

which it is placed. A novelist can often take an actual 'given' character he knows in life and put the character in quite different circumstances, with different bodily traits, while retaining the sum and substance of an identity. This is how we do get recognizable people, inhabiting a different body and quite different imaginary situations. But here also lies an important distinction between character and *bhāva-rūpa*. A *bhāva-rūpa* is not as independent of the outer *nāda-rūpa* as character is of the body. A *bhāva-rūpa* affects the *nāda-rūpa*, can modulate it to an extent, but it cannot 'inhabit' quite another *nāda-rūpa*; it cannot like a character assume a very different body altogether. It is much more essentially tied down to a *nāda-rūpa*. The wonder really is that in a *rāga*, which is pure structure or form, an interacting duality of an inner acting on the outer can at all be palpably made. Perhaps, any self-conscious creative process does two things by nature: it seeks some kind of identity—as it does through *rāgadārī*—and in doing so initiates a duality of an inner linked to an outer.

The two very different analogies we have discussed above, I believe, afford two different insights into the nature of *rāga* and its identity, insights which complement and complete each other, however disparate they might seem to be. Character provides a metaphor for the embodied aspect of *rāga* as a felt *bhāva-rūpa*, with an inner being merging into an outer 'body'. But character is perhaps weak as an analogy for the plurality of *bhāva-rūpa* (despite what we have said above), as well as its 'abstract' quality. Here the analogy of idea or concept seems more apt. This analogy focuses on *ālāpa* in *rāgadārī* and its key role in formulating an identity, where plurality is seen as necessary to it as an identity-seeking reflexive activity. It allows us to see *ālāpa* as a 'thinking', ratiocinative activity rooted in self-consciousness. Together the two different analogies, I think, suggest the identity of a *rāga* as a 'felt concept'.

A crucial distinction between character and *bhāva-rūpa* is that characters as imaginative entities reflect living human beings. We do not create living human characters (unless we speak of self-creation in some unusually profound sense); we only reflect them or recreate them through imagination. But *rāgas* are more palpably created by us. *Rāgas* assume us. Somewhat in the same sense as do concepts.

Praśastapāda's Mapping of the Realm of Qualities: A Neglected Chapter in Indian Philosophy

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Qualities are all that we know, and what else can we know but them. Yet, they are a most neglected subject in philosophical reflection. Locke might have distinguished between primary and secondary qualities, and others might have added the idea of tertiary qualities to them, but that is not to talk of qualities, but of their relation to consciousness. Even Buddhists who gave up the notion of 'substance' and denied its 'necessity' for thought, do not seem to have engaged in any in-depth exploration of the categorical variety in the realm of qualities, perhaps because they too were interested only in their relation to consciousness, as is evident in the vast Abhidhamma literature on the subject. As for the rest, it is substance, the 'know-not-what', the 'thing-in-itself', the *Ātman* or the *puruṣa* which is the centre of their attention. The Sāṃkhyanas do talk of *sattva*, *rajasa* and *tamasa* but, though considered as qualities or *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, they too are defined and understood only in relation to consciousness. The 'ego-centricity' or 'self-centricity' or 'consciousness-centricity' of philosophical thought, whether in the east or the west, seems to have ensured that 'object' which is constituted by its qualities and qualities alone, shall be treated as secondary and in a perfunctory manner, even when the 'self' or the 'subject' itself appears as such, that is, as 'object'.

The Vaiśeṣikas are a notable exception and Praśastapāda's treatment of the subject is challenging in more ways than one. He is said to have divided them on the basis of twelve different criteria which, however, are not as clear-cut as one would have wished them to be. Yet, there are interesting insights which, if critically reflected upon, may help us in thinking about the subject in our own times.

Praśastapāda's first criterion draws our attention to the radical distinction between qualities that are abstract or *amūrta* as he calls them and *mūrta* or concrete, a distinction that is different from the one drawn by Locke or Galileo in the western tradition. The former are grasped, so to say, by reason, while the latter are grasped by the senses. The latter are further divided by him into the inner and the outer senses, and even amongst the latter he distinguishes between those that are grasped by one sense alone and those that are grasped by more than one sense.

The distinctions, though clear at first sight, lead to difficulties and even inconsistencies which do not seem to have been seen by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, as the two have been clubbed together in the Indian tradition. In fact, even Praśastapāda does not seem to have realized them as will be evident if one closely examines the diverse criteria he has offered for distinguishing between qualities in his system.

First, what exactly is meant by the term 'inner sense' and what exactly are the 'qualities' grasped by it? Is it the same as *manasa* or what has been called 'mind' in the Western tradition? Also, is there only one 'inner sense' or are there more than one?

Similar problems bedevil the idea of qualities that are apprehended by more than one sense. Normally, each of the senses apprehends only the qualities that can be apprehended by it, and if one apprehends something through more than one sense, one is said to perceive or apprehend an 'object' to which those qualities belong. The 'qualities' themselves remain 'separate' in the sense that they are grasped by each of the senses singly and separately.

There is the additional problem regarding the qualities that are supposed to belong to a 'whole' which consists of parts. Praśastapāda makes an interesting distinction in this context between qualities which are the same as the qualities of the parts and those that are distinctly different from them. The latter are what have been called 'emergent' qualities and the 'wholes' to which they are said to belong, 'organic wholes'. But, though he makes the distinction, he does not make it clear whether these are sensuously apprehended or not. The question is important, particularly in the case of those qualities in the 'parts' that

are themselves sensuously apprehended. The problem will get still more complicated in case of 'wholes' whose parts have properties that are apprehended by different senses. And, in case the parts or at least some of them are supposed to have what Praśastapāda calls *amūrta* or abstract qualities, the so-called 'emergent quality' of the whole will itself be *mūrta* or *amūrta*, concrete or abstract, or an amalgam of both.

Abstract qualities themselves are not supposed to be grasped by the senses, but by reason. In fact, that is the reason why they are called 'abstract'. But in case they are apprehended in an object which is grasped by the senses, then the so-called *mūrta* or concrete object will have qualities in it which are grasped by reason, and reason alone, and thus will have to be thought of as *mūrta* and *amūrta* at the same time.

The distinction between *mūrta* and *amūrta*, though generally made, is not clear as nothing could perhaps be more 'concrete' than pleasure or pain, or desire (*icchā*) or say, the apprehension of a quantitative or qualitative relationship such as $2 \times 2 = 4$ or the 'aesthetic matching' between two spaces or two forms, or colours which occurs in architecture or painting. Yet, these are generally regarded as 'abstract' qualities even though they are as immediately apprehended as colour, smells, taste, touch or sound.

Perhaps, the distinction could be drawn in terms of what is grasped by the senses, whether internal or external, and what is grasped by *buddhi* or reason. Praśastapāda draws this distinction also, as well as the one between *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, or those that are universal and those that are particular. But he does not seem to see the relation between the two and, in fact, does not appear even to grasp the point of the distinction between 'reason' and 'sense' as he treats pleasure and pain, or even *icchā* and *dveṣa* as grasped by the former. Interestingly, he also puts *dharma* and *adharmā* in this category and suggests that moral qualities are grasped by reason and that this is what distinguishes man from all other animals with whom he shares other qualities belonging to them both. In contrast, the western tradition ascribes *only* the knowledge of 'universals' to reason and not that of values, even though the idealist tradition from Plato onwards tried to conflate the two. The attempt, however, was unsuccessful mainly because

mathematics was taken as the paradigmatic example of truth grasped by reason, a turn for which Plato himself has to be held responsible.

But, paradoxically, *buddhi* which may be regarded as the Sanskrit term for 'reason', is considered a 'quality' in the Vaiśeṣika system and is mentioned as such in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra 1.1.6. On the other hand, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are said to be 'dependent' on *buddhi* in the Sūtra 1.2.3 सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्. In other words, they do not have an 'independent' or *nirapekṣā sattā* of their own, as is asserted of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* in the Sūtra 1.2.8. Prāśastapāda also puts *buddhi* in the category of *guṇa* and treats it as *amūrta* in his *Padārthadharmasamgraha* (*Prāśastapāda Bhāṣyam*. Varanasi, Sampūrṇānanda Sanskrit Viśvavidyālaya. 1977, p. 229.). Yet he also, like Kaṇāda, considers certain qualities as 'buddhyāpekṣā' but, surprisingly, he does not include *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* amongst them. For him, it is *paratva*, and *aparatva*, *dvitva* and *dviprathakatva* which have this characteristic (ibid., p. 239). He, of course, adds the term '*ityādi*' or 'et cetra' to suggest that there may be other qualities which share this characteristic also. But Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on the text added *tritva*, etc. (ibid., p. 239). Like Kaṇāda and Prāśastapāda, he does not see the problem posed by this. Nor does he seem to notice the fact that Prāśastapāda's list does not include the ones given by Kaṇāda in the Sūtra 1.2.3. In his discussion of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* he does not seem to raise the question whether they are '*buddhyāpekṣā*' or not.

But the fact that both Kaṇāda and Prāśastapāda make a distinction between entities whose 'existence' or 'being' can only be conceived of as 'being there' because of *buddhi* and those that are independent of it raises important issues for the *Vaiśeṣika* view of reality. The *buddhi*, it should be remembered, is explicitly conceived of as 'knowledge' in the *Nyāya Sūtras* where it is defined as '*upalabdhi*' or '*jñāna*' (1.1.15) and if certain entities come into being just because of this activity, then in each type of 'knowledge' one will have to distinguish between those elements which are there *because* of something being known and that which is known *because* it was there to be known. The author of the *Nyāya Sūtras* seems to be aware of this to some extent as evidenced in his definition of perceptual knowledge which he characterizes as *vyavasāyātmakam*, *avyapadesyam* and *avyabhicāri* (1.1.4). Perceptual

knowledge, it is being suggested, need not necessarily have these characteristics, and in case it is so it cannot be treated, as a *pramāṇa*. Something may be perceived and yet the resulting knowledge need not be a *pramāṇa*, as is well known in the case of perceptual illusion.

But once one accepts this, one will have to develop some sort of a theory of *pratyakṣābhāsa* on the analogy of *hetvābhāsa* even though, as far as I know, it has not been developed in the tradition, perhaps because of the fact that tradition itself is not clear as to what a *pramāṇa* is. The *Nyāya Sūtra* only enumerates the *pramāṇas* and does not give its *lakṣaṇa* which was mandatory for it if it was to follow its own practice in respect of the particular *pramāṇas* later on. In fact, if there can be a *pramāṇābhāsa* as is accepted in the case of *anumāna* and if it has to be extended to all the other *pramāṇas*, then one will have to give some criterion or criteria to distinguish between a *pramāṇa* which gives true knowledge and one which does not. One may define *pramāṇa* as that which gives *pramā* but that will be to give a circular definition and hence one will have to give some independent criterion of what is *pramā* and not just say that *pramā* is what is given by a *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa* is what gives a *pramā*.

It is true that circular definitions are not always considered vicious and some logicians have recently talked even of 'virtuous' circularity but the present circularity is *prima facie* undesirable and unless proved otherwise has to be avoided, if possible. *Nyāya* itself attempts to do so, at least in the context of *anumāna* explicitly and of *pratyakṣa* perhaps not so explicitly. The whole discussion of *hetvābhāsa* in the case of the former attests to this, as the inclusion of *doṣas* in the case of the *indriyas* does in the case of the latter. But the fact that *Nyāya* thinkers did not realize the necessity of making this distinction is shown by the fact that they did not draw it in the case of either *śabda* or *upamāna* which they *also* treated as *pramāṇa* in their system. Not only this, they did not even think of applying the notion of *doṣa* in the case of the internal sense or the *antarindriya* through which one was supposed to apprehend pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, *dharma*, *adharmā*, etc.

The idea of *doṣa* does occur in *Nyāya* and that too in a generalized fashion so as to be almost coterminous with *pravṛtti*. But, then the *Nyāya* thinker forgets that the whole *pramāṇa vyāpāra* is, and has to

be, inevitably carried on within this basic *doṣa* which destroys the distinction between *pramā* and *apramā* at its very foundations as everything becomes an *apramā* if one takes the contention seriously.

The so-called *pramā* ultimately becomes meaningless if *pravṛtti* itself is regarded as a *doṣa* by everybody, and even the criterion of *pravṛtti-sāmarthyā* which is supposed to distinguish true knowledge from false makes no sense, if one accepts the equation given in the *sūtra* 1.1.2 of the *Nyāya Sūtra*.

The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, at least at the *prima facie* level, does not seem to make this move and hence does not seem to suffer from the apparent conflict between the two proclaimed *prayojanas* of the *Nyāya Sūtra*, that is, *niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga*. It regards both *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* as the fruit of *dharma* and if *niḥśreyasa* is understood in the sense of the *Nyāya Sūtra*, then one will have to find how *apavarga* or *mokṣa* can be accommodated within that system.

Prāśastapāda treats *dharma* and *adharmā* as *amūrta*, *vaiśeṣika*, *atīndriya*, *akāraṇaguṇapūrvakāḥ*, *saṁyogaja*, *samānāsamānā-jātyārambhakāḥ*, *ubhayatrārambhakāḥ*, *kriyāhetavaḥ* and are *nimitta kāraṇa*, and *yāvaddravyabhāvitvam*.

Prāśastapāda, it should be noted, places each of the *guṇas* that he has already listed in one or the other of these twelve categories, each of which consists of a pair. He is empirical enough to observe that some of them may belong to both the classes which generally exclude each other. In this he is closer to modern logic which admits in the case of relations properties that cannot be attributed in a clear-cut, exclusive 'either-or' manner to those relations as they can be done in other cases. It is the 'empiricality' of the relation that creates this problem in some cases, and it is strange that Kant did not see this in his discussion of the categories of understanding in his system.

Kant did not raise the question whether all the twelve categories have to be simultaneously applied in every act of judgement, or that only *one* out of the four sets of quantity, quality, relation and modality has to be applied in each case depending upon the 'appropriateness' or 'fittingness' of the category so chosen to the object concerned. Prāśastapāda is not so concerned either, but he seems to believe that the heart of both epistemology and ontology is an understanding of the

qualities that we ascribe to substance and the exact characteristics that they have. He devotes a major part of his work to this exercise and its understanding, I believe, may provide a clue to an important aspect of Indian philosophizing which has not been paid attention up till now.

Kant, it should be noted, is not interested in 'qualities' at all. By that term he merely means, following Aristotle, whether the judgement is affirmative or negative. He adds the third alternative 'limitation' only to make the list threefold, forgetting that it has nothing 'logical' about it. In fact, the term 'quality' in the sense of predicate occurs under the heading of 'relation' where it occurs as 'Substance-Accident' and reminds one of the category of *samavāya* in the Vaiśeṣika system. Substance, it should be noted, is not an independent category in Kant; it occurs in a relational context and the 'name' for it is just the same as in the Vaiśeṣika system, that is, inherence. Even the other term of the relation, 'accident', does not make much sense as it not only does not distinguish between essential and accidental properties, but also between them and what may be called 'relational properties' which all are usually treated collectively as 'predicates' in traditional logic. Kant, strangely, has no 'real' relations under the category of 'relation' in his categorical scheme. 'Causality' and 'Reciprocity' are not judgemental relations, but are rather empirical in nature involving the notion of time which has already been treated as the form of inner sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Besides this, at least 'causality' involves the notion of 'necessity' which itself is a category under the heading of 'modality'. There is just no place in Kant's scheme for such simple relational statements as 'A is between B and C', a judgement which requires *three* substances to obtain and not one.

Prāśastapāda, interestingly, brings in the notion of 'causality' in the understanding of 'qualities', but does so in a strange manner. For him, a quality can be seen in a causal context as being the product of qualities similar or dissimilar to itself, and as giving rise to other properties which may be *samānā-jātiya* or *vi-jātiya*, as the case may be. The Sanskrit terms practically mean the same as 'similar' or 'dissimilar' though, strictly speaking, they mean belonging to the same *jāti*, that is class or genus or universal, as the case may be. This, however, is to see the qualities in a dynamic context where they are seen as 'arising' and

'giving rise to' and thus being essentially related to time, involving almost a Buddhist way of looking at reality, something that no one would have dreamt of associating with the Vaiśeṣika way of looking at things.

But Praśastapāda is not wedded to time or obsessed by it as the Buddhist seems to be. He is equally aware of the 'space-occupying' character of qualities and distinguishes them on this basis as those which belong to the 'object-as-a-whole' or belong only to one specific part of it. The term used is 'pradeśa-vṛttitva' and 'vyāpitvam'.

A similar categorization of qualities occurs in respect of their relationship to the qualities of the parts of which the whole is constituted. The quality of the 'whole' may be the same as the quality of the parts, or different from it. The nature of the relation between these two, however, is not clear but judging from the emphasis on 'causality' in the classification adopted, one may surmise that it may be so.

The classification or categorization of qualities given by Praśastapāda, thus, deserves a closer examination than has been given to it up till now. At times, it seems that the qualities actually enumerated under the category do not illuminate or clarify the nature of the category. Sometimes, the fact that some qualities are included under both the categories adds further to the confusion. But, in spite of these and other limitations, Praśastapāda's exercise challenges us to think about the problem anew, for it is only the qualities that we know, and to 'know' more about them would certainly be desirable from all points of view. But, then, qualities, will have to be ascribed 'qualities', a doctrine that is expressly rejected by Praśastapāda in his own definition of quality as *dravyāsrūpam*, *nirgunatvam*, *niṣkriyatvam*. How could this definition be sustained in face of the detailed characterization of qualities by him, which, *prima facie* involves a manifest inconsistency, is the question which scholars and votaries of this school have to address themselves to. Not only this, how could he ascribe *niṣkriyatvam* to them when so many of his characterizations are based on *kāranatvam*. Terms such as 'kriyāhetavaḥ', 'ārambhakartvam', 'samyogaja', 'karmaja', 'akāraṇa', 'kāraṇa', etc. are freely used in the characterization of qualities that are extensionally enumerated by him, adding to those that were given in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* without adducing any reasons why he is doing so.

And, strangely still, he adds even to these in his explication of the categories under which he wants to include them. Many of these seem to be complex properties compounded out of other properties, built for some reason or another for some purpose. Such are, for example, उष्ण and अनुष्ण (241, 244, 246), एकत्व, एकप्रथकत्व, द्वित्व, द्विप्रथकत्व सासिद्धिक द्रवत्व (243, 247, 249). But it will be more difficult to explain such formations as (231, 238) and सासिद्धिक द्रवत्व (230, 249) and almost impossible to do in case of तलम परिमाणोत्तर संयोग (238) and ज्ञान (241). The last that is *jñāna* may be said to raise no difficulty, but if it is remembered that it is *not* included amongst the original qualities mentioned by Praśastapāda, and that *buddhi* which is supposed to mean the same as *Jñāna*, is mentioned *separately* in these lists, then its independent mention in the discussion of qualities would be seen as justifiably raising a problem in the context of Vaiśeṣika thinking on the subject. But whatever may be the case for *jñāna* no one, I hope, will dispute that there *is* some problem about the bizzare property concocted by the author of the *Padārtha-dharmasamgrah* where he mentions *nīlaparimāṇottarasamyoga* as a property. And, who would deny that *all* these properties involve having *another* property in respect of a property?

It may be said that such a construal of what Praśastapāda has said depends on a total misunderstanding of his contention in this regard. He is not saying that qualities have these characteristics, but that they reside in *dravyas* or substances that have these characteristics. This is clearest in the case of *mūrta* and *amūrta* which as Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa's commentary makes amply evident characterize the *dravyas* and *not* the *guṇas* to which they are mistakenly thought to belong. It is not *rūpa*, *raśa*, *gandha* or *sparsa* which are *mūrta* but the substances or *dravyas* to which they belong.

The argument, or the explication, may be extended to all the other characterizations of qualities which Praśastapāda has discussed in his work. But, then, these will have to be treated as qualities, as *guṇas* of the *dravyas* and *added* to the list he has given. This, however, has not been done, as no list of the *guṇas* given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers includes them. Not only this, they are not *guṇas* in the usual sense.

They have some sort of a necessary dichotomous division between them. A *dravya* has to be either *mūrta* or *amūrta*. No *dravya* can be both, though a quality may belong either to one, or the other, or both.

These qualities, then, are radically different in nature from the others enumerated by him. They are categorical in nature, in that all *dravyas* shall have to belong to one of the dichotomous pairs mentioned by him in his discussion of the subject. They are also second-level qualities as the qualities mentioned by him have to belong to the *dravya* classified by him on this basis.

Understood in this way, Praśastapāda's classifications would be seen as providing ontological categories for the description of the qualities of the *dravyas* that are found in the world. But one problem would remain even then. He had defined *guṇas* not only as *nirgunatvam*, but as *niskriyatvam* and many of these categorical qualities have been defined in such a way that they impose a 'causal' activity or function on the first-level qualities he had already enumerated in his work. In fact, one of the basic distinctions in this respect is between those which do not need these activities and those which do, that is, those which are 'akāraṇa' and those which have *kāraṇatva* in them and, if so, they cannot be *niškriya* as defined by him. But even if someone attempts to save the definition by taking recourse to the same strategy as was adopted in the case of *mūrta* and *amūrta*, then one will have not only to add to the list of *karma* or activities originally enumerated in the system, but will have to treat them as typically different from them on the same ground, as given in the case of *guṇas* above.

There is, thus, a lot to challenge contemporary thinkers in the discussion of Praśastapāda on the subject. And, once one does so, one will find that many of the 'orthodox' positions ascribed to these thinkers need a radical revision in the light of their own work, i.e. the texts attributed to them. Besides this, they may also discover a lot of physics prevalent in those times and the problems it was raising for the thinkers of that age. The House of Vaiśeṣika needs to be opened once more and fresh air let in so that it may begin to house 'living thought' in it once again.

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The Sāṃkhya Argument for the Self and Some Related Issues

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III

We pass now to consider in greater detail one of the most thorny questions connected with the Sāṃkhya philosophy. This is the question of the real or imposed agenthood of the self whose twin interests, *bhoga* and *apavarga*, *prakṛti* seeks to promote through its creation, the manifest world. This issue has traditionally been sought to be solved in mainly two ways: (1) the 'single reflection' theory advocated by, chiefly, Vācaspati, and followed by others, and (2) the 'mutual reflection' theory proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu, who finds Vācaspati's solution unsatisfactory.

To take up Vācaspati first, we saw above in our consideration of SK 20 that however inscrutable the whole proposition stated therein may be, all commentators take the two-fold appearance it posits literally and seriously. In fact, Vācaspati goes to the length of attributing this illusion—the illusion that the (inactive) self (consciousness) is active and that the (non-conscious) *buddhi*, etc. are conscious—to the proximity of self and *buddhi* (*bhrāntibijam tatsamyogaḥ tatsannidhānam*). Consideration of the full implications of this comment of Vācaspati we shall postpone for the present. The immediate point to be noted is that instead of choosing the present and certainly more relevant occasion, Vācaspati prefers his gloss on Kārikā 5 to express his first ever statement of how he views the crucial agency problem and its resolution:

The *puruṣa* indeed is conscious and has no contact whatever with pleasure, knowledge, etc.; he, on account of being reflected (*pratibimbita*) in the *tattva* called *buddhi*, and so being identified