"Thinking without 'Things':
without identity, without Non-contradiction, and yet 'Thinking'.

One has to think

If one thinks, one is supposed to think about something. But is this necessary?

And, in any case, what is a 'thing'? Is, for example, a 'problem a 'thing', and yet, as everyone knows, we think about 'problems', and if problems are not 'things', what are we thinking about?

And philosophers are supposed to think even about 'thinking', and 'thinking', certainly is not a 'thing'.

Thinking, then, need not be about a 'thing'. But what is a 'thing'? Has a 'thing' to be necessarily somewhere, located in space and need it have a temporal dimension also; space-time coordinates as it is generally said. But as definitely invisible and time are indeterminable, shall the notion of a 'thing' find some need some restriction and, at the other end, shall any restriction to be imposed on what will constitute a 'whole' in space on time, or with...
One has to think
If one thinks, one is supposed to think about something. But is this necessary? And, in any case, what is a 'thing'? Is, for example, a 'problem' a 'thing', and yet, as everyone knows, we think about 'problems' and if problems are not 'things', what are we thinking about? And philosophers are supposed to think even about 'thinking', and 'thinking', certainly is not a 'thing'...

Thinking, 'thinking', need not be about a 'thing'. But, when is a 'thing' has a 'thing' to be necessary somewhere, located in space and need it have a temporal dimension also; space-time coordinates? 2. By it is generally said. But as definitely space and time are interrelated and, at the other end, shall the notion of a divisible, shall the notion of a restriction, and, at the other end, shall any restriction to be imposed on what will constitute a 'whole' in space or time, or both...

Science today works
(at both ends and creates seemingly unnecessary problems)
for at least for those who want to understand what it says, if not also for itself. The universe according to it is around 14 billion years old and there are 'particles' that last only a millisecond of a second, and yet those are 'things' presumably because they have given them a 'name', and whatever one emits is given a name, because a 'thing', just as 'san', 'god', or 'behaviour on earth'...

But 'particles' are also supposed to have 'wave-like' properties, and waves certainly are not 'things', at least the sort of things that 'particles' are. Shall we then distinguish between types of 'things'? But why think in terms of 'things' at all? And does it help at all, or just create more confusion? Shall forces be treated as 'things', for science wants to talk about 'things', for science wants to talk about fundamental physical reality in terms of 'Fundamental forces', which it wants to reduce to as few as possible. But is 'gravitation' a thing, and what sort of a thing would an electro-magnetic
force be which has to have a change
positive or negative change will
intrinsic inbuilt properties of
atraction and repulsion it is.
What sort of problems
a thing should have in order
to be a thing, and has it to
be reversible in space and time
if it is the sort of thing that
has necessarily to be so, for it
is supposed to be the sort of
thing? But space and time
are supposed to be infinitely
divisible in principle and if
so, things would become
momentary "point-instants"
having an "instantaneous"
reversing or "infinite" or
like the abrasion on the
wheel of time, as the
Buddha's answer was and is. But
the problem relating to how
a thing is to be understood
is unproblematical and geometrical
is unmetrical and geometrical
when put into the picture, so far
complicated and complex this is an oppression of suffering. The animistic operation of divisibility seems to make it. We will have to accommodate the 'irrationalities', the 'imagination', and perhaps even the 'Transfinite' accept of Cantor into the heart of 'things'. And, not just this of we will also have the difficult problem of choice in respect of the geometry we would like our 'thing' to be located in. Of this we all, even myself, the problem would seem insoluble but, unfortunately, for those who wish to 'understand' a 'thing', the difficulties do not cease just here. A 'thing', if it is to be a thing, must have last properties, relations, and powers of effectivity, causality and merely some difference in the very fact of its being just where it is. Each of these creates...
incomplete

The more fundamental error, as those that are characterized as being "incomparative," as in case one can say, whether it be "by necessity," or "by reason," or "by power," or "by chance," or "by chance," cannot, and if there appear to be, the "thing," cannot be regarded as a thing in the "necessity," sense of the term, but in the "inference," or "contradiction," or "contradiction," and "contradiction," are only usual traditional uses, deriving from Aristotelian logic, and considered as a characteristic of sentences, propositions or judgments which, in Aristotle, had to have the same subject noun about which is only needed in the "sententential" sense where "negation" seems to function independently and is concerned only with the truth-value of the proposition or the sentence or the judgement, and not with the actuality of the exclusion or the exclusion of the predicate on the relation of the noun concerned.
The exclusion need not necessarily be experimental, in the empirical sense of the word. Nor need it be purely
initially defined, as some have tried to say, even in a mathematician's sense and the question which
there are 'exclusions', as otherwise
the term "Non-Euclidean
geometry", would make no
sense and the question which
of them is 'true' of the
"physical world" make no sense.

But what is this 'exclusion',
this power of exclusion, this power of
negation, on which the whole
argument for the notion of

a 'thing', depends and on which it is built. "This is
not that", is the heart of
being a 'thing', without
which the 'understanding',
of 'this' would be
impossible as it would
not have a distinctive
identity, of its own

distinctive

identity, of its own
for may understood as what it is. But 'difference' need not necessarily lead to 'exclusivity' or 'incompatibility', as has generally been thought. Applied in Aristotelian formulation of the Law of Identity as "A is A" is prima facie incompatible with his formulation of the Law of Contradiction on the Law of Excluded Middle. If "A can be B", as it necessarily has to be if "A cannot be both B and Not-B" and "A must either be B or Not-B", then "A just cannot be the same as B", but has to be B, something else also, a 'something' symbolized by 'B'.

The purely classical notion of 'identity' as symbolized by Aristotle is, thus, not only empty but
meaningless, something to which Moore indirectly pointed when he distinguished...

to a statement such as...

"pleasure is pleasure" and "pleasure is good." The current formulation of...
of the law on which the notion of...
of a "thing" rests does not fare any better; it shifts the problem from the "referent" of a word to...

its 'meaning'; and sees meaning in terms of the 'use' of the word, and understands the law as an stipulative imperative to keep the 'use' of the 'word' on the term, unchanged in a particular cognitive discourse as the discussion about what is claimed as 'knowledge' would become 'self-defeating if the normative injunction were not observed. The 'reformulation' shifts the problem to the identity of 'discipline' or 'context' and makes the law 'normative' in a way whose far-reaching implications have not been seen. Logic becomes
something like 'religion' as a priori conditional pre-requiem of the possibility of intersubjective discussion and argumentation amongst human beings, just as the latter may be understood as an a priori conditional pre-requiem for 'living together' as human beings amongst human beings.

But which is overlooked by those who argue like this is that whether it be discussion and argumentation or 'living together' each in its own way, nor only involves but demands a continuous procrustean modification and change in the 'illusionary identity' of all each and all of the linguistic and behavioural signs or signed that are transmitted, reflected back in converse transmission amongst participants who are continuously in motion intellectually and emotionally for more than the so-called "observed in motion" about
whom physicists do no rest of talking since Einstein achieved on this stone. And, which is why those
paradoxes ever were, that is no
anomalies or paradoxes if the
law which, as a signal, is
have not only a constant
celerity, but a velocity faster
than that which can be,
for even if it were to be their
human beings, constituted as they
physicists are, will not be
able to know it. But
behavioral But linguistic and
behavioral signals in inter
subjective communication which
occurs in discussion and
arguments, end, dying
together does not suffer from
the simulation: which signals
in physics seem to suffer
from. The whole world
of space and time will
ite indefinitely continuing
back and future can be
ranked about and discussed,
also that which is beyond
space and time, on to which
their categories do not attach. But
what is even more, all the
"propositional attitudes" can be
communicated by kinesthetic
and behavioral just by the
inflection of a tone or emphasis
in your speech or a movement
of your head or hands or some
er other gesture and, of course, one
may use the word 'no'
and render the whole to
an utter 'nullity' by its
negation. Prolly

D.K.