternality, superhuman origin, self-authoritativeness, or absolute authoritativeness, nor did those not far removed therefrom hold the hymns to be such.¹

As regards Daya Krishna’s criticisms of the current conceptions of Indian philosophy we are inclined to believe that they do expose themselves to criticism in a large measure, but that, if we go deeper, another conception of Indian philosophy will rise to view steering clear of many such criticisms. I think I would do well to state my case for such an alternative conception of Indian philosophy right away. Taking up for examination Daya Krishna’s position bit by bit will not do. As a matter of fact, on the current notion of Indian philosophy, many of his views appear to be controversial but not controvertible.

Let me sound a note of warning at the very outset: we must not fall into the dialectical trap of making too much of the lisping expressions of the ancients in our solicitude for precision. We must heed Plato’s warning that ‘there is something lowbred in being too precise’ (Theaetetus 184c).
Of Indian philosophy two views are possible: the quantitative view and the qualitative view, or rather, the extensional view and the intensional view. The first is based on geo-political, demographic, and juristic considerations, according to which a comprehensive account of Indian philosophy ought to take notice of the philosophies (i) of Indian nationals of all persuasions; (ii) of foreign nationals doing, say, Vedanta here or abroad; (iii) of Indian nationals doing, say, neo-Thomistic philosophy here or abroad; as well as (iv) of an Indian national founding an altogether new philosophical tradition (if it be possible). The qualitative/intensional view, on the other hand, otherwise namable as the typal view, is connotative, as it were, and drastically restricts the scope of Indian philosophy.

Philosophy may be said to be of two kinds: existential philosophy and dialectical philosophy. The first is rooted in and oriented towards the religious (including the spiritual, moral, and aesthetic) experience of mankind; the second is rooted in and oriented towards linguistics, logic, and mathematics. The mainstream of the Indian philosophical tradition belongs to the first category and is accordingly concerned primarily with experiential rather than logical verification of its findings.

Existential philosophy is usually done in the context of a culture, against the background of a cultural milieu, as part of a cultural tradition, never in a vacuum. An authentic philosophy is a system of shared presuppositions of a given culture, the self-consciousness of a culture, and hence is basically culture-bound in form and content, though not in intent. It is not tantamount, however, to denying cross-cultural dimensions to philosophy. What I mean to suggest is this, that since philosophy articulates the presuppositions of a given culture, by and large, it must bear the stamp of that culture. And it is this stamp which gives it its qualitative/typal name. It is also to be borne in mind that a culture or cultural tradition is not necessarily national, not necessarily confined to a geo-political unit; it may cut across geographical and national boundaries and become international. It is precisely in this sense that Iqbal sings that his country is Islam (neither India nor Arabia):

Thus, remaining as he does an Indian/Pakistani philosopher, historiographically or quantitatively speaking, he is essentially, qualitatively, or typically an Islamic philosopher. For the same reason, qualitatively or typically speaking, Indian philosophy is such philosophy as is done in the Indian cultural context, as embellishing, reinterpreting, or advancing the Indian philosophical tradition, against the background of the movement of Indian thought, no matter who does it and where. This being so, philosophy done in the Semitic or Western context and having precious little to do with the Indian philosophical matrix, is anything but Indian philosophy; citizenship, nationality, or domicile of the doer of philosophy is no recommendation.

Of course, cultures have begun to surrender their identities to what is called world culture, which is growing up fast. In the process many a cultural identity is doomed to extinction. I take it that substantive Indian culture with its unique philosophical bequest has the potentiality of playing a vital role in shaping the identity of world culture.

The foregoing conception of philosophy makes it incumbent upon philosophers to digest the philosophy already done. On the contrary, some of our contemporaries are showing symptoms of the same malady as diagnosed by Hegel in his contemporaries. He writes: 'It seems that mastery of philosophy is found precisely in the lack of knowledge and study, as if philosophy ceased where they begin. Philosophy is often considered as merely formal knowledge, void of content.' Indeed, some of us are fast developing a tendency to hide our hollowness under cover of the statement that we are philosophers, not scholars; as if scholarship is philosophically baneful. It is refreshing to find, however, after an acquaintance with Daya Krishna's work, that the tribe of scholar-philosophers is not going to be extinct.

In fact every age, every culture, has a philosophy, its own philosophy, a chief philosophy, articulate or inarticulate, in any case not very articulate or systematized. The historian's duty is to bring such philosophy into light and articulate, reconstruct, or systema-
tize it. Thereby, the historian of philosophy does deserve to be taken to be doing philosophy. The ever-widening gap between professed philosophy and lived philosophy, to follow Abraham Kaplan, must be bridged to make philosophy existentially relevant and efficient.

As conceived by the founding fathers of Indian philosophy, philosophy is not only informative (jñāna-jñāya), but also transformative (sāṃskāra-jñāya). Its aim is not mere truth-hunting but self-realization, self-seeking, so to speak, by penetrating beyond the ego, man’s lower self. It is claimed to be spiritual on account of the spiritwardness of its enterprise. To this end, courses of spiritual discipline are prefixed to the pursuit of philosophy. They are intended to lift man above his prejudices, pettiness and meanness and render him receptive to existential verities which are more than cognitive. The truth of such a proposition seems to have dawned upon Plato also, who remarks that the philosophic character has no touch of meanness; pettiness of mind is quite incompatible with the attempts to grasp things divine or human as a whole and in their entirety” (Republic 486a). It appears, indeed, that if deep existential truths have to dawn, they would tend to dawn on such characters only. Philosophy is not mere cerebration or ratiocination, nor is it merely a deductive science like mathematics, nor again is it reducible to dialectical philosophy, in this context. It is held to be the lamp of all sciences, the clue to all activity, and the ground of all dharmas:

Pradīpah sarva-vidyānām, upāyah sarva-karmanām, Āsrayah sarva-dharmānām saśvad āsāyāsā kālā.

On the Indian view, roughly speaking, the goal of religion is attainment of the summum bonum; that of philosophy, enlightenment on the summum bonum and the way to it. Philosophy is born in course of contemplation upon religious verities. It is a by-product, an offshoot, an offspring of religion. It is in the nature of a rider to it. It is fed by religion, which is the fountainhead of its deeper problems. It has deep religious obligations. Religion is the be-all and end-all of philosophy. We are inclined to be in general agreement with Hegel when he maintains: “Philosophy thinks and conceives of that which Religion represents as the object of consciousness”;4 Thought first of all comes forth within Religion;5 and ‘Religion has a content in common with philosophy, the forms alone being different’.6

Such philosophy has a subject matter comprised of the issue arising out of religious consciousness. It also includes the need to understand the universe as a whole, which does not fall within the purview of any of the sciences. Remember, such understanding is not merely cognitive, it is more than that. As Jung has said, “We should not pretend to understand the world only by the intellect; we apprehend it just as much by feeling.”7 In fact, a spiritual view of existence is the only way of understanding the world as a whole in all its ultimate mystery. To this end a synthetic view of all knowledge is a must. That way, philosophy is truly an interdisciplinary endeavour. It tries to integrate all knowledge. Integration of knowledge is a far cry from eclecticism or syncretism, from an amalgam of, say, anthropological, sociological, psychological and other data, which is sometimes attempted in the name of an interdisciplinary approach. There are certain issues which are by nature interdisciplinary. Take the issue of establishment of a saner social order. It is too multidimensional to belong to any specific discipline or department. Only philosophy can do justice to it. It does not mean, however, that philosophy should or does take upon itself the responsibility of dealing with the departmental disciplines on its own. The various disciplines should grow and function in their own right. In fact, if pursued in depth enough, every branch of knowledge is found to assume philosophical proportions, to rest on a philosophical substructure, and to have its own philosophy, which has no subject matter of its own and which is proper each to the various branches of knowledge. The subject matter of the particular branch of knowledge becomes the subject matter of its philosophy. This kind of philosophy is not one but many, as many as the branches of learning. Such philosophies should be the concern of their respective departments, primarily. In the ultimate analysis, they transpire to be grounded and rooted in the philosophy proper defined earlier. That way, departmental philosophies become the concern of the department of philosophy as well, but only secondarily.
With a view to facilitating interdisciplinary studies, too, the department of philosophy may take upon itself the responsibility of devising ways and means to coordinate and guide the philosophical programmes of the other departments. Of course, existential problems and problems of serious human concern are multi-dimensional from the very nature of the case, cutting across various disciplines all at once. Naturally, they cannot be entrusted to specialized disciplines. Only philosophy proper can lay claim to a canvas broad enough to accommodate them.

It is generally not known that Indian philosophy is far from confined to, or exhausted by, its well-knit systems, which purport to be in the nature of partial superstructures raised on a solid substructure, often in a polemical spirit. And polemical writings seldom bother themselves about unchallenged issues. Later thinkers and commentators come gradually to lose sight of this fact and tend to whittle down the scope of philosophy accordingly. Besides, it is a patent fact that fundamental postulates common to the contending parties are seldom debated. Lovejoy charges the historians of philosophy with preoccupying themselves too much with major systems and movements, overlooking the logically dynamic elements of which the systems and movements are either organizations or confusions. His conclusion is: ‘The history of philosophy and of all phases of man’s reflection is, in great part, a history of confusion of ideas.’

Take examples. None of the ancient systematizers cared to philosophize comprehensively and critically about dharma and svadharma, spiritual competence (adikkāra) and choice deity (śiva-devatā), congenital debt (ṛṇa) and yajña-mahāyajña, vārna and dharma, yoga and prayer, plunge (śravaṇi) and withdrawal (nirvṛtā), purusārtha and paramārtha, sihitā-praṇa and bodhi-sattva, naiskṛmya (transcendence of desire) and naiskṛmya (transcendence of activity), atbhāyā (transcendence of language) and metaphysical silence (tasnimbhāsam), ṛṣi and satya, Brahman and Puruṣottama, the various categories referred to in the creation hymn and such other hymns of the Vedas, and so forth. The result is that these concepts are left to the care of quacks and priests, who handle them in a vulgar way. Again, our classical philosophers also failed to give us philosophies of educa-

tion, law and the like. It is possible to do this all within the conceptual framework of Indian tradition. If, therefore, we whittle down the scope of Indian philosophy to its popular systems, we are bound to miss a lot of it.

As a matter of fact, the systems seem sometimes to refer beyond themselves and contain suggestions of what somehow lies unsaid and yet superior to themselves. They appear to be double-level systems by and large, howsoever crudely the levels might have been mooted. If we do not read them as such, we shall only misread them. Of course, they are not very susceptible to meticulous linguistic analysis.

Let us illustrate the point. That the Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism are double-level systems needs no saying. The Hinayānist Bahuśrutīya-Sutrasiddhi school of Harivarman also subscribes to the two-level thesis. The Buddha’s avyākrtas and nibbāna are pointers to his tacit assumption of two levels of his doctrine. The Pārva-Mimāṃsāsūtra ascribed to Jaimini knows no Brahman, but the Brahmasūtra (1.2.28, 31; 1.4.18; 4.3.11-14; 4.4.5) refers to him as a Brahmacārin along with Bādarāyana, the author of the treatise. In fact, there is a well-attested tradition that originally there was a great Mimāṃsā work comprising 20 chapters, divided into Karma-kāya comprising its first 12 chapters forming the extant Pārva-Mimāṃsāsūtra, Devatā-kāya comprising its next 4 chapters forming the extant Saṅkarṣa-kāya ascribed to Jaimini or Saṅkarṣaṇa, and jñāna-kāya comprising its remaining 4 chapters forming the extant Brahmasūtra. Śābara calls the ātman self-luminous and incapable of being known by others. According to Prabhākara, it needs to be taught to those only who have renounced all worldly attachment (mrdūka-kaśyānaṁ), Kumārīla advises the seeker of the ātman to turn to the Vedānta. (1.2.5, ātma-vāda, concluding stanza). He also countenances a space-bodied (vyoma-saśira) paramātman as the referent of the Vedic expression ‘Brahman is the space’ (Khaṁ Brahma) and as the presiding deity of the Vedas (Tantravārtika 3.1.13). According to some, the Nyāyasūtra used to conclude with the sūtra, fifty-second in number: ‘Tattvāṁ tu Bādarāyanaṁ’, that is, we should turn to the Brahmasūtra for the ultimate truth. Besides, Vātsyāyana seems to suggest that for the science of the
spirit (adhyātma-vidyā) one should turn to the Upanisad (1.1.1). The ostensible purpose of the Vaiśeṣikaśāstra is the treatment of dharma, from which, however, it seems to have derailed, as noted by some classical writers. The Sāṅkhya-kārikā preaches liberation from prakṛti, but it seems at first sight to contradict itself by asserting later, quite in tune with Advaita Vedānta, that it is not the self but prakṛti which is bound and liberated. Does it not show that it represents a double-level system? The Sāṅkṣetra, the earliest known but inexact Sāṅkhya-Yoga treatise ascribed to Kapila or Vārṣaganyā, declares gūra to be invisible, identifying the visible with māyā. The Jaināstha thesis that one who knows one knows all and the other way about, seems to presuppose some kind of monism. Besides, Jainism has its own list of two truths. And, others apart, even the Lokāyata system postulates truths empirical and transcendental in its own way. It dispenses with God but calls its putative founder, Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of the gods (śūra-guru). Moreover, it comes to culminate in agnosticism, scepticism, or even outright nihilism in the Tatttvopapakavasānśa.

A trenchant stanza of his Bṛhadārāja clearly weds Kumārla to Advaita Vedānta:

Dvaipā-puṣṭāh parānudya buddhyasuddhisamāsrayā
darśīnām evaikān tattvam tattvavidi udāh.

Likewise, Sāṅkhya is referred to as Brahma-uśī by Prabhākara, Brahma-vādā by the Śiva Purāṇa, and Brahmopadeśa-vidyā by the Māthara-eritī. Indeed, according to the Aṅkramukha Samhitā, brahma is the first category in the Śaṭṭāntra.

Again, it is significant that Rājaśekhara Śūri and Haribhadra Śūri have bequeathed to us definite indications as to how even the realistic systems of Indian philosophy are committed to their own religious traditions.

It is a pity, however, that our philosophers have simply missed this way of looking at Indian philosophy.

Daya Krishna is puzzled about the identity of the Vedānta as a philosophical system. There is Vedānta and Vedānta, he contends, each trying to cancel out the other. His conclusion is that Vedānta is not a philosophical, but an exegetical or theological concept. But I am inclined to maintain that Vedānta is a super-system comprising certain systems with a common base, but differing in their outlook to a limited extent. Their differences are not too radical, however, for them to be classed as altogether independent systems. Barr ing Madhava, all the Vedāntic schools are committed to monism of some kind or other. The Madhvaītēs did give a tough fight to the Śaṅkaraites, but the fight remained polemical and dialectical, with little philosophical result. Even Madhava’s commentary on the Brahma-śūla of little philosophical consequence. All the Vedāntic schools believe in śrutī, indeed even in its self-authoritativeness; yet śrutī is not the be-all and end-all for them. To them there are four steps to enlightenment—

vision (darsāna), śrutī (śravāna), reasoning/thinking (manāna), and meditation/contemplation (mudhyāsanā)—śrutī being just a starting point. Thus, the Vedāntic schools cannot be dismissed as mere theology, or exegesis. Śrutī embodies the quintessence of the ancients’ collective wisdom, which must guide us initially, but we must take leave of it in our forward march. Further, according to these schools of Vedānta, man is a fragmentary totality, to borrow Schuon’s expression; he does not have to seek perfection outside himself, in an extra-cosmic God or the like. Mokṣa of one kind or another is the goal of all of them. In fact, the concept of the Atman as part and parcel of the Godhead/Brahman, or the Godhead/Brahman itself, is shared in common by all of them, except of course the Madhvaīitēs. We have tried to examine Daya Krishna’s paper on Vedānta in some more detail elsewhere, hence I stop short here.

In some of the papers referred to above, Daya Krishna challenges the claim that the central concern of Indian philosophy is mokṣa or spiritual liberation. He contends that each classical philosopher, ‘after making the claim on the first page or in the first chapter, goes merrily along forgetting about it and writes on other things and other matters, as if the claim had not been made at all’. ‘But’, he adds, ‘if western philosophy is not concerned with spiritual liberation and yet raises the same problems as does Indian philosophy, there is something wrong either with the contention that western philosophy is not so concerned or with the claim that Indian philosophy is concerned only with this
and with nothing else at all.' ('Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy', pp. 37-38). Our reply is: First, the systematized Indian philosophy is not the whole of Indian philosophy, as indicated earlier. Second, breathing the polemical spirit that they commonly do, the systems became interested more and more in self-defence, in barbed-wire fencing (kantakāvarana), to which end they had to develop a whole methodology and ontology of their own and were unwittingly led into the quagmire of minutiae-mongering. Third, they also felt the need of enlightening the mokṣa-aspirant on theoretical issues, a good number of which may be common to both Indian and western philosophies, but, excesses and extremes of the Indian systematics apart, the thrust of Indian philosophy remains radically different from that of western philosophy. Daya Krishna writes: 'Intellectual difficulties seem to possess an enormous fecundity of their own, so that each, even in the process of its own death and dissolution, gives rise to innumerable others clamouring equally for its solution' (p. 41). True, but this is the case where intellectualism is for intellectualism's sake. If intellectualism is to be harnessed in the service of such an idea as mokṣa, there is little apprehension of its being caught in an unending process. Mokṣa as the ultimate goal of philosophy served to give a purpose and direction to philosophy and proved to be a bulwark against battle in the clouds, which Sri Aurobindo calls 'the besetting sin of metaphysics', and which is the bane of unhiered, directionless thinking for thinking's sake. Praxiological commitment makes all the difference. Modern western philosophy lacks such a serious purpose, direction and orientation. Nobody knows what it is out to do. Ancient philosophy aimed at enlightenment and felicity with or without salvation as the great denouement, whereas current philosophy aims at dry clarity and mechanical precision on their own account.

Daya Krishna's criticism of mokṣa as a fully realizable, and at the same time already realized, ideal appears to spring from a confusion of levels. Entering the portals of mokṣa may mean its complete realization but not necessarily complete exhaustion of its possibilities. But, viewed from a higher level, mokṣa is already realized. Hegel reached a kindred conclusion in the context of his own metaphysics: 'The consummation of the infinite End... consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that it needs [sic] not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality accomplished.' And why only Hegel, among the westerns? Defining religion, Whitehead remarks: 'Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things: something which is real, and yet wanting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.' In point of fact, this is the finale of all absolutistic trend of thought.

Of course, Daya Krishna's complaint is justified that usually our philosophers are ipso facto taken to be aspirants for mokṣa, whereas the bulk of them are seized of technical issues as much as western philosophers. As already indicated, the bulk of our systematics are experts on wire-fencing of closely guarded metaphysical truths, whereby the grip of the mokṣa ideal over them comes gradually to be loosened beyond recognition. But to say that none could have aspired after mokṣa betrays misconception of a great tradition. It is of course true that, once the ideal acquired popularity, authors of treatises on grammar and other secular disciplines, too, began to claim that it is possible to realize the ideal through their disciplines. For all that, we must value the consciousness of a common direction for the whole culture.

In conclusion, we must not fail to acknowledge that we have yet to find a philosopher of Daya Krishna's stature who can stimulate us equally to rethink the presuppositions of and about classical Indian philosophical systems.

NOTES

Philosophy, Religion, Morality, and Spirituality: Some Issues

K.J. SHAH

Is Indian philosophy philosophy? Is it religion? Or is it both? Is Hinduism religion? These and such other questions have raised considerable controversy and much greater confusion. It is this area that I propose to discuss in this paper. I shall do this by considering the nature of the Sāṃkhya system. In order to do so, I shall first present an outline of my understanding of the Sāṃkhya system. It is already known that according to Sāṃkhya, prakṛti-puruṣa viveka, discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa, is the goal of man. I want to suggest that it has three aspects: anubhava (experience or knowledge), vicāra (thought or reasoning) and ācāra (conduct or morality). All these together constitute the human goal. Any one of the aspects apart from the other two is an abstraction, though in the attainment of the goal one or the other aspect may be central and the other two subsidiary (consider the case of the exemplars).

But is this understanding of the Sāṃkhya a legitimate understanding, or only an understanding which I read into the text? I will try to show that it is a legitimate understanding by considering its relation to the text, by relating it to an understanding of the prasthānatraya (the Upaniṣads, the Brahmāsūtras and the Bhagavadgītā), some exemplars, and the theory of puruṣārthas.

THE SĀṂKHYA SYSTEM

I will begin with an account of the Sāṃkhya system of thought.
According to the Sāṅkhya system of thought, the goal of human life is to discriminate between puruṣa and prakṛti. But what is it to discriminate between puruṣa and prakṛti? The answer to this question is not a simple one—one could distinguish three answers which are interrelated, or one could say that there is one answer with three aspects. What are the three interrelated answers or aspects?

First, one might say that the discrimination between puruṣa and prakṛti is ordinarily understood as a matter of understanding the elements of the Sāṅkhya system and their interrelationship—prakṛti with its various elements and puruṣa. Second, the discrimination between puruṣa and prakṛti is a matter of experience—knowledge (anubhava) is usually translated as experience, and is thought of as a mystic experience. However, anubhava is not merely a flash of experience, but involves knowing oneself. In the Sāṅkhya thought, there is no clear account of the experience. However, the sort of account given in, say, kārikā 64, ‘I do not exist, naught is mine, I am not’ may be taken as a description of the experience/knowledge. Third, it is a matter of an aggregate of dispositions which brings about or consists in the three attainments of pramoda, muditā and moda-mana. These attainments together, or the last one (moda-mana) refer to the suppression of three kinds of misery.

Of these three answers, the first two are very often spoken of, but not so often the third. I should, therefore, like to explain my inclusion of this third answer.

Sāṅkhya distinguishes eight intellectual dispositions: four of the sāṅskāra variety—virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and the possession of lordly powers; and four of the tāmasika variety which are the opposite of the four of the sāṅskāra variety, viz. vice, ignorance, attachment and the absence of lordly powers. Besides the eight dispositions, there are the effects of these dispositions.

Through virtue (comes about) departure upwards and through vice departure down; through wisdom is release (acquired), and bondage through ignorance. From non-attachment (results) merger in Primal Nature, migration from passionate attachment, from power (comes about) non-

obstruction and the opposite thereof, from the contrary. (‘The Sāṅkhya-kārikā of Isvāra Kṛṣṇa, kārikā 45)

The dispositions and the resulting consequences form an aggregate. Accordingly, as the elements are combined in different quantities, there are different aggregates. These are classified under four main heads: (1) ignorance (viparyaya) (2) infirmity (āsakti), (3) complacency (tuṣṭi) and (4) attainment (śiddhā). The further subdivision of these gives us five types of ignorance, twenty-eight types of infirmity, nine types of complacency and eight types of attainments, thus giving us altogether fifty types of aggregates (kārikās 47–48). Of these, the three attainments—pramoda, muditā and moda-mana are the suppression of the three kinds of misery. I could not get quite clear about the meanings of the three terms. Is each of these concerned with a particular type of misery? Or, is each of them concerned with all the three types of misery and does each represent a stage in the suppression of all the three kinds of misery? However, what is important is that the highest attainment is also an aggregate of the dispositions and their consequences. It is an aggregate which brings about, or which is the suppression of, the three kinds of misery. It is an aggregate in which the consequences of the dispositions like virtue, vice, non-attachment, attachment, attainment of powers and absence of powers, are transcended, as is described in kārikā 67.

Virtue and the rest having ceased to function as causes, because of the attainment of perfect wisdom, (the Spirit) remains invested with the body, because of the force of past impressions, like the whirl of the (potter's) wheel (which persists for a while by virtue of the momentum imparted by a prior impulse).

It is true that even at this state, puruṣa's association with prakṛti has not ended. However, it has ended all but in name: only the previous satāsākhyas are working out, and there is no question of turning back. It is possible to call this stage the concrete expression of the discrimination between puruṣa and prakṛti.
In order to consider whether here we have three answers which are interrelated or one answer which has three aspects, we must consider the interrelationship between these three answers. I shall consider this by asking whether any one of these three by itself could justify the claim that one has attained discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa. For example, could one attain such discrimination in experience/knowledge without attaining it in thought and conduct?

Suppose that discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa could be merely a matter of experience/knowledge. In that case one can have such discrimination even when the aggregate of dispositions one has attained is not of pramoda-muditā or moda-mana. Nor would it be necessary that one should have an intellectual grasp of the discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa—more or less sophisticated. If this were to be so, would not the experience of such discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa be a matter merely of a sensation? Surely, to attain such sensation cannot be the ultimate human goal. Only when it is accomplished by the appropriate conduct and a theoretical understanding (it is important to emphasize that the theoretical understanding could be more or less sophisticated) that the experience/knowledge is not merely a sensation, but knowledge of such discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa, and therefore a matter of the knowledge of the self.

Now we shall consider the view that the discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa is a matter of merely intellectually understanding the relationship between the vyakta, the avyakta and the knower; between prakṛti and puruṣa. But how can such intellectual understanding be anything other than a verbal or a formal game, unless it is related to the understanding of reality and therefore enables one to distinguish between one who has such discrimination and one who does not have such discrimination. However, this would only enable one to understand others in terms of discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa. Only in so far as one has oneself attained the aggregates of pramoda, muditā or moda-mana would one be able to say that it is a matter of experience/knowledge or thought for oneself.

Nor is it possible for one to say that discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa is a matter merely of conduct. Conduct is not understood as merely physical activity; it is to be understood in the context of an intellectual framework, and it would be necessary to distinguish between conduct which shows discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa and that which does not show such discrimination. And when one has attained conduct which shows that discrimination one would have experience or knowledge of such discrimination, and therefore, knowledge of self.

If one is right in the foregoing account, then any one of the three answers by itself cannot justify a claim to discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa. The three answers are not independent answers, but three aspects of one answer. However, in actuality, the answers have a certain independence. In any actual case one or the other aspect may be central and the other two aspects subsidiary. But then it may be asked: am I not reading too much into the Sāṁkhya-kārikā, reading into it what I want to? Though all these aspects are present in the Sāṁkhya-kārikā, they are not distinguished, and there is no mention or consideration of their mutual relationship.

Let me now consider the doubt expressed at the end of the last paragraph: one reason why the different answers and their mutual relationships are not mentioned may be that they were taken for granted and there was no need to mention them. The need to mention them arises because there has been a tendency to overemphasize one or the other answer and devalue, if not ignore, the other two aspects. Under the influence of modern Western philosophy, the theoretical or the intellectual part only is over-emphasized, the other two aspects are ignored; they are an embarrassment (to philosophy).

Further, we can see that there is no reading into the text of what is not there, particularly if we consider the wider context that is provided by the concept of the pradhānatrayi—the Upaniṣads, the Brahma-sūtra, and the Bhagavadgītā. These give further support to the view that here we have an answer with three interrelated aspects. We might say that the Upaniṣads are anubhava-pradhāna, and in them experience or knowledge is at the centre and thought or conduct do not occupy that central a place; they are understood in the framework of knowledge. The
Brahmasūtras are vicāra-pradhāna, have intellectual considerations or thought at the centre and knowledge and conduct do not occupy that central a place in them; they are understood in the framework of thought. The Bhagavadgītā is acāra-pradhāna and in it considerations of conduct are at the centre; and knowledge and thought are understood in the framework of conduct.

It will help us to understand this kind of difference if we consider particular examples of each kind. Could we possibly say that even in this century, Ramakṛṣṇa Paramahāsa and Ramanā Mahārāja are examples of anubhava-pradhāna individuals; Śrī Aurobindo is an example of a vicāra-pradhāna individual; and Gandhi is an example of an acāra-pradhāna individual? A consideration of these examples will show that a particular factor in them is only central, not that the other two factors are absent. In the Sāṅkhya system, the aspect of thought is central, but knowledge and conduct are not absent from consideration.

SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

To consider the nature of the foregoing thought, it would help if we put forward some further considerations. We have presented the Sāṅkhya system in terms of anubhava, vicāra and acāra. Other systems of Indian thought can also be presented in a similar manner; however, the description or account of anubhava, vicāra and acāra will vary with each system. Though these differences are there, all the systems accept an account of the goal of the system which is the same for all the systems—this account is in terms of the puruṣārtha—the four human goals—dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. This raises many questions: how is it that in spite of differences in the description of anubhava, etc. the different systems accept a common account in terms of puruṣārtha? What is the relationship of the account to the systems? And how can the one goal of the system and the four goals of the puruṣārthas be reconciled?

First, we shall consider the last question. Some people say that there are not four goals, there are only three goals, mokṣa is a later addition. On the other hand, some others say that the three goals are not really goals, they are a means to the ultimate goal of mokṣa—freedom from the pursuit of the other goals. I do not want to go into the historical considerations (though my 'memory' of discussions at Tirupati tells me that there is good evidence in favour of the four puruṣārthas including mokṣa, though the word mokṣa may not have been used at some time in the distant past). I should like to mention that the four puruṣārthas are mentioned in Manusmṛti, Kautālīya’s Arthasastra, Mahābhārata, Ramayana, etc. But are these not later interpolations?

However, interpolations may be only explications, if we realize that dharma and mokṣa are not independent of each other; rather they are closely and necessarily interrelated and complement each other. One could say that dharma, the code of conduct, disciplines our relationship with others in the pursuit of artha and kāma, and at the same time it disciplines our emotions. It is this disciplining of our emotions that is related to mokṣa. When that discipline is complete, one attains mokṣa, one is a śīla-tapasyā, in the terminology of the Bhagavadgītā. On the other hand, any direct training of the emotions through meditation, tapas, etc., not only helps us to perfect internal discipline, but also helps us to discipline our relationship to others in the pursuit of artha and kāma. If this is so, the theory of four puruṣārthas need not be replaced by any of these two views. Not only that, the four puruṣārthas together constitute one goal—mokṣa, which perfects and is perfected by dharma; and dharma, which disciplines our pursuit of artha and kāma.

Now we see how the four goals of puruṣārtha are reconciled with one goal of the system. The four goals together give us self-realization—a single goal, and the goal of the system is also self-realization—e.g., described as prakṛti-puruṣa-vodaka.

This is true not only in the case of the Sāṅkhya system, but also in the case of the other systems—Vedanta, Vaisēṣika, etc. Even though the description of the goal is different it involves self-realization—ātmabrahmānta, or kaivalya, and so on. That is why all the systems accept the theory of puruṣārthas.

But then, why have different systems? Why should we not have only the theory of puruṣārthas? The theory of the puruṣārthas emphasizes the unity of the individual, and of the individual and the society. The systems emphasize the unity of all reality and the
place of the self in it. The systems do it differently because it can be done differently, because different persons are troubled by different problems, different doubts.

It is interesting to note that the Arthaśāstra mentions three systems expressing this unity—Śāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. Very often I have felt that here we have three different bases of unity—Śāṅkhya accepts transcendence but not God, Yoga accepts both transcendence and God, Lokāyata accepts neither transcendence nor God. Thus the theoretical metaphysical structures can be very varied, and yet the goal could be the same—realization of the self. This is not good-natured tolerance, but a hard theoretical understanding of the Hindus. It is at least as sound as the rigidity of the theoretical metaphysical beliefs of semitic thought.

Before I close this section, I shall give some references which support the foregoing understanding of the Śāṅkhya system and of Indian thought.

First, let me quote from Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra:

The followers of Manu say that the Sciences are only Traya, Vārttā and Daṇḍaniti and Anuksika is only a special aspect of the Traya.

The followers of Brhaspati say that Vārtā and Daṇḍaniti are the only sciences; Traya is only a summary of the principles to one who knows the affairs of the World.

The followers of Usanas say that the only science is Daṇḍaniti, it is the beginning and the end of all science. (Arthaśāstra I, ii, 2–3)

This account of the relation between the sciences shows also the close relationship between artha (and kāma), dharma and mokṣa. It is further brought out by the following.

... that he (the king) should not be without pleasures, but he should enjoy pleasures which are not against Dharma and Artha (consistently with the pursuit of Dharma and Artha). Or he should pursue the three equally which are bound up with one another. If any one is pursued in excess, it harms itself and the other two. (Arthaśāstra I, vii, 8–5)

Here what is said about the kind, holds true of every one.

Now, a quotation from Manu:

Some declare that the chief good consists in Dharma and Artha, others place it in Kāma and Artha, others in Dharma alone or Artha alone, but the decision is that it consists in the aggregate of all the three. (Manusmṛti II, 224)

The foregoing references do not support a simple hierarchical understanding of the puruṣārthas, rather they represent a matrix of interacting goals. (See my ‘Artha and Arthaśāstra’ in The Way of Life, edited by T.N. Madan.)

THE NATURE OF THIS THOUGHT

What is the nature of this thought? Is it moral? Is it spiritual? Is it religious? Is it philosophical? As we shall see in the following, there are no clear-cut answers to these questions. One could say that it is none of these (if one kept to the understanding of these in terms of Western thought); or that it is all of these (if one took into account not the technical definitions of these, but the functions performed by them).

One might say that in part it is moral thought, but it is so only in part. It does not concern itself only with what one ought to do (dharma?), but also with what one ought to be (mokṣa). What one ought to do and what one ought to be are not independent of each other; in fact, each is a necessary condition, though not a sufficient condition, for the full attainment of the other.

Is this thought spiritual thought? It is spiritual—it is concerned with what one ought to be; but it is not merely a matter of a state of being, it is related to what one ought to do. But is it religious? In so far as spirituality is an element of religion, it is also religious. But in so far as religion is a matter of belief in God or a book or a prophet or even a definite metaphysical point of view, it is not; because the spiritual element is related not only to the
metaphysics of the Sāṅkhya system; but also to the metaphysics of other systems such as Nyāya, Advaita, etc.

Is the thought philosophical? Once again, the thought, though not only that, is philosophical. The Sāṅkhya account articulates the intellectual structure of matter, life, mind, intellect/discrimination, morality and spirituality. This account establishes the existence and nature of the self—the realization of which in experience/knowledge and conduct is the goal. The intellectual structure and the practical life mutually support one another. May I suggest that this could be looked upon as giving us the necessary conditions of the possibility of discrimination between puruṣa and prakṛti (involving matter, life, mind, intellect or discrimination, morality and spirituality and their inter-relations)? Could I possibly say that Kant was in search of such a comprehensive account, but he could get only a fragmented account of the necessary conditions of the possibility of science and mathematics, of morality, of beauty and of religion within the bounds of reason, but not of all three put together?

If I am right, then, it would be misleading to characterize Sāṅkhya only in terms of morality, spirituality, etc. It is all of these put together. Perhaps it is best to call it an ‘anvikṣiṣa’ or an ‘enquiry’ or a durśāṇa. But on this account to say that there is neither philosophy, nor spirituality, nor religion, nor moral theory in Indian thought is too legalistic an attitude, especially when such two different traditions are under consideration. As I said earlier, all the functions of these various disciplines are performed by Indian thought—better, worse or equally well could be a matter of discussion.

CONSIDERATION OF FURTHER DIFFICULTIES

As I said at the beginning, I have given here one understanding of Indian thought, but it is no more personal or subjective than any other. It is one kind of understanding supported by texts and examples. Thus understanding, by being different, meets a number of difficulties that have been raised by Daya Krishna. However, I shall consider here some of the difficulties he has emphasized and considered at length and in detail.

Is mokṣa that which belongs to practical philosophy or that which belongs to cognitive philosophy? Obviously the question arises from considering the various disciplines as independent of one another. But in the light of the account I have presented of the Sāṅkhya system, and its relationship to the theory of prapātha hinting at, mokṣa is closely related to dharma and is therefore a matter of practical philosophy. But it has a cognitive aspect—ānubhava, experience/knowledge, where one knows the self through the discrimination of puruṣa and prakṛti. It has a cognitive aspect also in the sense that it is part of a metaphysical understanding of reality as a whole.

But is not the self nityasiddha? I must say that this is a controversial issue, but it does not rule out the possibility of the kind of understanding that is presented in the last paragraph.

If our understanding of the relationship between dharma and mokṣa is correct, then mokṣa does clearly belong to practical philosophy. But it also belongs to cognitive philosophy in so far as knowledge about dharma and mokṣa lead to knowledge of the self. But is not the self nityasiddha? Yes, but its knowledge is not nityasiddha. In knowledge there is confusion because of prakṛti, avidyā, māya. And it is the removal of this confusion or misunderstanding that leads to knowledge of the self. But, then, how can it be nityasiddha? Does it mean that entanglement does not injure it in its essential aspect?

What is it to come to know the self? Does it mean that its connection with the body ceases forthwith? Or, would it not be enough if its connection with the body changes its nature? Is this what is supposed to be the case in the account of a sīhata-prajñā that is given in the Bhagavadgītā? I think the understanding of mokṣa in terms of a sīhata-prajñā and a jīvanmukta is as much a part of Indian thought as anything else, and perhaps it may be a truer understanding, if one looks at the exemplars.

However, it seems that sometimes Daya Krishna wants to insist that there should be and can be only one understanding of mokṣa and therefore it alone can be or should be the goal of all Indian (philosophical) thought. I think it would be all right if one strand of philosophical thought is understood in that way.

But there is another way. I have tried to argue how mokṣa,
though described in various ways, is in substance the attainment of the highest spiritual discipline, and however differently it is described, it leads to knowledge of the self (even in Lokāyata) (consider the meaning of ānekkha).

Daya Krishna also wants to say that there are systems of thought which do not have mokṣa as a goal, and he argues that this is so in the case of Nyāya. This argues on the ground that the very first and second sūtras of Nyāya could be interpreted to show that mokṣa is not the goal of Nyāya—that the interest of Nyāya is argument, reasoning.

But one could also argue the other way. (And therefore the evidence in favour of the interpolation of the second sūtra is not strong at all—in any case, it is not as strong as it is claimed to be.) For, what is the interest of reasoning? To this question, even if one answer is that it is reasoning itself, there can be another answer, that it is not only reasoning itself, but also the realization of the highest human goal—mokṣa, kaivalya. (Here the understanding of Bhartṛhari regarding the relation of intuition and reason is important.) But surely one does not attain mokṣa by intellectual argument? I should like to present the following considerations. I think that it is not merely a matter of lip service that in the Indian tradition the various disciplines claim to help, if not bring about, the attainment of mokṣa. The point is that any activity which is a part of the total activity of living—language (Vyākaraṇa), ritual (Pūrva Mīmāṃsā), artha, kāma, reasoning—if performed properly, would lead to mokṣa because only in the context of such a life could the performance of any of these activities be said to be proper. Therefore, it is said that even if one could use one word properly (this does not mean merely in the syntax of a sentence, but in the syntax of life) then one could attain mokṣa. (It must be remembered also that in Indian thinking logic is not merely a theory of validity, but a theory of truth.)

Another issue which is emphasized by Daya Krishna is that of the significance of God in modern western philosophy. He says that in spite of such significance we do not call modern western philosophy spiritual, because to be spiritual all reality must be understood in terms of spirit. But what is the significance of God? In the case of most modern philosophers also, the reality and

truth of everything is derived from the reality and truth of God. The philosophical system presents a theoretical foundation for this view. But what is its relation to spirituality—which is a characteristic of human life? Is it life according to God’s will that makes it spiritual? But, then, if spiritual life is made an end of human existence the argument would be circular. Not only that, the argument which is grounded on God as the only reality and the argument from spiritual life are supposed to be independent of each other. This is perhaps important reason why western philosophy is not called spiritual.

Another issue that Daya Krishna discusses in detail is that of puruṣārthas. It is right that he does so, in view of the importance of puruṣārthas in the context of Indian philosophical thought. Daya Krishna rightly thinks that if his understanding of Indian philosophy is to be upheld, the theory of puruṣārtha should be rejected.

One of the first questions raised is about the meaning of the terms that designate human goals—dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. I shall discuss the terms with reference to the treatises which treat each of them.

Arthaśāstra—the sāstra of artha concerns itself with the acquisition and maintenance of land. Though the Arthaśāstra talks of these in relation to the king, the acquisition and maintenance of land by the king is also the condition of such acquisition and maintenance by citizens. And though only land is mentioned, it includes all kinds of material wealth.

Kāma is the enjoyment of appropriate objects by the five senses of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling assisted by the mind together with the soul. The ingredient in this is a peculiar contact between the organ of sense and its object, and the consciousness of pleasure that arises from that contact is called kāma. (Burton’s translation of Kāmaśāstra)

This is what one might call aesthetic pleasure in the mildest sense of the term.

Dharma has many senses, but in this context, it refers to the code of conduct derived from śruti, smṛti, sādācāra and ātmātusji.
The code of conduct is described in terms of śādārvarna dharma, vīśīga dharma (varna and āśrama dharma in their nīya, nātmitikā and kāmya form). (This will also include the rituals.) Dharmas regulates one’s behaviour in relation to others in the pursuit of artha and kāma.

Mokṣa, we have seen, is theoretically described in many ways, but in concrete terms it means self-realization—a complete internal self-discipline which is helped by external discipline as also by internal discipline such as meditation, tāpas, etc.

Thus, these four goals are distinguishable, but they are closely and necessarily related. And this creates confusion about their very nature.

(i) It might be said that artha is a means, whereas kāma is an end. But one might say that the pursuit of artha may itself be an enjoyment according to the manner in which the activity is performed. So the same activity may be pursuit of both artha and kāma.

(ii) It may be said that dharma is a means and mokṣa is an end. But this is to pose a sharp distinction between the two, which, we have seen, does not exist.

(iii) Sometimes a sharp distinction is made between artha and kāma on the one hand and dharma and mokṣa on the other, so that artha and kāma are secular ends whereas dharma and mokṣa are not. But, even in this case, a sharp distinction is made. If artha and kāma are pursued not according to dharma and therefore also not according to mokṣa, they cease to be “puruṣārthas”, goals of human beings. They become greed and lust.

And equally, if dharma and mokṣa are not related to artha and kāma, they become ritualism and escapism. Thus any activity is associated with all the puruṣārthas. Any activity is not specific to a puruṣārtha, except apparently. The puruṣārtha followed by the activity is a matter of the character of the individual as a whole.

But could not all the puruṣārthas be reduced to kāma? If this is done, there will be no hierarchy of desires. But a hierarchy of desires is posited when there is a conflict. Though no goal is to be

sacrificed totally in such a conflict, the goals of artha and kāma may have to be sacrificed totally in case the possibility of self-realization is for ever jeopardized (Charles Malamoud in The Way of Life, edited by T.N. Madan).

Is not self-realization a matter of freely developing oneself? But without reference to others and other aspects of oneself? Here, too, there is no one way of understanding freedom and development. Traditional Indian thought considers freedom and development with reference to others and other aspects of oneself; modern thought does so only in so far as it helps one’s own ideas of freedom and development.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In presenting this understanding, have I done any violence to the meaning of the word philosophy or the word religion? I do not think so. I think this way of looking at the two traditions gives us a better understanding of the two traditions than the sharp distinctions that one might want to draw.

It might be said that I want to say this because I want Indian thought to have the credit of having philosophy and religion, because I want to pull for tradition. If I wanted to pull for tradition, I would have said that Indian thought is not less of philosophy or less of religion because of its structuring, but rather that it is more of both philosophy and religion. And it is western thought which is less of philosophy and less of religion because of their structuring and sharp separation. But I do not want to say any such thing. What I want to bring out are the possibilities and limitations of both the traditions of thought.

I am sure that Daya Krishna and many others would disapprove of my approach as a whole; they would call it illegitimate and an attempt to confuse issues. I think I have done sufficiently in terms of explanation and results to ward off such a charge. In so far as it is said that I have not done my work well enough or that I have not done it in sufficient detail, I must agree, but plead both lack of ability and lack of serious response—except from Daya Krishna. But I do want to say that I have done enough to make a meaningful debate possible. If a certain historical pers-
perspective is to be added to the theoretical one, this is a preliminary to the addition of the historical perspective.

I do not think I have discussed at length the various issues I have raised but I do think I have done enough to show that the other side of the issues raised by Daya Krishna is not without strength, that it has at least as much strength as the more prevalent side.

Daya Krishna on Indian Thought: Some Unanalysed Assumptions

PRATAP CHANDRA

Every living culture must cherish the source of its basic tenets and values and keep re-examining it to look for new meanings, new guidelines, facets hitherto inadequately appreciated or understood. Building and/or strengthening the cultural identity of a nation requires this. But what happens when this source itself becomes an altogether new discovery, as has happened in our own particular case? The fact that our cultural tradition has remained largely unbroken over the millennia signifies little when one notices the trepidation with which a reasonably educated Indian approaches the classical or even recent Indian thought. Linguistic barriers, basic shifts in the socio-political situation, challenges posed by repeated confrontation with alien cultures and the adjustments necessitated by them have all combined to convert Indian thought into a museum piece, and that too of no great consequence. It does not really interest the vast majority, the much vaunted 'spirituality' and 'religiosity' of this great land notwithstanding. Autistic pet generalizations are good enough for most of us. The few who do manage to feel interested rarely succeed in relating it to the present-day situation. We see no incongruity in taking pride in the great antiquity of our cultural tradition though we know so little even about the ideas current in the last century!
Philosophy does not occupy the same place in the making of a cultured person in our country as it does in the developed countries. Perhaps this pervasive apathy towards our philosophical moorings is one reason for it. Indian philosophy has belonged to Indological studies ever since modern historical works on it in western languages started appearing in the first half of the last century. Scholars like Colebrooke, Barth, Max Müller, Garbe, Monier-Williams and Deussen were primarily students of Sanskrit, with little training in philosophical analysis. In any case, not many questions can be raised and claims disputed in a newly discovered tradition. More so when that tradition has come down to us in a vast corpus, comprising a bewildering multiplicity of sects and schools. All this, regrettably, made for an uncritical acceptance of the tradition. It is understandable, though not wholly excusable.

The teaching and study of western philosophy started soon after the establishment of the university system in India. However, not many students of this discipline showed any inclination for Indian thought before Radhakrishnan. Even after the publication of the monumental works of Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Hiriyan, et al., the teaching and study of Indian and western philosophy continued to belong to two different worlds, with little interaction except in some doctoral dissertations purporting to compare and contrast some Indian thinker or school with a western thinker or school. Most such comparative exercises display a not particularly high level of critical awareness, resulting in a large-scale difference about comparative philosophy as such. As for the rest, which no doubt constituted the majority, those with first-hand knowledge of the original texts of classical Indian thought had no understanding of or interest in modern western philosophical issues and methods, while students of the western tradition remained busy with either analysis or examination of some western thinker or current of thought. An effective and fruitful communication between the two is yet to be established.

This is where Daya Krishna’s contribution, particularly since 1965, becomes especially relevant and notable. He began as a rather perspicacious student and scholar of western, chiefly analytical philosophy—witness his papers up to 1959. Was it during this six-year interregnum that he realized that interpretation, analysis and explication of traditional concepts is not only a legitimate but also essential philosophical activity? I have no means to know. Philosophical analysis is undoubtedly a domain sans geographical limits, but it is debatable whether one can undertake a re-examination of the sources of certain alien basic ideas and values and can also do justice to this task. Moreover, will that alien culture care much for such exercises? Works on western philosophers have been published by Indian scholars off and on. I seek enlightenment from those who know what kind of reception these works have had in the West. It can rightly be said that many western scholars have written authoritatively on Indian thought, art, culture, history and other aspects and that such works enjoy much respect in India. There could be several reasons for this. There is still so much to do to bring the whole of Indian culture to light that contributions from any source are welcome. This is not the case in the West. Then, the way we look at ‘foreign experts’ in every field is perhaps quite exclusive to us. Even then, western writers whose understanding of the Indian situation is inadequate gain acceptance. This is certainly not to deny that some of the western writings on India are highly commendable. But these are mostly the works of scholars who had a command over classical languages and had access to sources not within the ken of an average member of the Indian intelligentsia. However, not one of them regards classical Indian thought as of living abiding interest the way Daya Krishna does. One cannot miss noticing that they write about matters which are of strictly academic interest to them. There is no sense of involvement that characterizes a scholar trying to delve deep in his or her own tradition. For instance, would a western (or non-Indian) scholar say, ‘There is nothing sacrosanct in what somebody collected thousands of years ago and the format that he gave to that collection. We need a new Vyāsa for modern times who would undertake the work keeping in view the needs of the times’? To Daya Krishna, the Vedas are not so many pieces in a museum but have living significance.

There is much in Daya Krishna’s recent writings on Indian thought which inspires admiration. He is among the first, if not the only one, to use analytical tools in the field of Indian philoso-
phy unsparingly and relentlessly. However, I am afraid he has not paid adequate attention to the peculiar Indian context and how it affects the use of common philosophical terms. To this I seek to draw his attention through this brief piece.

As I have endeavoured to show elsewhere, while medieval and modern western thought is uni-linear in approach, Indian thought has all along been multi-linear. This is not a superficial difference but a basic cleavage of far-reaching consequence inasmuch as it affects our total comprehension of the situation. Uni-linear or singularistic thinking is inherent in the Hindu tradition. It assumes that there is, and can be, only one truth, which, according to it, is revealed and thus cannot be questioned. All else is either a case of diversification or a heresy. This line of thought logically posits a ‘mainstream’ or ‘dominant’ view and attaches inordinately excessive importance to it at the cost of other streams or views. Suppression of free thinking is natural in a uni-linear situation, as happened during the European Middle Ages. So is coercion and inquisition. Eventually, this situation causes deep resentment leading to large-scale protest and dissent movements. In contrast, in a pluralistic or multi-linear situation, there is willing acceptance of the fact that different individuals think, and have a right to think, differently. Logically, in this situation there is no place for a mainstream or dominant view. Here we must talk only of so many streams and so many views. Admittedly this will be neither easy nor elegant since we will be deprived of the right of passing judgement on the entire gamut. We will have to keep reminding ourselves that what we are saying about one current may not be applicable to another. Multi-linear situations do not throw up substantial protest movements since a single focal point is the sine qua non of all such protest. The amazing plurality which ancient Indian society seems to have not only tolerated but also cherished, the complete freedom of thought and expression which characterized that era, become anathema in a uni-linear situation.

Certain philosophical terms evoke different feelings in these two contexts. I have in mind particularly terms like ‘authority’, ‘infallibility’, ‘sacrosanct’, ‘revelation’ and ‘authoritative’. While in a uni-linear situation they signify a great deal and are perhaps the very basis of the thought process, in a multi-linear situation they mean very little. Free thinking and these epithets do not go together. The need to point this out arises because if we are not careful and neglect to keep the two contexts separate, we may see things that are not there. To cite only one example, the use of the terms ‘āstika’ and ‘nāstika’ is common in all the modern histories of Indian thought. These have been rendered as ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ in English, connoting as they do believers and non-believers in the non-human origins of the Vedas. But this has been done in such a way that to anyone outside the circle of the knowledgeable they assume a significance that they never had in ancient times. All talk of Indian thought being spiritualistic and other-worldly ultimately springs from an over-emphasis on the orthodox. There was a time when scholars writing about the naturalistic trends in ancient India talked in a language befitting a new discovery. I have always wondered how these scholars overlooked the fact that right from Śaṅkara to Śāṅka Mādhava no thinker dealing with the whole range of Indian sects and schools attached much importance to this distinction. Acceptance or otherwise of the Vedic ‘authority’ meant precious little to them, engaged as they were in countering argument by argument. Modern histories of Indian thought, whether by Europeans or Indians, necessarily divide the sects and schools between these two categories and follow this pattern rather than sticking to the chronological order. As a result, not only has an unhistorical picture come to occupy our imagination, but, what is worse, we fail to see the dialectical relationship between the different schools.

Daya Krishna has used these terms and, I hope, I am proved wrong, without always making a clear distinction about the contexts. Please allow me to examine three of his latest papers published in the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* to substantiate my point. He begins the first of these, on the Upaniṣads, thus, ‘The Upaniṣads are perhaps the most famous of the sacred texts of India. Besides being acknowledged as sacred and thus surrounded by an aura of religious authority...’ (emphasis added). Later, ‘Yet, if the Upaniṣads not only continued to be composed but also to be accepted and included in the orthodox canon, then they cannot be regarded as śruti in the
same sense as the Vedic śāṁhitās...4 (emphasis added). Later still, 'Still, it is surprising that what proclaimed itself as an Upaniṣad should have been the subject of controversy, a situation that casts grave doubts on the veneration and infallibility with which śrutis is supposed to have been regarded in the orthodox Indian tradition'5 (emphasis added). At yet another place, he raises an issue of great relevance, 'But if an extraneous text can smuggle itself into the Vedic śāṁhitā and manage to pass itself as an integral part of the śāṁhitā, what happens to the much vaunted sacrosanct character of the Vedic texts whose transmission through an infallible oral tradition is praised by scholars and laymen alike? Further, if all this is true, how can one accept their so-called revelatory character which gives them the aura of supernatural authority? If the text could be tampered with, it could not have been regarded as a revelation by those who tampered with it. The Upaniṣads are now regarded by most people as revelatory in the same sense as the Vedic śāṁhitās...'.6 (emphasis added).

These passages indicate that a monolithic 'orthodox tradition' has been assumed which is supposed to venerate the Upaniṣads, the sacred texts of India, and invests them with a kind of 'religious authority'. Moreover, they gain their 'supernatural authority' (no less) because they are held to be revealed. Do the facts on the ground warrant such an assumption? Should we not stop and ponder how all the non-Vedantic schools of the supposedly orthodox, i.e. āstika, tradition more or less ignore them? Were the Mimāṃsakas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Nyāyāvakas and the Śāṅkhyans less orthodox than the Vedāntins? The truth is, no one except their followers regarded the Upaniṣads as sacrosanct or some kind of a religious authority. 'Religious authority' as such appears to be a little out of place in the context of ancient India. If there was any such authority, it could be the smṛtis and certainly not any text of purely philosophical nature with little or no set of injunctions in them. I suggest that Daya Krishna should further clarify his intention in using these terms and take this highly commendable analytical exercise that he has undertaken to its logical conclusion.

The second paper is devoted to a rebuttal of certain arguments advanced by Karl Potter against Daya Krishna’s earlier papers questioning the integral relationship between ‘Indian philosophy’ and mokṣa. We hear of Indian philosophy almost as if it is a uniform single body of ideas. Even the editor of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies and writer of the Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies does not mind using the term in singular. A fixation with the uni-linear model, one wonders. I agree with and admire all the arguments advanced by Daya Krishna against Potter. ‘... if one were to count heads on this score [acceptance of God] there is little doubt that the Indian philosophical tradition would be found to be far less “spiritual” than the western one in this respect.’7 Similarly, the touchstone of a system’s being spiritualistic consists not in acceptance of God or spirit but in denial of matter, as has been pointed out.8 However, I wonder why Daya Krishna allowed Potter to define the ground-rules in the first place. Could we not say that a multi-linear, pluralistic tradition necessarily includes all kinds of philosophico-religious thinking? While some schools of Indian thought were spiritualistic, others were not, and some were explicitly anti-spiritualistic. Similarly, Daya Krishna has chosen to rebut Potter vis-à-vis the latter’s reference to the puruṣārthas also on his grounds. Should we not try to find out how many sub-traditions comprising the multi-stranded Indian tradition accept the doctrine of puruṣārthas? And while doing so, the further question: Is the acceptance merely verbal or also practical? Thus, we know that the entire śramaṇa tradition has little regard for artha and kāma, though everyone is not required or expected to renounce family life. To the Buddha and Mahāvīra, family life is nothing more than a necessary evil, while according to Manu it is the very basis of society. Similarly, though Śāṅkara’s training and commitment (I will not use the term ‘orthodoxy’ because of what follows) obliged him to pay lip service to the doctrine, he never practised it himself since he had no inclination towards artha and kāma. In fact, if my understanding is correct he broke the tradition in many ways. Daya Krishna is right in thinking that the doctrine of puruṣārthas is integral related to that of the four āśramas and that the one cannot be admitted without the other. The Buddha, Mahāvīra and Śāṅkara are one in rejecting the second phase of life also.

The third paper raises some extremely pertinent questions
about the Vedic corpus. Certainly it is time we took the Vedas seriously as a philosophical document of great antiquity. However, one again feels at a loss as to what to make of the opening statement: 'The Vedas are supposed to be, by common consent, the oldest and the most authoritative fountainhead of almost all tradition in India. In fact, it is with respect to the express acknowledgement or denial of their authority that the various traditions tend to define themselves and be defined by others in the long course of Indian history' (emphasis added). What kind of 'common consent', when thinkers were free to define themselves by denying Vedic authority also? They are certainly most authoritative, but only to the followers of a particular tradition, not to everyone. Moreover, this deserves greater attention than it has so far received, have we not uncritically accepted this dogma regarding the acknowledgement and denial of Vedic authority? The one religious canon with which I am personally acquainted, the Pali canon of the Theravada Buddhists, makes fun of some of the Vedic notions (like the birth of Brahmapati the Brahma's mouth), casts aspersions on priests and generally lacks respect for the Vedas. But I am not aware if it explicitly questions their authority. As far as I can see, the very notion of any text having religious authority is not known to them. I for one have never understood what is meant by 'denial of authority' or similar phrases. Perhaps the time has come when such phrases should be subjected to thorough analysis. And Daya Krishna is doubtless the most competent person to do it.

NOTES

4. Ibid., p. 72.
5. Ibid., p. 73.
6. Ibid., p. 74.
8. Ibid., p. 54.
Perhaps it is in the very nature of philosophy that anyone who takes it seriously feels compelled at one time or the other to raise the self-reflective question: What is the nature of philosophy? It seems that Daya Krishna experienced this compulsion quite early in his philosophical career and that is why his first major work is devoted to the nature of philosophy itself. The source of this compulsion can be traced in the fact that it characterizes the discipline of philosophy. As Daya Krishna points out at the beginning of his book, though reason has been the 'organon of philosophy' it has seldom enabled the philosophers to be convinced of each other's arguments (p. 2). Not only do few philosophers agree with each other in respect of the theses they propose relating to the various problems of philosophy, they do not agree even about the very function of the discipline (pp. 7–8). This situation has not at all changed since The Nature of Philosophy was written. Hence a discussion on the theme of the nature of philosophy is as relevant today as it was then. On this occasion it would be only appropriate to discuss this question in the light of Daya Krishna's views.

The concept of philosophy is interlinked with the concept of philosophical problems on the one hand and with the form of philosophical analysis on the other. According to Daya Krishna, a problem is not an item among other items that we may list in the world over there. A problem exists as an object to a conscious being. Moreover what is problematic to one conscious being may not be so to some other. Contradiction or paradox is often a motive force to reflection. However, it is often the case that what seems contradictory or paradoxical to one, does not appear so to the other. Unless the incompatibility is felt a problem hardly exists. 'The dismissal of any problem as abstract, therefore, means either that we do not feel the incompatibility or that we do not think the incompatibility to be a problem' (p. 218). But to say that philosophical problems are generated by contradictions or paradoxes would be to unnecessarily narrow down the nature of philosophical problem on the one hand and permit unwanted cases to be treated as philosophical problem on the other. For, there may be problems that may not involve contradiction or incompatibility and may yet interest the philosopher, while it is obvious that non-philosophical disciplines are not bereft of contradictions and incompatibilities. So, unless something very peculiar is shown to characterize philosophical problems it would be hard to distinguish them from the problems of other disciplines. Interestingly, what is peculiar to philosophical discipline, as Daya Krishna points out, is the enigmatic fact that this itself constitutes a problem as to what is or what ought to be construed as a philosophical problem. 'The existence of a problem, however, is itself a problem.' (p. 21) Philosophical problems are different from logical problems on the one hand and from scientific problems on the other. Scientific problems are related to some state of affairs—possible or actual. Consequently they are capable of direct or indirect verification. A problem of logic or mathematics is not concerned with any state of affairs and hence is incapable of being tackled by empirical verification of any sort. Its structure is formal and its resolution calls forth coherence rather than verification (p. 292). Philosophical problems are neither concerned with state of affairs and so with verification, nor are they concerned with logic or form and coherence (pp. 292–294). Philosophical problems arise because of conceptual confusions. They require conceptual analysis for their resolution. This, Daya Krishna claims, 'has been the essential nature of philosophical thinking in the past and in the present' (p. 229). 'The philo-
sophic activity is peculiarly parasitic upon a particular type of confusion. The confusions are conceptual, i.e. are of such a nature that they can be resolved in no way other than that of conceptual analysis. The resolution gives us freedom from the problem, i.e. from philosophy itself. Philosophy, therefore, lives in the clarification of its own confusions, a clarification that is its own death' (pp. 299–300). Fortunately, the temper of a philosopher is such that he is hardly ever in a state in which he is not bothered by one confusion or the other.

And so philosophy is a never-ending enterprise in a sense (p. 231). Another important and distinctive feature of philosophy is that it has been acclaimed as knowledge (p. 1). It is neither a matter of emotion nor of action. 'It is a cognitive activity par excellence' (p. 215).

Negatively, Daya Krishna rejects the belief that philosophy can give us final and absolute knowledge about the ultimate real or the 'really real'. He examines and finally rejects what he takes to be the presuppositions which have motivated western thought. These presuppositions are: the nature of ultimate reality is such that it can be discovered by pure thought; both the object and organon of knowledge are final and finished; the rational is the same as the valuational; and that philosophy gives us knowledge which is final and completely valid. These presuppositions are said to be inter-related and are ultimately connected with the problems of reality, knowledge and value. The first three are different facets of the same belief; that is, there is something really real and its nature can be determined. The fourth is said to be the consequence of this belief; that is, philosophy is a discipline which gives us access to the real and the knowledge we so attain is valid and final. If these beliefs are rejected one cannot and, according to Daya Krishna, one should not, approach philosophy with the hope to find something really real or a method which would infallibly lead to it. As he concludes, 'it is time that philosophers dispel the general impression that they are on intimate terms with Reality with a capital, R, and hobnobbing terms with the Absolute and the God Almighty. The philosopher should not don the false plumes of the shaman, the priest or the prophet' (p. 293). Thus the philosopher is neither supposed to prescribe for the world nor is he supposed to describe it as a scientist.

I hope that the above is a faithful, though sketchy, account of Daya Krishna's concept of philosophy as delineated by him in his Nature of Philosophy. Now, as must be evident, the notion of 'conceptual' or 'concept' and the notion of 'cognitive' are central to Daya Krishna's characterization of philosophy. On both these notions much more needs to be said than is done in the work referred to, before the explication of the notion of philosophy can be said to be reasonably satisfactory. So let us first ask, what is to be understood by a 'concept'? Let us consider the concept of man. What do we understand by such a concept? Suppose one proposes that M answers concept of man. Philosophically, mere assertion of M will not be adequate at all. One would like to know how one can validate or justify an answer of this sort. One line of thought may be that we see whether M answers the demands which might be raised regarding the concept of man in the light of one's own experience. At the pre-reflective level some relevant awareness is already present. So what comes to the surface when the issue about man is raised is a more precise articulation of experience already encountered at the pre-reflective level. The articulation in terms of concept, while involving rational apparatus with linguistic nets, may generate all those problems which constitute the dynamics of conceptual analysis. While one demand or constraint on conceptual explication may be derived from the pre-reflective experiential source the other can be traced to the demand for conformity to some ideal pattern or form. This tension between is and ought may be said to characterize the life-blood of thought. The point to note here is that the explication of the concept will involve a reference to experience in the widest sense of the word and thus would include a reference to the empirical. Similarly, though the idea of form or essence may remain as vague as 'pre-reflective', it serves as a spur to thought in the direction of more and more precise articulation. I am not sure if it is this kind of activity of thought which is implied in the acceptance of non-finality or non-absoluteness of the object and the method to know or realize it.
The articulation associated with conceptual explication involves the processes of both identity and difference. Perhaps it is here that one may look for the source of laws of thought. An interesting aspect of the process is its intimate connection with reflection, with forms, with contours, with limits, with definitions. The process comes to an end only as a pause. Constant interaction with the world both at the physical as well as the thought level gives the process further impetus. Reification, forms, limits, boundaries, etc., keep on getting blurred, making fresh attempts in the same direction imperative. And thought moves on. In a later paper on comparative philosophy Daya Krishna seems to attribute an instrumental character to concept, not unlike the one proposed here. While writing about the choice from amongst various conceptual structures, he describes them as 'tools for organization of experience and for giving it meaning and significance' (p. 120). The level at which thought or thinking operates with concepts as its tools is highly generalized. It enables any matter to become an object for thinking. A level below, one might introduce all kinds of differentiation within the range of immense objects. The point may be illustrated by an example from the history of thought itself. Kant introduced a dichotomy between phenomena and noumena, between knowing and thinking, between practical and theoretical, and so on. Hegel introduced the notion of concept itself to make it possible to treat all these divisions as objects of thought at the same level. In fact, Kant was actually operating at that level while making and providing for those distinctions. An example of this is his use of the word 'concept' for space and time which are not concepts at all as he shows in his 'Aesthetics'. Hegel somehow assimilated both consciousness and its contents within the same stream. Whether this constitutes an advance over the Kantian position or not is not the issue. What is important to note is the fact that it seems necessary to allow for the possibility of something becoming an object of thought and the possibility of that something being treated in some preferred way. The level of concepts' eminently fills the bill. Perhaps it is in this sense that the subject matter of philosophy cannot be rigidly defined. Any aspect relating to experience and thus any matter relating to human activity—practical or theoretical—serves as the datum for philosopher. Thus, what would distinguish philosophy from non-philosophical disciplines is the level of generalization associated with concepts themselves.

Let us now ask what is meant by 'cognitive'. In 'Philosophical Theory and Social Reality', Daya Krishna writes, 'It is a common presupposition of cognitive enterprise that what is real and is sought to be known is independent of the beliefs of man' (p. 28). At the same place he adds that the determination of 'truth' and 'falsehood' is so 'central to the cognitive enterprise', that without it 'it can hardly be regarded as making any sense at all' (p. 28). In other words, a philosophical statement must in some respect reflect some aspect of reality or the world there and must not be capable of being true or false. Now, as already noted, it is not the business of the philosopher to describe the real. He is also not concerned with ordinary verification or confirmation of some fact at the empirical level. If this is so how shall we incorporate the notion of truth or falsehood unless these notions are assigned some function other than the normal one?

If the philosopher is also not concerned with reality what possible sense could be attached to the cognitive demand that the object of knowledge must be independent of the beliefs of man?

Now, a philosopher is supposed to be concerned with concepts. Can it be shown that the demands of the cognitive enterprise have some application in respect of concepts? Can a concept be treated as an object independent of the beliefs of man? Is it right to think that a concept or a sentence in which something corresponding to a concept be a part, could be true or false? If these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, conceptual reflection cannot deserve the designation of being cognitive. While there is some sense in thinking that a concept can be independent of the beliefs of man as an object of thought, it will have to be distinguished from the reality which may be intended to be encapsulated by it. Besides, the designations of truth and falsehood would be inapplicable to a concept as concept. A concept can be said to be adequate or inadequate. It would sound odd if one were to speak of a concept as a true concept or a false concept. Then, what is the sense of saying that
philosophy is a cognitive enterprise? Is cognitive to be understood in some extended sense?

When we think of cognitive we think of various different aspects of conscious experience. The experiences include not merely an understanding of things there, but also our reaction to them, and our volitional attitudes to them. It seems that conscious experience has a pivotal role in cognitive. Such an awareness would also be concerned with itself. Thus conscious activity will have two nodes, one extending outward towards the object, the other receding towards the source, that is consciousness itself. In another paper, 'God and the Human Consciousness', Daya Krishna seems to accept the idealist tradition while accepting that 'to be conscious, for man, is to be self-conscious, and to be self-conscious is to be aware of the "Other" in relation to which one becomes aware of oneself' (p. 1). In fact, we come very close to the Hegelian concept of philosophy when we find Daya Krishna characterizing philosophy in the following way: 'Philosophy at the deepest level... is the self-articulation of reason...'. ('Philosophical Theory and Social Reality', p. 33). 'The life of philosophy is the life of reason and the life of reason is the life of objection and counter-objection... philosophy is culture become self-conscious of itself; and self-consciousness, as always, is not critical of what is, but reaches out to what can be or even what ought to be' (ibid., p. 34).

However, consistent with his dynamic concept of philosophy, Daya Krishna would not like to think of philosophical enterprise ever coming to a finale. For him philosophy which is a 'dialogue of reason with itself' is as unending as 'the life of the Mind or even, to a certain extent, the life of the Spirit' (ibid., p. 37).

The notion of cognitive gets a wider dimension when to the notion of truth is added another entirely different notion of truth — transformative truth! In an attempt to assimilate arts to the cognitive enterprise Daya Krishna accepts a wider range of the use of the word 'truth'. 'Truth, in the first instance, may be defined as that which mirrors reality or, in other words, represents it as it is. On the other hand, truth is also conceived as that which not merely reveals reality but also transforms it, and in a deeper sense, transcend sin it' ('The Arts and the Cognitive Enter-
prise of Man', The Visva-Bharati Quarterly, Vol. 41, Nos. 1-4, p. 4). Further in the same paper, 'unless the transformative and transcending aspects of truth are kept in mind equally with those that are usually regarded as informative or descriptive, it would always be suspected that the arts have no cognitive function at all' (ibid., p. 9).

Does recognition of the transformative and transcending aspects of truth commit one to postulate eternal verities? So far as The Nature of Philosophy is concerned this question seems to take us out of the narrow confines in which philosophy is conceived there. Obviously the belief that there are eternal verities to be known by the philosopher is rejected there. The notion of transformative truth seems to be connected much more with some sort of becoming or being rather than with corresponding to something. The notion of truth seems to function more as a beacon than as a terminus. Writing on comparative philosophy Daya Krishna remarks that 'the cognitive enterprise is as unending as any enterprise, and though the truth-claim has inevitably to be made it is equally certain that it shall remain unfulfilled in time' (p. 13). The cognitive enterprise extends not merely to the entire life of reason and consciousness but comprehends the flights of spirits too. The very structure of self-consciousness compels the spiritual seeking of man which informs the spirit of religion itself. The objective that is sought is the most real, i.e. God ('Diogenes', No. 47, p. 10). Is it not the top which at some moment philosophers including Daya Krishna himself refused to climb because of its rarified atmosphere or at the worst thinking that there was no top to climb to?

The characterization of cognitive needs it to be distinguished from the imaginative. In many respects what goes on in the name of cognitive activity is not very different from imaginative activity. Perceiving, constructing, experimenting with different forms and configurations seem to be as much imaginative as cognitive. Moreover, imaginative is also connected with consciousness in a wider sense. Perhaps imaginative is not so self-conscious an activity as cognitive. We might hold that imaginative is cognitive under certain constraints. These constraints reveal the nature of reason itself. Answers to 'what' and 'why' questions have to make
sense in terms of rational constraints. Man while submitting himself to the call of reason has to struggle to keep his other facets in a subordinate position and thus has to effect some sort of transcendence within himself. This, of course, is the demand of the cognitive enterprise as a whole. In philosophy, as we have noticed, the cognitive enterprise has to go on at a generalized level. The necessity to rise to this generalized level and the necessity to transcend are intimately connected, and enable the foundational search to be possible which is so distinctive of philosophy.

Another important aspect relating to the cognitive enterprise is its role in the life of an individual. It is commonplace to say that cognition is essentially a human affair. It would not make sense if it were not preceded by the lack of some kind of awareness of illusion and so on. Further, if the cognitive enterprise does not modify this kind of awareness and does not place one in a more satisfactory state of mind, it cannot be supposed to have mattered. Considering the usual informative level it is familiar to everyone what it means to be more knowledgeable. However, given the wide connotation of cognition it remains no more obvious in what way an individual who is engaged in the cognitive enterprise is better off than the one who is not.

Even if we do not institute an evaluative comparison between a philosopher and a non-philosopher it would be still sensible to ask why philosophy should be placed among the various desirables. Of course, philosophy does not add to our information. The sciences other than philosophy and various arts and techniques need information and process it according to their own specific objectives. When information becomes an object of philosophical reflection it is usually dissociated from the usual pragmatisms. Elevated to the level of concept, its particularities and specificities remain no more relevant for reflection. Let us think of the proverbial ‘table’, ‘ghata’, or ‘pata’ that have served as objects of discussion in the context of epistemology. Philosophers did not ask how they were made or what was the purpose for which they were made. They were interested in them as objects of knowledge, as every student of philosophy knows. Were they independent of the knowing consciousness? How at all could one establish that what was grasped by the consciousness had some correspondence to something there? These and allied questions were related to the wider question of appearance and reality and

that again was related with some vital concerns of human life.

Once the inquiry relating to these questions itself becomes an object for philosophical reflection, questions of logic, language víśeṣāṇi reality acquire an interest of their own. The process goes on. The question, however, is what is interesting here and why at all one should go in for it. Philosophy being the life of reason itself and reason being involved in its own articulation one may think that philosophical reflection or inquiry is inevitable. If this is so, then raising the above question would be like asking why one should be interested in life or what is life good for.

There is something more to it, as we gather from the various remarks Daya Krishna has made in some of his writings. In his ‘Comparative Philosophy’ he writes that ‘ultimately it is the arguments given for a certain position that are of interest to a philosophical mind’ (p. 15). Lest one gets the impression that philosophy is merely an intellectual game, we add another remark from the same paper: ‘as a human enterprise it is bound to be concerned with what man in a particular culture regards as the highest good for mankind or as the summum bonum for man’ (p. 8). In his paper on ‘God and the Human Consciousness’, where he analyses the structure of self-consciousness in relation to the concept of God, he points to an ever-seeking spiritual quest which signifies man’s encounter with God, his quest for his true self and truth, the realization of beauty and the actualization of good (p. 6). If we take the unending search towards the most real (p. 10) as continuous with the philosophical quest, then philosophy could be characterized as a process which endows meaning. As Daya Krishna himself writes, ‘to give shape to thought, to provide it with the terms of its own articulation, to lay down the norms of meaningful discourse, and at a larger remove, of meaningful living itself, are some of the things that philosophy does and in doing so, shapes social reality both in its actual and in its ideal aspects’ (‘Philosophical Theory and Social Reality’ p. 35). The constant claim that philosophy is a continuous and never-ending activity does not obscure the fact that philosophy cannot be dissociated from basic ontological and epistemological concerns. A philosopher may not be a priest or a scientist but he cannot disown his responsibility to engage himself in a rational quest into the nature of the highest human seeking on the one
hand and an explication of the human situation vis-à-vis existence in its totality on the other.

NOTE


Daya Krishna and Creativity in Philosophy

RANJIT GHOSE

I

Philosophizing is associated with scholarship more often than not. Scholars are mostly system-bound and in the process they develop a sort of intellectual laziness. We may differentiate between two opposing types of philosophers: one who is merely critical and one who possesses creative talent. The first, when confronted with a new idea, reacts to it in a distinctively negative way and by means of his logical expertise proves an idea to be wrong or a project unworkable. The second, however, reacts to the idea in a very different way; he would keep speculating about the implications of the different mental models which can be constructed out of such an idea. This second type of philosophers who are ready to explore the possibilities of fresh ideas may be called 'creative philosophers'. They are free from the 'compulsion neurosis' from which the first type of philosophers suffer. They always encourage the construction of new mental models which are in conflict with the tradition and discourage one's taking shelter in a revered authority, because scholarship in philosophy develops mental rigidity whereas creative philosophizing has a distinct flexibility inherent in it.

Daya Krishna, while supporting the creative philosophers, suggests that we should keep ourselves free from the prevalent letter and spirit of philosophical texts. He categorically emphasizes the ability to continuously reformulate one's
viewpoint as it is the only way of dispensing one’s understanding of any subject matter. He feels that the application of a single set of concepts, without the conception of alternative models, is the death of creativity. Daya Krishna writes:

Though the text has seemingly a beginning and an end, this is illusory. And to see it as illusory is to realize that the so-called ending is only a provisional ending, and that the end is really a challenge to us, the readers, to continue or carry the thought further. The ‘continuance’ or ‘carrying’ need not be in the same direction and may even oppose it or move in a direction which is essentially tangential to it.¹

Let us now put this sort of philosophizing in a well-ordered manner. For this, first, we have to point out what creative philosophizing is not, second, say something on its project and lastly discuss its prospects.

Ⅰ

Creative philosophizing is not to be compared with a creative product, i.e. a book or a piece of art. An author and an artist may be called creative by virtue of the end product of their creative spirit, which is determined by their works. Philosophizing is a never-ending process and its creativity is marked by the uncovering of the many faceted dimensions of an issue at hand.

Can it be identical with creative thinking? Although the boundary line is very thin we may state their difference by saying that a thinking process may not be expressed in language paving the way for the development of mystical insights of the thinker, but this is not possible in the case of creative philosophizing which must be expressed in language in howsoever rudimentary a manner.

Ⅱ

An expressed piece of statement (apparently philosophical) is the starting point for creative philosophizing. This piece of statement may be expressed in an insufficient way by the inter-

trogative form and hence the primary task is to put this statement in an articulated, clear-cut manner leading to fruitful discussion on it. This is definitely not only primary but also an indispensable preliminary and requires sharp wit and intellectual acumen on the part of the person involved in it. On the issue of questioning Daya Krishna writes:

To ask a new question is to disrupt the closed circle of accepted knowledge and to open a new vista for thought. Asking a new question is, in a sense an invitation to look at things new . . . what one has to cultivate is a sensitivity to questions and the ability to think and feel what lies behind the question.²

Creative philosophizing is usually carried out in the form of a dialogue between professional philosophers who may include serious thinkers from other disciplines also. Its uniqueness lies in group thinking. Daya Krishna feels that ‘thinking is not a monadic activity but rather the achievement of a community of thinkers’.³

However, the distinctive nature of creative philosophizing is revealed when it originates with the seemingly philosophical assertion of a common man who is not bound by any system and is a free thinker on his own. According to Daya Krishna,

what the other says, is always an opportunity for one’s own thought—not in the sense of contorting what he has said or in seeing in it what one always says, but rather in finding in it the possibility of a new direction for thinking which is not only different from what one has usually thought regarding that issue until that time but also beyond what the other person actually meant when he said what he said. What is required, in other words, is conceptual imagination, the ability to think beyond what has been thought.⁴

Creative philosophizing is marked by its interdisciplinary approach to a problem at hand. At some point in the discussion it may appear that the problem and the issue with which it started initially has been sidetracked giving rise to a completely new issue
which was never conceived of at the beginning. This is not a serious shortcoming but an encouraging move. For Daya Krishna, "one's attention need not be confined to the questions asked or the problem raised as, in the course of thinking, new questions or problems may emerge which might seem, at least for the moment, even more interesting or more promising."  

The dialogue, although moving in a coherent direction is not logical in the strict sense of the term as it is in the case of presenting something in the form of writing. According to Daya Krishna,

"It is a half-serious, half-playful attempt to explore collectively the various possibilities that spontaneously arise when people gather together to think about something that appears problematic to anyone belonging to that group at that moment. The attempt is to welcome each idea that spontaneously suggests itself to anyone present, and to see in it the possible opportunity for a new direction of thought. But the idea need not be pursued to the bitter end, even when some other interesting idea has suggested itself to someone else. The purpose, ultimately, is not so much to find a definitive answer or solution to the question raised or the problem posed, but rather to see how many directions thinking can take when confronted with a question or a problem."

IV

Apart from these strategies we should also discuss certain conditions for conceptual creativity. Peter McKeever in his *Imagination and Thinking: A Psychological Analysis* tried to set forth the conditions for creativity. In his view overlearning, period of incubation, sensory cues, motivational factors and economic security may contribute to the development of creativity in their own right. "Over-learning", he suggests, provides us with automatic input of information which could be recalled and this is not possible in case of "mere learning". Discussing "incubation", he suggests that a period of inactivity or at best a change of activity should follow "over-learning", i.e. when sufficient input of information has taken place. The curious and eccentric functions of creativity rest on different 'sensory cues', according to him. He emphasizes 'motivational factors of a social kind' and also a 'device for insulating oneself from basic human needs' as the conditions for creativity. These conditions, he feels, are not exhaustive since the natural capacity to reason is hardly explainable. However, McKeever's views come closer to the views of Daya Krishna when he writes:

"A fruitful advance of thought seems, rather, to result from reaction against established thoughts in the interest of its adjustment, refinement and extension; and the attitude that appears most readily to favour creative thinking combines receptivity towards what is valuable in traditional and new ideas alike with discriminating criticisms of both. A thinker in these lines is uninterested in established ideas when they are obviously wrong; this is the preserve of a destructive critic. He is concerned, rather, with vigorously criticizing ideas, both new and old, where they are most nearly right. To employ a mental model which may perhaps be appropriate, he is more concerned with 'growing points' than with 'dead wood'."

Here McKeever has pleaded for an 'open texture of thought' as is used by Daya Krishna instead of closure of a discussion at hand.

V

For Daya Krishna an analysis of strategies for creative philosophizing becomes an act of creativity itself. He writes,

"Devising of strategies for conceptual creativity is itself an exercise in creativity. And hence, they can neither be fixed in number nor be used in such a way as to ensure the result deterministically. The exercise of the strategy is as much a creative act as its discovery for, ultimately, it is an invocation of the same mystery and power that lies at the root of the universe and ourselves."

To conclude, we admit that any attempt to systematize such
an idea of creativity in philosophy would not be the same as creating a system for its own sake, the merit of such type of philosophizing lies in encouraging philosophical restlessness rather than philosophical docility. However, the future prospect of such type of philosophizing, though not bleak, gives rise to further debatable issues on it.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 49.
3. Ibid., p. 48.
4. Ibid., p. 54.
5. Ibid., p. 54.
6. Ibid., pp. 53–54.
8. Ibid., p. 113.
9. 'Thinking vs. Thought', p. 57.

An attempt at an analysis of the concept of freedom would necessarily have to take into account the following questions:

(i) What is meant by freedom? Can only human beings be free? Or can all the elements of the universe—conscious or unconscious—be said to be free? If only the consciousness elements of the universe can be said to be free, is the freedom of unicellular elements, animals and human beings to be treated at par?

(ii) If only human beings can be said to be free, what is freedom as a human experience? Is the desire for freedom something inherent in human nature? Is it an identical experience, irrespective of the kind of culture a person lives in, or is it dependent upon the degree of individuation (individualism) reached in a particular society? Is freedom only the absence of external pressure or is it also the presence of something—and if so what? What are the social and economic factors in society that make for the striving for freedom? Can freedom become a burden too heavy for man to bear, something he tries to escape from? Why then is it that freedom is for many a cherished goal, and for others a threat?